Between Doctrine and Failure: The Political Dimension of Nato’s Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan (2001–2021)

NATO’s Comprehensive Approach (CA) was designed to integrate military, political, and developmental instruments into a coherent stabilization strategy. Afghanistan (2001–2021) constituted its most extensive operational test — and in the political domain, it failed systematically. Drawing on SIGAR thematic reports as primary empirical sources, this article investigates how CA principles were applied to political governance across three operational phases. The analysis identifies three structural dysfunctions: inter-agency coordination failure, a mismatch between the transplanted governance model and local realities, and the paradoxical effects of resource allocation on political legitimacy. The central argument is that political failure was structural, not incidental — corruption functioned as a constitutive mechanism of the Afghan state rather than a symptom of its dysfunction, and external assistance progressively severed the social contract between the Kabul government and its citizens. The August 2021 collapse is interpreted as the political culmination of these failures, not a tactical defeat. The article offers an empirically grounded contribution to CA scholarship with actionable insights for NATO’s future complex operations.