The main aspects of the NBRs in the CSM
| NBR | National | Private/NGO | Individual |
|---|---|---|---|
| Continuity of Government | Authorities as main actors
| NGOs and companies in auxiliary role and messengers
| Individuals as ‘active survivors’
|
| Resilient Energy Supplies | Authorities in supplementary role
| Private sector in leading role
| Individuals as ‘active survivors’
|
| Resilient Civil Communications Services |
| Private sector as service providers
| Individuals as ‘active actors’
|
| Resilient Food and Water Supplies | Authorities as observers and stock keepers
| Private sector as producers
| Individuals as ‘active survivors’
|
| Resilient Civilian Transportation Systems | Authorities as legislators and stock keepers
| Private sector as service providers
| Individuals in a minor or non-existent role
|
| Ability to Deal with Large-Scale Population Movements | Authorities as planners and service users
| Private sector as service providers
| Individuals in a minor or non-existent role
|
| Ability to Deal with Mass Casualties | Authorities as service providers and stock keepers
| Private sector as service providers and stock keepers
| Individuals as ‘active survivors’ and active participants in the NGOs
|
The vital functions in the security strategy for society (Government of Finland 2017)
| Vital function | Main objectives |
|---|---|
| (1) Leadership | Leadership ‘provides the basis for safeguarding all other functions’. It includes the requirements of effective leadership, for example: ‘clear lines of authority’, ‘a situation picture’, ‘crisis communications’, ‘continuity management’, and ‘cooperation’. (p. 15). |
| (2) International and EU activities | The vital function ‘[p]roviding a basis for international cooperation and participation in crisis prevention’ is deemed important in ‘safeguarding of other vital functions’ and includes fighting global threats such as ‘uncontrolled migration, pandemics, terrorism and international crime’. (p. 17). |
| (3) Defence capability | The main objective is to ‘establish deterrence against the use of military force against Finland’ and the preparedness needed for this is developed ‘as part of the concept for comprehensive security in a joint effort by the authorities, business operators, organisations and citizens’. (p. 18). |
| (4) Internal security | The vital function aims to ‘prevent and counter criminal activities […] prevent accidents, environmental damage and other similar incidents and threats. It also allows Finland to successfully manage the consequences of the above activities, threats and incidents’. (p. 19). |
| (5) Economy, infrastructure, and security of supply | The vital function safeguards ‘the funding and other resources for vital functions’. The objects to be safeguarded include Finnish and ‘international infrastructure’, organizations, constructs and ‘processes’ that are ‘essential for vital functions’. (p. 20). |
| (6) Functional capacity of the population and services | The vital function aims to maintain ‘key basic services’ to help ‘ensure independent living in all situations’. This includes ‘social welfare’ and medical services. (p. 22). |
| (7) Psychological resilience | The vital function means ‘the ability of individuals, communities, society and the nation to withstand the pressures arising from crisis situations and to recover from their impacts’. This includes ‘will to defend country’s independence’ and is strengthened among other things by high ‘trust in the authorities’ and preventing social divisions among citizens. (p. 22–23). |
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| NATO (2021b) Enhancing the Resilience of Allied Societies Through Civil Preparedness | Meyer-Minnemann (2016) Resilience and Alliance Security: The Warsaw Commitment to Enhance Resilience | |
| Continuity of Government | ‘An assured continuity of government and critical government services: for instance, the ability to make decisions, communicate them and enforce them in a crisis’ (p. 8) ‘Strengthen the democratic resilience of our societies’ (p. 17) | ‘Continuity of Government: maintaining at all times the ability to make decisions, communicate them, and enforce them, and to provide essential government services to the population.’ (p. 92) |
| Resilient Energy Supplies | ‘Resilient energy supplies: back-up plans and power grids’ (p. 8) | ‘Resilient energy supplies: ensuring that energy supply, including national power grids, are secure and that nations maintain the necessary prioritization arrangements and redundancy.’ (p. 92) |
| Resilient Civil Communications Services | ‘Resilient civil communications systems: ensuring that telecommunications and cyber networks function even under crisis conditions’ (p. 8) ‘reliable 5G network and efficient options to restore it if need be’ (p. 8) | ‘Resilient Civil Communications Services: ensuring that telecommunications and cyber networks remain functional even in demanding conditions and under attacks.’ (p. 93) |
| Resilient Food and Water Supply | ‘Resilient food and water resources: ensuring these supplies are safe from disruption or sabotage’ (p. 8) | ‘Resilient Food and Water Supply: ensuring sufficient supplies are available to both civilians and the military, and safe from disruption of sabotage.’ (p. 93) |
| Ability to Deal with Large-Scale Population Movements | ‘The ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people.’ (p. 8) | ‘Ability to Deal with Large Scale Population Movements and to be able to de-conflict such movements from potential national or Alliance military deployments and other requirements.’ (p. 93) |
| Ability to Deal with Mass Casualties | ‘The ability to deal with mass casualties: ensuring that civilian health systems can cope and that sufficient medical supplies are stocked and secure’ (p. 8) | ‘Ability to Deal with Mass Casualties: ensuring that health systems can cope even in very demanding situations when there might be simultaneous pressure on civilian and military health care capabilities.’ (p. 93) |
| Resilient Civilian Transportation Systems | ‘The functioning of transport systems: ensuring that NATO forces can move across Alliance territory rapidly and that civilian services can rely on transportation networks, even in a crisis’ (p. 8) | ‘Resilient Civilian Transportation Systems: ensuring that NATO forces can move across Alliance territory rapidly and that civilian transportation networks remain functional and effective to support civil and military requirements even when challenged or attacked.’ (p. 93) |
Coverage of Finnish Government level (G) and lower-level (L) documents of the NBRs
| NBR | Authorities | Private/NGO | Individual |
|---|---|---|---|
| Continuity of Government | G | G | L |
| Resilient Energy Supplies | G | G | L |
| Resilient Civil Communications Services | G | G | (G), L |
| Resilient Food and Water Supply | G | G | G, L |
| Ability to Deal with Large-Scale Population Movements | G | G | |
| Ability to Deal with Mass Casualties | G | G | L |
| Resilient Civilian Transportation Systems | G | G |