Figure 1

Figure 2

The Effects of an SPP in Example 1_
| θH |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.30 | 1.2 | 0.200 | 0.213 | 0.0025 | 0.0026 | 1.12524 | 1.12521 |
| 0.35 | 1.4 | 0.258 | 0.328 | 0.0066 | 0.0078 | 1.12658 | 1.12670 |
| 0.40 | 1.6 | 0.264 | 0.392 | 0.0099 | 0.0131 | 1.1285 | 1.12971 |
| 0.45 | 1.8 | 0.257 | 0.438 | 0.0125 | 0.0180 | 1.13055 | 1.13402 |
| 0.50 | 2.0 | 0.246 | 0.478 | 0.0145 | 0.0227 | 1.13258 | 1.13959 |
| 0.55 | 2.2 | 0.235 | 0.517 | 0.0161 | 0.0272 | 1.13453 | 1.14644 |
| 0.60 | 2.4 | 0.225 | 0.557 | 0.0174 | 0.0316 | 1.13638 | 1.15467 |
| 0.65 | 2.6 | 0.215 | 0.599 | 0.0185 | 0.0361 | 1.13813 | 1.16437 |
| 0.70 | 2.8 | 0.206 | 0.644 | 0.0194 | 0.0406 | 1.13978 | 1.17565 |
| 0.75 | 3.0 | 0.198 | 0.692 | 0.0202 | 0.0453 | 1.14134 | 1.18858 |
| 0.80 | 3.2 | 0.190 | 0.743 | 0.0209 | 0.0502 | 1.14281 | 1.20322 |
Optimal Payments in the Setting of Example 1_
| θH = 0.3 | θH = 0.4 | θH = 0.5 | θH = 0.6 | θH = 0.7 | θH = 0.8 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
| − 0.113 | − 0.085 | − 0.071 | − 0.063 | − 0.058 | − 0.054 |
|
| 0.839 | 0.738 | 0.683 | 0.648 | 0.623 | 0.605 |
| ΔL | 0.952 | 0.823 | 0.754 | 0.711 | 0.681 | 0.659 |
|
| − 0.127 | − 0.149 | − 0.179 | − 0.212 | − 0.246 | − 0.280 |
|
| 0.873 | 0.851 | 0.821 | 0.788 | 0.754 | 0.720 |
| ΔH | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
|
| − 0.115 | − 0.088 | − 0.071 | − 0.060 | − 0.053 | − 0.048 |
|
| 0.845 | 0.752 | 0.684 | 0.635 | 0.598 | 0.570 |
| Δ | 0.961 | 0.840 | 0.756 | 0.695 | 0.651 | 0.617 |
The Minimum θHθL \frac{{{\theta _H}}}{{{\theta _L}}} that Ensures Pareto Gains in Example 2_
| k |
| k |
| k |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.10 | 1.34 | 0.25 | 1.56 | 1.0 | 2.18 |
| 0.15 | 1.44 | 0.50 | 1.88 | 2.0 | 2.72 |
| 0.20 | 1.52 | 0.75 | 2.00 | 5.0 | 3.68 |