Of counterfeits and delusions: Revisiting Ryle on skepticism and the impossibility of global deceit

Douglas McDermid

doi:10.2478/disp-2004-0010

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Of counterfeits and delusions: Revisiting Ryle on skepticism and the impossibility of global deceit

Disputatio

Volume 1 (2004): Issue 17 (November 2004)

By: Douglas McDermid

Open Access

|Dec 2018

Abstract

Consider the following proposition: (Q) It is possible that all of our perceptual experiences are ‘delusive.’ According to Gilbert Ryle, (Q) is demonstrably absurd. In this paper I address four questions: (1) What is Ryle’s argument against (Q)?; (2) How persuasive is it?; (3) What positions are ruled out if (Q) is absurd?; and (4) How does Ryle’s position compare with contemporary work on skepticism?

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