Central Bank Independence and Inflation Under Asymmetric Information: Delegation vs. Seesaw Effects
By: Ceyhun Elgin and Oğuz Öztunalı
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/jcbtp-2024-0029 | Journal eISSN: 2336-9205
Language: English
Page range: 245 - 270
Submitted on: Nov 30, 2023
Accepted on: Jan 25, 2024
Published on: Sep 19, 2024
Published by: Central Bank of Montenegro
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 3 issues per year
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© 2024 Ceyhun Elgin, Oğuz Öztunalı, published by Central Bank of Montenegro
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.