Freedom of Will as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability: Humans and Artificial Intelligence in a Czech Criminal Law Perspective

Jaroslav Fenyk

doi:10.2478/in-2026-0001

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Freedom of Will as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability: Humans and Artificial Intelligence in a Czech Criminal Law Perspective

Ius Novum

Volume 20 (2026): Issue 1 (March 2026)

By: Jaroslav Fenyk

Open Access

|Apr 2026

Abstract

The paper analyses the form and place of human will in the foundations of criminal liability. It explains the necessity of will for the traditional criminal liability of natural persons and presents a comparison with the possible criminal liability of autonomous and non-autonomous systems equipped with artificial intelligence. The conclusions of the paper are negative with regard to the possible direct liability of such systems. A solution is proposed in the form of criminal liability for persons who create, control and monitor autonomous and non-autonomous systems.

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Articles in this issue

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/in-2026-0001 | Journal eISSN: 2545-0271

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Language: English

Page range: 1 - 24

Published on: Apr 30, 2026

Published by: Lazarski University

In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services

Publication frequency: 4 issues per year

Keywords:

will,

artificial intelligence,

algorithm,

autonomous and non-autonomous systems,

Related subjects:

Law,

Commercial law,

Commercial law, other,

Law of civil procedure, voluntary jurisdiction,

Law of civil procedure, voluntary jurisdiction, other,

© 2026 published by Lazarski University
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

Volume 20 (2026): Issue 1 (March 2026)