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Of counterfeits and delusions: Revisiting Ryle on skepticism and the impossibility of global deceit Cover

Of counterfeits and delusions: Revisiting Ryle on skepticism and the impossibility of global deceit

Open Access
|Dec 2018

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2004-0010 | Journal eISSN: 2182-2875 | Journal ISSN: 0873-626X
Language: English, Portuguese
Page range: 42 - 64
Published on: Dec 31, 2018
Published by: University of Lisbon
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 issues per year

© 2018 Douglas McDermid, published by University of Lisbon
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