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From narrative competition to model confrontation: Cover

From narrative competition to model confrontation:

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Open Access
|Jun 2026

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/medok-2026-0004 | Journal eISSN: 2601-503X | Journal ISSN: 1842-2498
Language: English, Hungarian, Romanian
Page range: 59 - 80
Published on: Jun 30, 2026
Published by: Medea Association
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services

© 2026 Liu Qingtao, published by Medea Association
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.