The First-Person Plural and Immunity to Error

Joel Smith

doi:10.2478/disp-2018-0010

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The First-Person Plural and Immunity to Error

Disputatio

Volume 10 (2018): Issue 49 (November 2018)

By: Joel Smith

Open Access

|Jan 2019

Abstract

I argue for the view that some we-thoughts are immune to error through misidentification (IEM) relative to the first-person plural pronoun. To prepare the ground for this argument I defend an account of the semantics of ‘we’ and note the variety of different uses of that term. I go on to defend the IEM of a certain range of we-thoughts against a number of objections.

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