Thomas-Durell Young and Jarosław Gryz are the editors of a scholarly volume on the Russo-Ukrainian War comprising, in addition to the introduction and conclusion, twelve chapters.
In the introduction of the monograph the editors state that the objective of the volume is to identify potentially relevant lessons for Western defence officials and military planners, enabling them to prepare for various scenarios that could emerge from the Russo-Ukrainian War. As they explain, much of the volume focuses on how Ukraine, initially relying largely on its own resources and subsequently receiving support from Western countries, succeeded in mobilising civil society and adopting innovative approaches to confronting the considerably larger Russian military.
Among the important observations presented in the volume is the editors’ finding that, despite the use of new technologies, many older forms and methods of warfare remain highly relevant on this particular battlefield. At the same time, new technologies make an important contribution to continuous and highly accurate real-time situational awareness, which in turn affects strategic planning.
Krisztián Jójárt, in The Russo–Ukraine War: How Russian Military Theory Presaged Future Wars, observes that the Kremlin's strategy for the so-called special military operation in Ukraine anticipated the use of new trends in warfare developed over the preceding decade and described as a “new type of war”. This approach was centred on a hybrid form of warfare involving only a limited use of conventional military operations. While such a strategy and approach to warfare proved successful in Crimea and, to some extent, in Syria, it was considerably less successful in Ukraine.
In OSINT Chronicles: Analysing Frontline Dynamics, Equipment Losses, and Casualties in the First 500 Days of the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine, written by Zsolt Lazar, analyses the role of open-source intelligence (OSINT) on the battlefield and its importance for intelligence professionals, analysts, strategists and planners. The author notes that, despite the dynamic pace of the conflict and the use of the latest technologies, the Russian approach to warfare continues to display features of a military mindset associated with the Second World War.
In the conclusion of the chapter Battlefield Communications in the Russo–Ukraine War: The First Six Months, Glen Grant summarises some of the most important lessons observed in the field of battlefield communications. Some of these may appear straightforward, yet they are essential to the most basic and critical functions on the battlefield.
Anthony King, in The Russo–Ukraine War and the Urban Battle, emphasises that urban operations in Ukraine have not developed in the way that might have been expected given the increased use of modern technology and advanced weapons systems. Instead, they have largely taken the form of slow, grinding and highly destructive urban warfare.
In Operational Fires: Lessons Observed, Zhirayr Amirkhanyan examines the role and use of operational fires in the conflict. He highlights the extensive Russian use of artillery, while at the same time emphasising Ukraine's remarkable adaptability and innovation in this domain. In particular, Ukrainian forces have demonstrated an ability to integrate precision fires, unmanned aerial vehicles and technological solutions into their operations. In the author's view, these experiences are likely to have an important influence on the principles and conduct of future warfare.
Christian F. Anrig, in Ukraine's Air War in Context, observes that the war in Ukraine has witnessed the return of certain concepts of air warfare that many experts had considered long obsolete or, as the author puts it, effectively dead. These include linear and attritional warfare. It is precisely this paradigm shift that has had an important impact on innovation in the conduct of air warfare.
The maritime dimension of the conflict is examined by Piotr Mickiewicz and Daniel D. Kasprzycki in The Black Sea as an Area of Military Operations during the Russian “Special Operation”. The authors draw attention to the importance of so-called soft factors, including military exercises, learning from practical experience and equipment failures, communications, the organisation of duty systems and, crucially, the availability of sufficient spare parts and qualified personnel.
In In the Classroom of Cyber-War: Lessons Observed from the Cyber-Kinetic Nexus, Roman Kolodii systematically identifies five lessons observed from the Russo-Ukrainian War. These lessons are relevant to a broad readership, while specialists in cyber warfare should consider them an important source of practical experience to complement their professional work.
The next chapter Logistics Lessons Observed: A Critical Enabler and Vulnerability, written by Ronald Ti, discusses lessons observed in the field of logistics in Ukraine while also comparing Ukrainian experience with the organisation of logistics within NATO. The author identifies measures that NATO should consider adopting in the field of logistics, with particular emphasis on medical support.
In Ukrainian Cultural Heritage in the Russian–Ukrainian War: Ukrainian Theatre—A Case Study, Ilona Urych, Anna Korzeniowska-Bihun, Robert Boroch and Tadeusz Szczurek stress the importance of Ukrainian cultural heritage to Ukrainians throughout their history and particularly during the Russo-Ukrainian War. Cultural heritage has frequently been damaged or destroyed during the conflict, with significant moral, ethical and identity-related consequences for Ukrainians.
In Lessons Observed from Critical Energy Infrastructure: Its Role in the Russian– Ukrainian War, Jarosław Gryz, Andrzej Soboń, Dariusz Majchrzak, Krzysztof Król and Andrzej Wilk emphasise the importance of protecting critical infrastructure during armed conflict and war. The specific cases examined in Ukraine demonstrate the importance of safeguarding this sector, with particular attention devoted to nuclear power plants.
Marlena Zadorożna, in Lessons Observed: Countering Information Warfare, draws attention to the steps and approaches required to counter information warfare. Russia has been developing its capabilities in this domain for a considerable period and continuously refines them through activities conducted in different countries and environments. Its highly assertive approach in the information domain requires an appropriate response from other states and, in particular, from Ukraine.
In the concluding chapter, the two editors present Preliminary Insights for NATO Defence Officials and Planners, bringing together the principal observations of the volume and considering their relevance for NATO defence officials and military planners.
Modern technology enables us to access information about developments in Ukraine at any time and from virtually anywhere. Yet, despite the abundance of available data, interpretations of the dynamics, dimensions, and wider implications of this war are far from self-evident or necessarily reliable, and they are not always grounded in professional expertise. This is precisely what makes this monograph particularly valuable: its chapters have been written by experts in their respective fields.
The war in Ukraine offers many new lessons, and it is essential that we learn from them. Perhaps the most important lesson is that this battlefield should never have existed in the first place. The reasons for seeking political solutions are therefore becoming ever more compelling, while concrete ideas for achieving peace appear to be increasingly scarce.
This volume is therefore highly recommended for scholars, military professionals, defence planners, policy-makers, and political decision-makers seeking to better understand the evolving character of contemporary warfare and the lessons emerging from the Russo-Ukrainian War.