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Corportate Diversification and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the Moderating Effect of Stock Ownership Cover

Corportate Diversification and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the Moderating Effect of Stock Ownership

Open Access
|Dec 2019

References

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Language: English
Page range: 83 - 92
Submitted on: Jul 1, 2019
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Accepted on: Dec 12, 2019
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Published on: Dec 31, 2019
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 issues per year

© 2019 Hwei Cheng Wang, Yung-I Lou, Chiulien C. Venezia, Nicole A. Buzzetto-Hollywood, published by University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszow
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.