Sino-Russian Military Integration since the Collapse of the Soviet Union

Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the global balance of power and the bipolar world which had emerged after the end of World War II. During this period, Russia sought to strengthen its political, economic, and other ties, primarily with Europe, but also with the US. In the 1990s, we can even see the beginnings of military cooperation between Russia and the West. Within the framework of a rules-based world order, the US, as the only remaining superpower, has taken the lead in shaping international relations.

However, events following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the expansion of Western political, economic, and security structures – particularly NATO and the EU – have increasingly caused unease in both Moscow and Beijing. The US has used its dominant position in the world to consolidate its global role, which Russia and China have understood as a restriction of their political and economic influence, and as a selective application of the principles of world order, which should be based on international law and the sovereignty of states. A Sino-Russian alignment 1 has consequently developed primarily as a response to the hegemony of the US (and its allies), which both countries perceive as a threat. This is mainly because they wish to maintain the immutability of the existing world order. Part of their response to maintaining the status quo is military cooperation.

This study uses a simple methodological approach based on diplomatic history and the analysis of Sino-Russian relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The development of military cooperation between China and Russia is examined through the process-tracing method, as military cooperation often serves as a key indicator of the level and quality of political relations. To capture this evolution, the analysis is divided into three distinct time periods:

1. From the collapse of the Soviet Union (26 December 1991) to Vladimir Putin's presidential victory (26 March 2000);

2. From Putin's election to the start of the war in Ukraine (24 February 2022);

3. From the outbreak of the war in Ukraine to the present.

To highlight a comparable historical example: “One of the reasons for Rome's lasting hegemony in the ancient world was that its various opponents found it difficult to coordinate effective opposition against it” (Luttwak, 1976, p 192). Washington's military advantage over Beijing is rapidly diminishing, and US military experts estimate that China will surpass the US in military capabilities within the next few years.

Although Chinese experts have not viewed Russia as a security threat since the end of the Cold War, some occasionally express caution. Sagild and Hsiung highlight the ‘warnings’ of former defence attaché Wang Haiyun at the Chinese Embassy in Moscow that “Russia, as China's largest neighbour with a strong strategic culture of expansionism, could once again threaten China's security, even if it did not have the same power as the USSR during the Cold War” and the assessments of Chinese experts after Russia's annexation of Crimea (in 2014), which, in their opinion, is “objective proof that Russia can now prevent any actions by other major powers and effectively project its military power into neighbouring and more distant regions in order to protect its interests”. We can add their (updated) statements, in the light of the current war in Ukraine, about “Putin's misjudgements regarding Russian military power and the (in)ability to mobilize the population” (Sagild and Hsiung, 2024, p 9).

According to Pillsbury 2 , Chinese analysts in the 1990s showed sympathy for Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union and predicted the possibility of a future strategic partnership. They predicted that Russia would return to being one of the five greatest powers. Even then, the (nationalist) Chinese author He Xin suggested that »China must enter into a long-term strategic partnership with Russia in order to counterbalance the rise of militaristic Japan (and not the US)«. He also quoted one of the traditional older analysts, who said that »Russia must rely on China because the US (and Japan) view Russia as a potential force that could reduce their influence in the Asia-Pacific region, while Japan has territorial disputes with Russia« and that »Sino-Russian cooperation can largely counterbalance American and Japanese forces and maintain the balance of power in Asia«. He quoted one Chinese military analyst as saying that »Russia will use its military innovations to maintain its military superiority over the (leading) US position in this area« (Pillsbury, 1999, p 319).

Škerbinc emphasized that »well-known global political, economic, and military trends predict a transfer of power from the West to the East«. According to him, it is probably no coincidence that the great idol of the current Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, is Yevgeny Primakov, whose ‘Primakov Doctrine’ 3 paved the way for modern Russian foreign policy in the mid-1990s (Škerbinc, 2023, p 6). This doctrine challenged the outdated and anachronistic Western perspective, or even exploited it. Primakov recognized the inherent logic of Kissinger's »triangular diplomacy«, reversed its premise, and turned potential adversaries into strategic partners. Or, as Sergey Lavrov said: »In the mid-1990s, when everybody viewed the future of the world as ‘the end of history’, he (Yevgeny Primakov) put forth the revolutionary concept of multipolarity. I would like to note that Yevgeny Primakov not only did that in his theoretical writings but also translated it into practice by proposing the idea of the group of three – Russia, India and China (RIC) /.../« (Lavrov, 2022). Primakov had already understood, justified, and established a kind of strategy for breaking through the paradigm that originated in Kissinger's triangular diplomacy from the post-Vietnam War era. Škerbinc pointed out its false assumptions, when the West (wrongly) perceived China as a non-interventionist country isolated behind the ‘China Wall’, and assumed »complete incompatibility between China and the Soviet Union«. He noted that many found it difficult to understand these dynamics at the time, and many still find it difficult to understand how Russia, with the support of China and other supporting countries, is waging a broader conflict against the West, not just a war against Ukraine. Škerbinc therefore proposes an in-depth understanding of strategic competition, which can provide valuable insight into complex geopolitical developments. Despite the enthusiasm for multipolarity, even among ‘important’ parts of the Western political elite, there is a danger of misinterpreting its consequences, similar to the misunderstandings which occurred in relation to the Gerasimov and Primakov doctrines (Škerbinc, 2025, pp 89–90).

Some experts doubt the depth of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership and argue that the reason for their coordination is more a shared rivalry with the US than a natural affinity (Fong & Maizland, 2024). Regardless of Chinese assessments of the (non)threat and military (in)competence of the Russian army, Sino-Russian military cooperation has gradually developed over more than three decades. Let us begin by listing the (formal) names given to Sino-Russian relations since the end of the Cold War, which undoubtedly reflect the trend towards their deepening. In the early 1990s, their relationship was defined as »good neighbourliness«, then in 1994 as a »constructive partnership«, which progressed to a »strategic partnership« in 1996, upgraded to a »comprehensive strategic partnership« in 2001, in 2012 to a »comprehensive strategic partnership and coordination«, and finally to a »comprehensive strategic partnership of equality, mutual trust, mutual support, shared prosperity, and long-lasting friendship« (Korolev, 2020, p 769).

Korolev pointed out that his methodological approach can only provide a rough estimate of the degree of military cooperation or alliance. The ultimate goal should be to develop a comprehensive index based on a more accurate measurement of the individual dimensions of cooperation within each category (Korolev, 2020, p 769).

In this article, we therefore seek to identify key indicators of Sino-Russian military cooperation, and assign them relative analytical weight, thereby providing a better understanding of the development and intensity of these relations over different periods of time.

Based on the analysis and overview of Sino-Russian military cooperation, political (and military) decision-makers can make decisions which will pursue the desired goals. The result of this article is an in-depth understanding of Sino-Russian military cooperation, including the identification of the most important milestones which were crucial for its development. It may further contribute to evaluating whether this cooperation is evolving towards the formation of a long-term strategic alliance grounded in the overarching interests of both states, or whether it represents a form of short-term pragmatic engagement primarily motivated by the pursuit of immediate gains.

The study of Sino-Russian military cooperation thus provides a better understanding of the current competition between the great powers, the causes of (the latest) Russian aggression in Ukraine, and the identification of ways to end it. It also allows for a better understanding of the polarisation of the European political environment in the context of a ‘Cold War 2.0’.

The main constraint is the limited availability of specialist literature by Russian and Chinese authors. The analysis was based solely on publicly available data and literature; unfortunately, it does not include documentation from diplomatic, intelligence, or military Sino-Russian circles, which would undoubtedly provide a better picture of the nature of this relationship.

1. RUSSIA-CHINA MILITARY COOPERATION, 1991–2000

The 1990s were marked by upheavals in both countries. China's concern that Russia and its (first post-Soviet) leader Yeltsin would “turn toward the West” was short-lived. Radin (and other co-authors) concluded that Yeltsin had already “effectively aligned himself with China” (Radin et al., 2021, p 57).

As early as December 1991, the two countries had signed minutes of an intergovernmental meeting and transferred bilateral relations between China and the USSR to relations between China and Russia. The minutes confirmed China's support for Russia's succession to the USSR's status under international law, and emphasized the continued validity of the principles governing their relations, as set out in two joint communiqués signed by the two heads of state (in 1989 and 1991, respectively), including the ‘One China’ position (Guan, 2022, p 23).

Lo commented that »progress in Sino-Russian relations seemed flawless in addressing key bilateral and international issues«. However, he pointed out that »there were unresolved issues from the past beneath the surface«, primarily the demarcation of the common border, Chinese illegal migration, Russia's perception of the »Chinese threat«, differences in political and business culture, and above all their (priority) focus on strengthening relations with the West at the expense of strengthening bilateral relations (Lo, 2008, p 31). However, the »reality of the competitive international environment« soon knocked on the door, prompting (among other things) the strengthening of military cooperation between China and Russia.

This was followed by Russia's »return to geopolitics« due to the belief that international politics is competitive by nature. Although the international community was no longer formally bipolar after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow retained a bipolar mindset, i.e. that on one side there was the US (and its NATO allies) and on the other the main (non-Western) centres of power: Russia, China, India, and the Islamic world. In these circumstances, China was (primarily) assigned the role of »balancing force« (Lo, 2008, p 33).

In this light, we can understand Putin, then acting president, when he stated in his 1999 article entitled “Russia at the Turn of the Millennium” that »Russia was and will remain a great power. It is preconditioned by the inseparable characteristics of its geopolitical, economic and cultural existence. They determined the mentality of Russians and the policy of the government throughout the history of Russia and they cannot but do so at present. But Russian mentality should be expanded by new ideas. In the present world the might of a country as a great power is manifested more in its ability to be the leader in creating and using advanced technologies, ensuring a high level of people's wellbeing, reliably protecting its security and upholding its national interests in the international arena, than in its military strength« (Putin, 1999).

The initial starting point for strengthening Sino-Russian military cooperation in the 1990s was confidence-building mechanisms aimed at resolving border disputes and reducing military forces along the 4,300 km long common border. Military consultations were also held in parallel 4 , officially beginning with a visit by the then Chinese Minister Qin Jiwei to Moscow in 1992. These were (formally) upgraded during his return visit a year later with the conclusion of the Military Cooperation Agreement between the Ministries of Defence of China and Russia, which established the formal basis for bilateral military cooperation. The first frameworks for regular consultations established were the »regular (annual) meetings of the two defence ministers« (established in 1993) and the »(annual) strategic consultations of the chiefs of general staff« (established in 1997) (Korolev, 2020, p 771).

The first instances of Sino-Russian military-technical exchanges can be traced back to the early 1990s. These were »questionable practices« whose impact on bilateral relations is difficult to assess. One such example is the exchange of a Russian Tupolev Tu-154 civilian jet aircraft for two freight cars of Chinese cucumbers. The first attempt to regulate military-technical cooperation was the Agreement on Military-Technical Cooperation, which enabled the establishment of a »joint intergovernmental commission for military-technical exchange« in 1992. This provided a (formal) platform for agreements on the sale of (Russian) weapons to China (Korolev, 2020, pp 773–774).

2. RUSSIA-CHINA MILITARY COOPERATION, 2000–2022

High-level Sino-Russian military consultations only developed after 2000, when the two countries demilitarized their common border and resolved border issues. The successful resolution of the border issue raised mutual trust to an incomparably higher level. While the measures outlined were aimed at reducing (or preventing) the risk of renewed escalation of violence on the border, further steps were aimed at establishing a multi-level institutionalized structure of mutual connections which would ensure the (regular) exchange of information.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation played a key role in institutionalising regular military consultations within the framework of its members’ annual summits. An important upgrade was the mechanism of Russia-China Consultations on National Security Issues, established in 2004, which China has exclusively with Russia. The consultations, focused on the national interests of both countries, have been held four times a year since 2009. An additional platform is the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue, which focuses on regional security issues. The frequency of meetings is adjusted according to the current situation in the international community (Korolev, 2020, p 771–773).

Under Putin, Russian arms export agencies and supervisory institutions underwent a comprehensive overhaul, enabling more advanced forms of military-technical cooperation with third countries (including China). As a result, technology transfers and joint ventures accounted for 30% of total transfers and sales of Russian military equipment to China by the mid-2000s (Barrios & Bowen, 2023). The Agreement on Intellectual Property in Military-Technical Cooperation, signed in 2008, dispelled concerns about (Chinese) theft of (Russian) intellectual property in weapons systems and facilitated the export of more advanced weapons and technologies to China. Since then, cooperation has moved to a high level, and the number of joint long-term and medium-term projects has been steadily increasing (Korolev, 2020, p 774–775).

Russia's tendency to establish relations with China as an indispensable partner in military-technical cooperation has intensified since the (first) Ukrainian crisis, mainly as a result of deteriorating relations (and cooperation) with Western countries. According to Korolev, this cooperation has become a »mutual two-way flow«, with Russia »already past the point of no return and unwilling to heed Western provocations regarding the threat that China allegedly poses to it« (Korolev, 2020, p 776). The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, said as far back as 2014 that in Sino-Russian cooperation »we can now even talk about an emerging technological alliance between the two countries« (Lavrov, 2014).

During this period, both China and Russia shared a common criticism and condemnation of US policies around the world, which they perceived as increasingly threatening. This was accompanied by expressions of intent to prevent them. It should be noted that in official contacts with third countries, neither country has ever referred to the other as a threat. On the contrary, the description of their relationship is constantly being upgraded.

In January 2017, China defined Russia as a »diplomatic priority« in its White Paper on Asia Pacific Security Cooperation. In December 2017, the Chinese Ambassador to Russia, Li Hui, stated that »the comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination between China and Russia occupies a special position in the major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics and is an important manifestation of practicing Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era« (Sinkkonen, 2018, p 3). In 2019, Putin and Xi announced their intention to develop a »comprehensive strategic coordination partnership for a new era«, expressing a »high level of political trust« and »all-round cooperation« (Barrios in Bowen, 2023). Sinkkonnen believed that »after the start of the Ukraine crisis in 2014 followed by Western economic sanctions against Russia, Sino-Russian strategic interests became more congruent«, as evidenced by political cooperation on key issues of global politics (Sinkkonen, 2018, p 4). This was also reflected in the area of military cooperation.

With regard to the exchange of military personnel, which took place in parallel with the development of military-technical cooperation, »short-term technical training visits« were upgraded to »long-term military education programs«. Russia was the first foreign destination for the military education of officers of the People's Liberation Army of China. Korolev pointed out that »we do not have statistical data on their number because they are secret, but existing (open) sources indicate a significant increase« (Korolev, 2020, p 776).

The first exercise took place in August 2005, under the name ‘Peace Mission’, on the Chinese peninsula of Shandong and in Vladivostok, Russia, with the participation of 10,000 soldiers and officers (8,000 Chinese and 2,000 Russians). The reason for its implementation was the fight against terrorism. Such ‘peace’ exercises have become a regular practice, held every one or two years. Some are also conducted within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and include strategies and tactics for preventing »colour revolutions« and curbing political unrest in Central Asia. In 2021, another type of (regular) joint military exercise was added, called ‘Joint Sea’, which takes place every year. It is worth highlighting the one from 2015, a year after the (first) Ukrainian crisis, which took place in the Mediterranean Sea. Both the land and sea versions allow the two countries to conduct extensive military exercises together, involving a large number of personnel and significant amounts of technical equipment (TASS Russian News Agency, 2007). Korolev also mentioned a new version of joint military exercises launched in 2016 under the name ‘Airspace Security 2016’, which marks the beginning of Sino-Russian computer-simulated missile defence exercises with the aim of »joint planning of combat operations in the organization of missile defence, operations, and mutual fire support, as well as responding to sporadic and incendiary attacks with ballistic and manoeuvrable missiles over the territory of both countries«. He believes that despite their denial that they are not directed against »third countries«, they point to the conclusion that this is a Sino-Russian response to the US global defence system (and the strengthening of their military interoperability). Finally, Korolev mentioned »joint regular exercises of internal security forces«, which include the Russian National Guard and Chinese police units. If we add up all the activities outlined, this means that we have between six and seven joint military exercises per year (Korolev, 2020, pp 777–779).

Sino-Russian military cooperation is important as it includes military exchanges and joint exercises, as well as the sharing of intelligence and the joint development of weapons systems. In November 2021, they signed a military cooperation plan for the period 2021–2025, which guides cooperation in this area (Barrios & Bowen, 2023).

3. RUSSIA-CHINA MILITARY COOPERATION SINCE THE 2022 UKRAINE INVASION

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has placed China in an uncomfortable position. Beijing has not (publicly) pledged military assistance to Russia (even though Russia is said to have requested it), as this would violate its long-standing policy of noninterference. It is well aware that this would trigger opposition from the »democratic camp« led by the US and the EU. Fong and Maizland pointed out that Xi is even said to have personally warned Putin during his state visit to Moscow (in March 2023) not to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine (Fong & Maizland, 2024).

Medeiros says that »Russia's aggression against Ukraine has created a diplomatic trilemma for China, which must balance three conflicting interests«: a) its alliance with Russia, b) respect for the fundamental principles of its foreign policy, and c) the need for stability in its relations with the US and European countries (EU). It has therefore resorted to a policy he calls »strategic stretching«, which attempts to balance the conflicting interests outlined above, creating in practice a gap between »strong rhetorical, informational and diplomatic support for Russia« and »caution in providing significant material (military) support«. It believes that this will be difficult because these needs will only increase as the war progresses. While China's efforts in its relations with the US and the EU have been less successful, it is now seeking its strategic advantage in the countries of the global South, which are also facing the negative economic consequences of the war in Ukraine, and in ‘traditional’ multilateral institutions, such as the UN, where these countries have a voice (Medeiros, 2022, pp 2–11). Even before Russia's aggression in Ukraine, Kydd warned that »the rise of China could lead to a shift in the balance of power, with Russia perceiving China as a greater threat than the US«, and in this regard he addressed the questions: »Will Russia switch sides? If so, when?« (Kydd, 2020, p 858).

China's desire to form a (military) alliance with Moscow will depend on the nature of its rivalry with the US (Bekkevold, 2022, p 50). In the current war situation which Russia finds itself in, it still recognizes the US (alongside EU countries) as the most significant threat. This may change with US President Trump (although there are no signs of this at the time of writing). For China, the American threat is reflected in the form of the danger of a ‘preventive war’. Russian aggression in Ukraine has therefore not had a (significant) impact on bilateral relations between the two countries. Military cooperation and joint military exercises show no signs of decline at the time of writing.

Continuing military cooperation since the start of the war in Ukraine has “great symbolic value” for Russia, as it seeks to neutralize the impression of international isolation. In July 2023, the two countries conducted their largest joint naval and air exercise in the waters separating Japan from Russia (Sagild & Hsiung, 2024, p 9). Current developments even point to further strengthening of Sino-Russian military cooperation (and the closest circle of like-minded countries). In July 2024, members of the Chinese People's Liberation Army participated in military exercises with Belarusian soldiers in Belarus. This was the first time that Chinese soldiers had been deployed on NATO's (European) borders. In the same month, the Russian and Chinese air forces used strategic bombers in joint military exercises near Alaska, prompting the US and Canada to send their fighter jets there in response. China also did not attend the July (2024) Peace Summit in Ukraine, justifying its absence by Russia's non-participation, and instead, together with Brazil, presented a six-point peace plan which did not mention Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity but (only) called for a freeze on the conflict in accordance with guidelines which would allow Russia to retain the occupied territory (Fix & Crebo-Rediker, 2024).

While China was the main buyer of Russian military equipment in the early 2000s, this is no longer the case. The highest sales volume was achieved in 2005, when it exceeded 3 billion TIV 5 . This was followed by a downward trend, which reached its lowest point in 2014, when it amounted to only 516 TIV. The reason for the decline in Russian sales was China's reduced dependence on imports due to licensed (domestic) production and the development of its own products, some of which were based on Russian models (also linked to the issue of intellectual property theft, as also pointed out by the Russian state corporation Rostec at the end of 2019). Russia's ‘restraint’ in selling the most modern weapon systems decreased after the start of the first Ukrainian war (in 2014), when it faced retaliatory measures from the West. During this period, there was a renewed increase in sales, which peaked in 2018 at 1.7 billion TIV, and then began to decline again. There was most likely also a military-strategic reason behind Russia's decision at the time to provide China with advanced air defence and combat aircraft. Both systems strengthen China's military position vis-à-vis its regional allies (Japan and Taiwan), but are not expected to play a significant role in a hypothetical military conflict between Russia and China. Russia likely expects that China will become even less dependent on Russian arms supplies due to its own development. An additional problem is posed by (extra) Western sanctions following Russia's latest aggression in Ukraine, which are hampering Sino-Russian cooperation in the field of defence. In the absence of sanctions, Russia would certainly already be purchasing Chinese military equipment (also due to the heavy losses of military equipment in Ukraine) (Kluge, 2024, pp 21–23).

China (despite not selling weapons) keeps backing the ‘Russian war machine’, not just by dodging Western sanctions, but also by supplying dual-use goods and providing many of the raw materials Russia needs to keep its military going. Fix and Crebo-Rediker assessed that »China's influence on the war in Ukraine is perhaps one of the most overlooked current threats to (European) security« and that, through its actions, it has »clearly chosen (Russia's) side«. China is (for now) still observing restrictions on the nature of its military support to Russia and is not sending »lethal military aid«, while continuing to supply dual-use goods and critical (military) parts and components. China has announced that it is introducing controls on the export of dual-use drones, but at the same time is developing a new attack drone in collaboration with Russia. Fix and Crebo-Rediker emphasized that »China is not a neutral actor in the Ukrainian war« (Fix & Crebo-Rediker, 2024).

Publicly available customs data shows that China exports more than 300 million USD worth of dual-use products each month which Western countries have designated as ‘high-priority items’ necessary for Russian weapons production. Although monthly transactions have declined from a peak of more than 600 million USD in December 2023, China remains the largest supplier of these ‘controlled items’ to Russia; this refers to fifty dual-use items which are essential for the production of weapons such as missiles, drones, and tanks. Despite the sensitivity of this type of trade with Russia, China's General Administration of Customs continues to report bilateral transactions, including in areas subject to Western export controls. In 2023, China accounted for approximately 90% of Russian imports of goods covered by the G7 export control list of ‘high priority items’. Based on this, Sher concluded that Chinese exports play a »key role in sustaining Moscow's war effort«. Russia's reliance on China for ‘high-priority products’ increased from 32% in 2021 to 89% in 2023; semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, and machine tools were among the largest categories of Chinese exports to Russia in 2023 which were included in the high-priority export control list. Machine tools alone accounted for nearly 40% of the annual increase in Chinese exports of dual-use goods. Sher raises a (very) important question in this regard: »Whether the Chinese government is directly involved in such transactions with Russia or whether private firms have been largely responsible for evading sanctions and export controls?«. Sher assesses that »while China may not want to upend ties with Europe and the United States, it seeks to ensure that Russia remains a stable strategic partner« and »even if Beijing curtails dual-use exports in order to avoid further sanctions, its strategic interest in Russia remaining a stable partner will persist« (Sher, 2024).

Regardless of China's (non)involvement at the state level, which does not change the ultimate effect on the capabilities of the Russian military machine, this alone has (potentially) significant political consequences. China has supervisory institutions which can, if they so wish, at least restrict such transactions, even if they cannot prevent them entirely. The continuation of the war in Ukraine, which has not only destabilized (and polarized) the European political arena, but also exposed the weaknesses of its military capabilities and growing economic problems, places Russia in a distinctly subordinate position to China in the medium term.

Sagild and Hsiung concluded that »China still considers Russia, despite its misguided strategic decisions, to be an important security and military partner« and its »most crucial partner in counter-balancing US global dominance and regional strategic pressure« (Sagild & Hsiung, 2024, p 6). The result of its actions has the greatest (negative) impact on the European area. Based on the above, the war in Ukraine can be understood not only as a conflict between Russia and Ukraine (or between the US and EU countries in its shadow, as many like to point out), but more broadly as a conflict with China (via Russia), which is striving to establish global dominance and create a new world order according to its ‘own recipe’. If China's role in the continuation of Russian aggression is crucial, as outlined above, then it must be encouraged to stop immediately (although it most likely would have already done so if there had been an interest in doing so).

Blank also highlights China's strong support for the dissemination of Russian war propaganda (and anti-Western sentiment) in the domestic media, which followed extensive cyber attacks on critical Ukrainian infrastructure which could have been carried out by China (Blank, 2022, p 40). This only further confirms that China is not neutral in the events in Ukraine.

Conclusion

In the light of current domestic political developments in the US, following the election of the ‘new/old’ President Trump, we are witnessing changes in foreign policy approaches, including in response to the situation in Ukraine. These changes are evident not only in open public diplomatic communication with Moscow, but also in criticism of previous US policy towards Ukraine and in the assessment of the (in)effectiveness of European countries – EU member states – in addressing the security challenges on Europe's eastern borders.

If the US is now seen by the Sino-Russian alliance as a weakened actor, then this is even more true for the EU. The realization of Europe's limited defence capabilities has prompted many European countries to upgrade their capabilities, as Sino-Russian military cooperation has been systematically strengthening and deepening. This is clearly evident from the findings of this chronological review of three selected periods.

The first period, from the collapse of the Soviet Union to Putin's election (1991–2000): After the end of the Cold War, both China and Russia realized that the world had become unipolar, with the US emerging as the victor and ‘appropriating’ the status of global hegemon. Due to internal political instability, military inferiority, ideological ambiguity (especially in the case of Russia), and a poor economic situation, they tolerated their subordinate position. Their rapprochement was based solely on pragmatism, although the outlines of a common opposition to the new world order and simultaneous economic alignment with the West are becoming apparent. Only when they resolved the most important realpolitik issue – establishing a demarcation line –were the conditions for military cooperation created.

The second period, from Putin's election to the start of the war in Ukraine (2000– 2022): This was a period of systemic (global) competition between the democratic and authoritarian camps, in which the survival of authoritarian Russia depends primarily on China. The goal of the Sino-Russian (authoritarian) camp, as is clear from the content of the 2001 ‘Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship’, is to »promote and establish a just and equitable new world order« as envisioned by both countries. This is nicely summed up in their joint statement from 2022 (just before Russia's aggression in Ukraine), in which they emphasized Sino-Russian »boundless friendship«, and once again explicitly criticized »attempts at hegemony, unilateralism, and the imposition of democratic standards on other countries«. The Ukrainian case is a clear example of what (perhaps) happens when the ‘softer’ methods used in the countries of the global South do not produce the desired results. Sino-Russian military cooperation was constantly upgraded and expanded beyond the bilateral framework during this period.

The third period from the start of the war in Ukraine (2022–): Russia interpreted the West's response to its attack on Ukraine as a hostile act aimed at preventing its ‘historic’ right to Ukraine. China perceives the strengthened US role in Asia in a similar way, especially in relation to its ‘historic right’ to the South China Sea and Taiwan. Russian analysts in particular are trying to present Putin's aggression in Ukraine as more than just an attack by one country on another due to disrespect for the (linguistic, cultural, etc.) rights of the Ukrainian population, which identifies more with Russia than with Ukraine. They claim that this is an ideological conflict between Russia and the West. Only the US regional allies (South Korea and Japan) can conditionally oppose Chinese hegemony in South-East Asia for a short time in the event of a military invasion of Taiwan. The only country responding to incidents in the South China Sea is the US, whose presence in the region has a deterrent effect because it is the only one that can counter Chinese aggression in the event of a military conflict.

Most of the facts and assumptions on which the global security order has been based since the end of the Cold War have fallen or changed. Deepening Sino-Russian military cooperation is now a reality which negates the West's false assumptions about the complete incompatibility of China and Russia.

Sino-Russian military cooperation has remained virtually unchanged even after Russia's aggression. This is another reason why Western aid to Ukraine (and other conflicts around the world) is crucial if the West wants to ‘win’ this race. At the same time, based on the facts outlined in this article, Western efforts to end the conflict in Ukraine will be ineffective if they do not take into account China's (military) role in it, which stems from the Sino-Russian military cooperation outlined above.

The ‘competition’ we are witnessing at the global level has gone beyond competition between individual countries. It is a process of strategic expansion of influence and control with the aim of forming the widest possible circle of allied countries – Sino-Russian on the one hand and Western-democratic on the other. In this context, every country, including Slovenia, must define its foreign policy and security orientation.

Military cooperation between China and Russia is just one dimension of their increasingly close ties, which are also based on economic capacity and political coordination. Among other things, this cooperation enables the financing and development of the military capabilities which Russia is using in its aggression against Ukraine, which constitutes a violation of the fundamental principles of international law – an area that Slovenia has traditionally championed.