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Central Bank Independence and Inflation Under Asymmetric Information: Delegation vs. Seesaw Effects Cover

Central Bank Independence and Inflation Under Asymmetric Information: Delegation vs. Seesaw Effects

Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice
Volume 13 (2024): Issue 3 (September 2024)
By: Ceyhun Elgin and  Oğuz Öztunalı  
Open Access
|Sep 2024

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/jcbtp-2024-0029 | Journal eISSN: 2336-9205
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Language: English
Page range: 245 - 270
Submitted on: Nov 30, 2023
Accepted on: Jan 25, 2024
Published on: Sep 19, 2024
Published by: Central Bank of Montenegro
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 3 issues per year
Keywords:
Central Bank Independence,
Inflation,
Asymmetric Information,
Fiscal Policy
Related subjects:
Business and economics,
Business management,
Business management, other

© 2024 Ceyhun Elgin, Oğuz Öztunalı, published by Central Bank of Montenegro
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

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