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The First-Person Plural and Immunity to Error

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Open Access
|Jan 2019

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2018-0010 | Journal eISSN: 2182-2875 | Journal ISSN: 0873-626X
Language: English, Portuguese
Page range: 141 - 167
Submitted on: Jul 2, 2018
Accepted on: Oct 24, 2018
Published on: Jan 3, 2019
Published by: University of Lisbon
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 times per year

© 2019 Joel Smith, published by University of Lisbon
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.