The Principle of Non-Self-Incrimination: A Comparative Analysis of ECtHR Standards and Judicial Practice in Albania

The principle of non-self-incrimination, nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare (no one is obliged to accuse oneself), constitutes one of the fundamental guarantees of due process and the right of defence in criminal proceedings. This principle protects individuals from any form of compulsion to contribute to establishing their own guilt and places important limits on the powers of state authorities in the collection and use of evidence in criminal proceedings. The principle of non-self-incrimination performs several fundamental functions. First, it safeguards respect for human dignity and individual autonomy. Second, it reinforces the presumption of innocence by ensuring that the burden of proving the charges rests with the prosecution. Third, it reduces the risk of coercion and abuse by state authorities during criminal investigations. In the absence of this guarantee, criminal proceedings would risk becoming a mechanism in which the accused is transformed from a subject exercising the rights of the defence into an instrument of their own prosecution. This paper analyses the historical origins, normative foundations, interpretation, and practical application of the principle of non-self-incrimination in light of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Constitutional Court of Albania. Particular attention is devoted to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, especially Saunders v. the United Kingdom, John Murray v. the United Kingdom, and Brusco v. France, as well as to relevant decisions of the Constitutional Court of Albania. Through legal and jurisprudential analysis, the paper argues that the privilege against self-incrimination is closely connected to the presumption of innocence, the right to remain silent, and the broader right to a fair trial. The study concludes that effective observance of this principle is a necessary condition for the legitimacy and fairness of criminal proceedings and, more broadly, for the effective functioning of the rule of law.