T-test Results for Security Governance in Jordan
| Research Question | Sample Estimate | T Statistic | P Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| What are the status and function of Jordan's national security governance system? | 0.77 | 10.25 | 0.000 |
| How well does the framework support coordination among agencies to address security risks? | 0.89 | 9.46 | 0.005 |
| How well do security practices correspond with national objectives of Jordan? | 0.85 | 15.93 | 0.004 |
| What are the linkages between security governance and democratic institutions? | 0.82 | 13.81 | 0.001 |
| What upgrades would enhance Jordan's ability to defend sovereignty and combat threats? | 0.73 | 14.66 | 0.001 |
j_cejpp-2025-0011_tab_006
| Thematic Area | Variable Description | Primary References |
|---|---|---|
| Security System Design | Structural integration and inclusiveness of Jordan's national security framework | Seeberg (2016); Azam (2024); Seeberg & Zardo (2023) |
| Interagency Integration | Effectiveness of collaborative efforts among military, intelligence, and civilian security entities | Badarin (2021); Csicsmann (2022); Webber et al. (2004) |
| Policy and Strategy Alignment | Compatibility between national security directives and wider political, social, and economic strategies | AlMomani (2020); Jordan (2017); Cooper & Nimer (2024) |
| Civil Oversight Mechanisms | The role of democratic institutions in monitoring and regulating security decisions | Nasrawin (2025); Jonasson & Mezagopian (2017); Krahmann (2003) |
| Reform and Institutional Gaps | Identification of needed legal or institutional reforms to elevate responsiveness and state sovereignty | Bank & Valbjørn (2010); Forester (2024); Zardo & Cavatorta (2019) |
j_cejpp-2025-0011_tab_004
| Constructs | ISF | CSA | ANDO | DGPO | KIRA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Institutional Structure and Functionality | 1 | 0.66 | 0.64 | 0.67 | 0.69 |
| Coordination Among Security Agencies | 0.66 | 1 | 0.6 | 0.64 | 0.66 |
| Alignment with National Development Objectives | 0.64 | 0.6 | 1 | 0.62 | 0.62 |
| Democratic Governance and Parliamentary Oversight | 0.67 | 0.64 | 0.62 | 1 | 0.66 |
| Key Institutional Reform Areas | 0.69 | 0.66 | 0.62 | 0.66 | 1 |
Comparative Analysis of Security Governance Frameworks Across Selected Countries
| Country | Governance Body Name | Established As | Key Features | Structure and Composition | Functions and Strategic Focus | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The United States | National Security Council | Advisory Body | Centralized decision-making, President-led | President, Vice President, Secretaries of State, Defense, others | National security and foreign policy | Bank & Valbjørn, 2010 |
| Russia | Security Council | Constitutional Advisory | Coordination and advisory focus | President, senior officials, security advisors | Strategic coordination of national security | Alkhawaldeh et al., 2023 |
| The United Kingdom | National Security Council | Evolved Institution | Broad coverage via subcommittees | Prime Minister, senior ministers, officials | Wide-ranging security issues | Devanny, 2015; Zardo & Cavatorta, 2019 |
| France | National Security Council | Advisory Manager and Executive | Centralized, strong defense/intelligence role | President, key ministers, security officials | Defense, crisis management, counterterrorism | DiCicco, 2014; Eder, 2011 |
| Türkiye | National Security Council | Advisory Body | Strategic coordination and policy making | President, senior government, military leaders | Policy formulation and implementation | Gurpinar, 2013; Yorulmazlar & Turhan, 2018 |
| Egypt | National Security Council | Advisory Body | Crisis management and strategy | Senior government and security experts | Crisis management, threat assessment | Badarin, 2021 |
| Algeria | Supreme Council for National Security | Advisory Body | Coordination with diverse expertise | President, ministers, security advisors | Strategic security challenges | AlMomani, 2020 |
| Morocco | Supreme Security Council | Advisory Body | Institutionalizing security governance | King, ministers, security officials | Security strategy, crisis management | Hussein, 2019; Seeberg & Zardo, 2023 |
Summary Statistics
| Governance Dimension | Item | Mean | SD | Median | Mode | Variance Inflation Factor | Cronbach's α |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Institutional Structure and Functionality | SF1 | 3.55 | 0.53 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 1.2 | 0.89 |
| SF2 | 3.45 | 0.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 1.22 | 0.86 | |
| SF3 | 3.6 | 0.42 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 1.18 | 0.87 | |
| SF4 | 3.3 | 0.58 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 1.26 | 0.73 | |
| Coordination Among Security Agencies | IC1 | 3.5 | 0.47 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 1.22 | 0.87 |
| IC2 | 3.55 | 0.53 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 1.2 | 0.85 | |
| IC3 | 3.4 | 0.56 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 1.23 | 0.78 | |
| IC4 | 3.35 | 0.59 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 1.26 | 0.71 | |
| Alignment with National Development Objectives | PA1 | 3.6 | 0.52 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 1.19 | 0.86 |
| PA2 | 3.5 | 0.58 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 1.22 | 0.72 | |
| PA3 | 3.55 | 0.49 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 1.24 | 0.75 | |
| PA4 | 3.35 | 0.59 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 1.21 | 0.71 | |
| Democratic Governance and Parliamentary Oversight | DG1 | 3.75 | 0.5 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 1.23 | 0.91 |
| DG2 | 3.6 | 0.53 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 1.21 | 0.88 | |
| DG3 | 3.5 | 0.56 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 1.18 | 0.75 | |
| DG4 | 3.45 | 0.58 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 1.22 | 0.71 | |
| Key Institutional Reform Areas | KR1 | 3.7 | 0.55 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 1.25 | 0.83 |
| KR2 | 3.75 | 0.51 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 1.27 | 0.82 | |
| KR3 | 3.8 | 0.48 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 1.29 | 0.84 | |
| KR4 | 3.85 | 0.56 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 1.31 | 0.8 |
Demographic Characteristics of Respondents
| Category | Group | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gender | Male | 194 | 52.72% |
| Female | 174 | 47.28% | |
| Age range | 20–30 years | 100 | 27.17% |
| 31–40 years | 133 | 36.14% | |
| 41–50 years | 96 | 26.09% | |
| 51 years and above | 39 | 10.60% | |
| Work experience | Less than 5 years | 95 | 25.82% |
| 5–10 years | 158 | 42.93% | |
| 11–20 years | 91 | 24.73% | |
| More than 20 years | 24 | 6.52% | |
| Job position | Entry-level official | 127 | 34.51% |
| Mid-tier official | 135 | 36.68% | |
| Senior official | 80 | 21.74% | |
| Executive-level officer | 26 | 7.07% | |
| Familiar with framework | Yes | 251 | 68.21% |
| Involved in implementation | Yes | 179 | 48.64% |
| Received relevant training | Yes | 214 | 58.15% |
| Use of AI in work | Yes | 173 | 47.01% |
j_cejpp-2025-0011_tab_007
| Code | Construct | Statement |
|---|---|---|
| C1_1 | Security System Design | The structure of Jordan's security system enables rapid strategic decision-making. |
| C1_2 | Centralized authority ensures coherence across national security efforts. | |
| C1_3 | Institutional roles within the security sector are clearly defined and consistently applied. | |
| C1_4 | The security system is inclusive of both military and civilian actors. | |
| C2_1 | Interagency Coordination | Agencies involved in national security operate with a shared set of goals and communication protocols. |
| C2_2 | There are clear coordination channels among intelligence, police, and cyber agencies. | |
| C2_3 | Information sharing across agencies is timely and effective. | |
| C2_4 | Coordination failures are rare in crisis response situations. | |
| C3_1 | Strategic Policy Alignment | National security planning aligns with economic development priorities. |
| C3_2 | Security institutions support broader objectives like employment and youth development. | |
| C3_3 | There is a clear link between national security strategies and environmental stability. | |
| C3_4 | Policymakers prioritize both hard security and societal resilience. | |
| C4_1 | Oversight and Accountability | Security institutions are subject to independent monitoring. |
| C4_2 | Parliament is regularly engaged in reviewing security policies. | |
| C4_3 | Citizens have access to information about national security decisions. | |
| C4_4 | Oversight mechanisms ensure checks and balances in the security system. | |
| C5_1 | Reform Momentum & Learning | Jordan's security sector adopts lessons from international best practices. |
| C5_2 | Institutional reforms are regularly introduced to address new security challenges. | |
| C5_3 | Security personnel are trained in emerging areas such as cybercrime and disinformation. | |
| C5_4 | Reforms are based on initiative-taking planning rather than reactive crisis management. |