Since 2013, the Jordanian process of political reform has completed a very unusual, not an unprecedented, course; it has started and has been led through the royal regulations. They represent the formal redirection of the state and the institutionalization of these shifts by several constitutional changes and legal changes, rather than a complete shift from one type of state to another. This development has triggered new institutional pressures, such as the external and internal safety of the National Committee for Affairs, which reflect the conversion of strategic leadership within a multiple pluralized regional order (Seeberg & Zardo, 2023).
This document contributes to the growing literature focused on security reforms in Jordan and is the first systematic study of the Jordanian Security Administration architecture during this period of the reform. It examines the transformation of institutions, evaluates the effectiveness of intermediate rivalry, and evaluates its compatibility with democratic principles. Although there is extensive literature in Jordan, most of it does not concern how they approach the internal evaluation and consolidation of their security sector's institutional foundations and efficiency of this work, as well as how democratic or legitimate they can be.
The survey is powered by the amount of internal and regional questions that include financial tension and geopolitical unpredictability. This document empirically contributes to a wider discourse about how small governments go through a fine balance between strategic cooperation, democratic legitimacy, and institutional opposition. We refer to 1578, Comparative and International Education, 50th edition.. Comparable knowledge is derived from the analysis of Türkiye, Japan, and the United States, which shows increased levels of response to external threats (Seeberg, 2016; Csicsmann, 2022). This framework underlines the need for increased inclusivity and transparency in decision-making, emphasizing that government measures are interconnected and that the global position of the nation remains undamaged.
The Jordan reform initiative also intersects with external agendas, especially the European Union (EU), where security policy is increasingly associated with the management and condition of the administration reform (Cooper & Nimer, 2024; Badarin, 2021). This article expands Jordan's safety management in four dimensions: institutional architecture, public administration tools, mandate clarity, and agency relations (Bazlamit et al. 2020; Al Rawajbeh & Al-Zoubi, 2024; Aljarrah & Al-Khawaja, 2024). We are discussing the emerging role of NDC and NSSF in politically temporary risk management (Almomani, 2020). The study claims that proper safety and supervision should be based on national development priorities, democratic goals, and regional diplomacy with parliamentary inspection as a prerequisite for any viable democratic security structure (Jonasson & Mezagopian, 2017; Nasrawin, 2025).
In recent decades, Jordan has undergone several waves of institutional reform, especially in relation to national security, administration, and administrative structures. While earlier studies dealt with the challenges of institutional development on developing markets, there is limited knowledge of how these reforms are reflected in the effective authorization of administrative bodies and the improvement of supervision functions in key national organizations. This gap is particularly evident in the Jordanian Social Security Society, which plays a central role in ensuring good citizens' life conditions and ensuring long-term stability.
The aim of this research is to explore how administrative authorization contributes to strengthening the institutional capacity of the Jordanian Society for Social Security, with special emphasis on its effectiveness in adapting to regional and global changes. Furthermore, the aim of this study is to focus on the procedures of seizing the mechanisms that administrative reforms can increase the resistance of the organization, improve decision-making, and support wider national security strategies. This article presents the first systematic empirical study of the Jordanian NSGS, which frames it in connection with comparative discussions on the administration and relations of the EU-Middle East. Its consequences are relevant to Jordanian politicians, regional scientists, and European institutions who are interested in learning from this special situation.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Part 1 provides a framework for discussion and argues that Jordan can be fruitfully read to understand political reform through the lens of safety management. In the second part, we map an empirical terrain and identify the gaps in the literature. At the methodological level, the study is based on the design of a case study of mixed methods in which a qualitative institutional analysis is complemented by quantitative evidence. The contribution concludes the design of politicians and possible reform routes for strengthening the Architecture of Security Administration in Jordan.
The research of safety management systems, especially in geopolitical context, defines them as “formal and informal institutional arrangements, processes and tools by which state authorities deal with concerns about home and international levels, oversee institutions, controls instruments and prosecute policies” (CSICSMANN, 2022). Literature constantly shows that good security management is necessary to maintain the stability of the state, democratic responsibility and cohesion of strategic strategy. As the danger gradually overcomes the boundaries and regional dynamics remains unstable, the viability of old management strategies is examined. Even minor security problems can strengthen the institutional capabilities of governments such as Jordan, and emphasize the urgent need for flexible and agile administrative processes.
Research shows that collective security is often determined by higher officials, including defensive, foreign and domestic ministers who serve as the main architects of strategic decisions. The interplay between these entities directly affects the efforts against terrorism and the overall efficacy of security management systems (Webber et al., 2004). This reality emphasizes the need for internationally oriented and integrated political management techniques. The structure for the formulation of foreign policy, which includes many ministries, enables more unified and fast responses to versatile challenges and therefore increases confidence in national and international level. The United States and Türkiye are an example of the use of multidisciplinary cooperation to achieve balanced resolutions in matters with security and foreign policy.
In Jordan, Article 122 of the Constitution does not provide the exclusive power of defense or intelligence chiefs before the establishment of a security strategy. However, there is often considerable abyss between the constitutional theory and its institutional performance. According to Azama (2023), this disjunction illustrates wider discrepancies between the formulation of evidence-based policy and institutional practices. Comparative international experience suggests that successful security reactions do not lead to multinational substitution unless the robust national structures are established to facilitate interstate cooperation. For example, Japan has created external intelligence networks that provide fast and well-integrated responses to crises and support the feeling of strategic globalization (Forester, 2024). Similarly, the Jordanian efforts to unify sector competencies into a single national coordination framework for strengthening institutional coherence allowed domestic security reactions to regional and international imperatives (ALKHAWALDEH, 2023). With the right creation, such organizations are essential for supporting national resistance and strategic legitimacy.
However, the robust institutions themselves do not ensure effective management. National Security Strategy must be deliberately aligned with wider developmental goals. American experience shows that security assistance can promote stability and economic development (Friis-Hansen, 2005). Recent constitutional revisions in Jordan provide cohesive justification that requires security measures in accordance with wider national objectives, including social and economic growth (Seeberg & Zardo, 2023). This strategy increases cooperation and emphasizes the need for adaptable administration in the liquid regional context.
Transparency and liability are the basis of effective safety management. The rationalization of the selection of essential bets and the promotion of public confidence requires more than just adherence to procedures. It needs significant legislative supervision. The “rule of law” increases the legitimacy and credibility of security decision-making through strengthening parliamentary supervision (Jonasson & Mezagopian, 2017). Jordan's recent changes, albeit modest, provide the way to reinforced responsibility and democratic engagement, illustrating the arriving, albeit a gentle balance between the requirements of the security state and the democratic administration (Sayigh, 2005).
In the Middle East they include public issues of fragmented policies and insufficient coordination across agencies and decision-making processes. Breach of security policy undermines public confidence and prevents national security activities (Badarin, 2021). Jordan claims that the solution of these shortcomings requires more than just rhetoric; This requires organizational resistance and increased international cooperation (Krahmann, 2003). These changes not only strengthen the domestic institutional structure, but also increase the Jordanian status of proactive and capable players in the regional security management.
Literature shows security management as necessary to understand how countries, especially Jordanian institutions, perform politicians and obligations to solve the current threats. This document contributes to a wider global dialogue on Jordan's reform and emphasizes the importance of strategic alliances, democratic supervision and resistance to minimal state management as an institutional shift in administration. It offers a new perspective on the dynamics of the Jordanian administration, extensive discourse on public policy, institutional framework and comparative security protocol.
A dynamic theoretical model of management was created. However, the empirical understanding of real operational mechanisms within the Jordanian security administration is rare. Jordanian literature mainly emphasizes external security dimensions through regional diplomacy, migration, and international cooperation (Cooper & Nimer, 2020; Anholt & Sinatti, 2016), which are insufficiently reflected by “internal mechanism.” The aim of this essay is to solve this gap by providing an inaugural and allegedly educated study of Jordan's internal security outside the conventional external perspective.
The main problems following this research have been explored:
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Structure and Functions of the Institution: What are the national security institutions that currently exist in Jordan and how well do they work?
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Inter-Agency Efficiency: How effective are these organizations in supporting cooperation among agencies in managing multilateral security challenges?
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Politician Coherence: How does the politician creation process differ from the declared national process objectives?
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Parliament and other democratic supervision: What benefit can parliament and other supervisory bodies provide in strengthening democratic safety standards?
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Trajectory for reform: What reforms or innovations could increase Jordanian strategic depth, surgical flexibility, and political legitimacy?
With these questions, this project not only creates a better understanding of cultures in the Kingdom of Jordan but also has clear comparative values for other small countries that are in concentric regions and external partners such as the EU.
This article uses mixed methods and includes quantitative voting analysis along with qualitative data derived from official articles, interviews with politicians, and professional discussions. This dual approach allows you to investigate real politic logic (calculations based on interest) with normative visions (idealistic ambitions) that shape Jordanian security management. This approach allows us to explore the undervalued connection between material interests and institutional ideals concerning three basic dimensions: the formal structure of institutions, the interaction between actors, and the quality of democracy.
The context framework is organized by three sets of theoretical lenses: administration, organizational efficiency, and theory of congruent policy.
Administrative theory first suggests that the quality of policy and its ability to achieve the effects is the function of how institutions are designed and what position they have in the political rules system (Seeberg, 2016). The National Security Administration in Jordan is classified according to the legal framework of a country that focuses mainly on defense, foreign relations and news (Azam 2025). This model is from top to bottom and often leads to linear thinking about the definition of threats and development capacities, creating a one-way flow of strategic influence, especially in the relationship between states (Seeberg, 2016).
The second lens of organizational efficiency emphasizes that the performance of structures depends on the clarity of the transaction and responsibility (Forester, 2024). For Earth like Jordan, which is located in the volatile area, this model suggests that the cohesion, balance and transparency are more than just bureaucratic ideals - they are optical needs (Almomania, 2020; Csicsmann, 2022). Clear coordination and communication in decision-making is necessary for national strategic effects.
The third lens, the theory of Congruence of Policy, claims that sustainable security strategies should be compatible with the wider country development goals (Badarin, 2021). In Jordan, both processes visibly combined in national strategies aimed at building long-term institutional and human capacities than just focusing on immediate risks (Seeberg & Zardo, 2023; Jordan, 2017). This theory points to the ways of tactical cooperation tools to combine the pressing of security imperatives with long-term goals of stability and building of the state.
The fourth basic dimension is democracy, which includes legitimacy, public responsibility, and confidence. Parliamentary inspection is an essential industry to determine that measures for life security are bound in the form of democracy and under public control (Jonasson & Mezagopian, 2017; Nasrawin, 2025). Although preliminary, Jordan's recent constitutional reforms are an example of conscious desire to hybridize their security architecture by building global proven procedures for local political traditions (Skare, 2023; Lavenex, 2004).
Jordan ™ turns into formalized security coordination, part of this larger trend in which states receive legal and institutionalized devices to help control their volatile geopolitical environment. For instance, this is observed in Türkiye, Germany, and the USA, comparative examples of cases could give lessons on how large states their security architectures are inserting, and (larger) small states are “blown by foreign winds” (Seeberg, 2016) but are still interested in internal stability and international status (Bank and Valbjørn, 2010).
These theoretical lenses offer a comprehensive platform to analyze whether Jordanian securitization provides stability at home and influence in the region. By applying this framework to empirical data, the analysis of standards, variables, and connective tissues that contribute to the creation of a proposal for politics and institutionalization illuminate how cohesion, responsibility, and legitimacy operate in the Jordanian development landscape.
This is a cross-sectional analytical study with a closed-end collective case of an organized survey to determine the effectiveness of Jordan security's governance. The survey methodology was selected because of its capacity to make data collection similar across organizations, to achieve high response rates, and to systematically explore relationships among institutional design, inter-agency working, and policy outcomes (Forester, 2024). Its claim is valid in some sphere, particularly in the perceptions and experiences of practitioners at the sharp end of governance in national security terms and in its integration of empirical rigor with practical relevance.
The dimension and impact on Jordanian strategic organization model are analyzed. The core assumptions are that more formalized inter-agency coordination contributes to the Jordanian ability to respond and adjust to security challenges (Webber et al., 2004, Forrester, 2024), security governance coherence with other national development strategies offers resilience and long-term institutional stability (Badarin, 2021, Seeberg & Zardo, 2023), accountability and oversight provide more democratic legitimacy in the security governance (Jonasson & Mezagopian, 2017, Nasrawin, 2025), but low inter-agency collaboration, non-harmonized policy, and strategic ambiguity decrease the effectiveness of the security governance, while the institutional framework needs to be reformed (Csicsmann, 2022, Seeberg, 2016).
The respondents were experts in institutions and policy implementation. Magistrates and judges throughout Jordan are selected for their dual roles as recipients of law and maintainers of governance. Court seeing was emphasized in view of its exceptional understanding of the interagency space as well as the institutional architecture and operational consequences of governance reforms to provide credible inputs on national security governance mechanisms. The sample was selected by stratified random sampling (n=520) from an estimated 1,670 judges and magistrates, and strata were defined to ensure that the sample was more representative of the population (stratification based on region, age group, and type of professional responsibility). Ultimately, there were 368 valid responses that accounted for approximately 71% response rate.
The participants' profile and their occupation were diverse. Males comprised 52.72% and females 47.28%, respectively. The age distribution was 27.17% (20–30 years), 36.14% (31–40 years), 26.09% (41–50 years), and 10.60% were older than 50 years. In terms of work experience, 25.82% had worked less than 5 years, 42.93% for 5–10 years, 24.73% for 11–20 years, and 6.52% for more than 20 years. Decision makers included 34.51% junior cadres, 36.68% intermediate cadres, 21.74% experts/mode to high cadres, and 7.07% senior cadres.
The survey first asked whether participants are men or women and how old they are before exploring their familiarity with the structure of the Jordanian government, their participation in organizations to make strategic coordination happen, and their access to professional training and digital technology tools such as AI. EC 1: Who participated in this study? Description and percentage of participants aware of the governance structure in Jordan 68.21 Had contributed directly to its implementation 48.64Had received specialized training in security governance 58.1 5Work with AI tools47.01MetaData1. The involvement of AI is consistent with earlier efforts in the enhancement of digital service capabilities and thus organizational efficiency in newspaper and other administrative sphere, adhering to the demand of students and regional culture (Almajali et al., 2023).
Statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS and comprised descriptive statistics to summarize respondent characteristics and their patterns of participation in governance mechanisms, correlation matrices for the assessment of the interrelationship between of institutional set-up, inter-agency cooperation and policy consistency and a multiple regression model developed to examine the relationship between structural and operational factors and democratic governance and strategic efficiency implied through the specified process. It is a means of exploring interrelationship among governance system in Jordan from institutional, operational, and policy standpoints, which affect national security in Jordan in more sophisticated ways.
This paper integrates practitioners' perspectives with empirical data to examine in which exact elements of the governance model it is strong or fragile, and for international partners e.g. EU as implications are concerned with aiding reform processes of governance and stability within regions (Seeberg, 2016; Skare, 2023; Bank & Valbjørn, 2010). The research was systematically undertaken as follows: formulation of research questions and hypothesis, identification of research counterpart using stratified random sampling, interview the samples with questionnaire, data clearing and validation, statistical process, and a generated result by drawing conclusions that are useful for policy making.
This study uses an experimental comparative methodology to evaluate the Jordan safety management model from a worldwide perspective. The aim is to provide detailed depiction of institutions and operations in Jordan. The secondary normative goal is to spread proven processes and identify systemic shortcomings affected by the Jordanian safety context. This approach is particularly beneficial for questions about organizational effectiveness, policy cohesion, and democratic responsibility.
Research is organized by four dimensions:
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Centrality: This applies to the extent of centralization or decentralization of liability for security management. This will find out whether centralization in Jordan will expand or reduce the effectiveness and organization of crisis reactions as well as limited innovations and perspectives across agencies.
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Recommendations: This area concerns relations between advisory bodies, including the National Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defense and Higher Policy. This shows how the structure and autonomy of these bodies support the development of knowledge, unlike political obstruction.
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Themed focus: These criteria evaluate to what extent the management systems are concentrated in certain political areas, such intelligence, crisis management or migration. In the Jordanian context, this approach can help in assessing whether functional specialization increases sensitivity or strengthens the responsibility of the silo.
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Membership composition: This factor concerns the inclusivity and representativeness of the security staff. This is a critical assessment of whether the government is defined by island and privileges of military and intelligence elites, or whether it is transparent, responsible and includes civil, legislative and civil involvement.
These four dimensions are analytical categories for critical analysis of the Jordanian administration. Through the examination of Jordan, compared to several international comparators, this study avoids a provincial approach tied to the context. The aim is not to replicate foreign models but rather to find out where Jordan is doing well and where its reforms want most.
Research is strategically selected by comparative governments across different types of regimes: established democracy (e.g., united governments, Great Britain, France), hybrid regimes (e.g., Turkey, Russia), and autocracy (e.g., Egypt, Algeria, Morocco). This deliberate selection makes it possible to explore the relying on the institution on administrative processes at different stages of the continuity of political preference. Table 2 illustrates many managerial strategies, institutional innovations, and adaptive approaches that provide Jordan significant knowledge.
Demographic Characteristics of Respondents
| Category | Group | Frequency | Percentage |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gender | Male | 194 | 52.72% |
| Female | 174 | 47.28% | |
| Age range | 20–30 years | 100 | 27.17% |
| 31–40 years | 133 | 36.14% | |
| 41–50 years | 96 | 26.09% | |
| 51 years and above | 39 | 10.60% | |
| Work experience | Less than 5 years | 95 | 25.82% |
| 5–10 years | 158 | 42.93% | |
| 11–20 years | 91 | 24.73% | |
| More than 20 years | 24 | 6.52% | |
| Job position | Entry-level official | 127 | 34.51% |
| Mid-tier official | 135 | 36.68% | |
| Senior official | 80 | 21.74% | |
| Executive-level officer | 26 | 7.07% | |
| Familiar with framework | Yes | 251 | 68.21% |
| Involved in implementation | Yes | 179 | 48.64% |
| Received relevant training | Yes | 214 | 58.15% |
| Use of AI in work | Yes | 173 | 47.01% |
Comparative Analysis of Security Governance Frameworks Across Selected Countries
| Country | Governance Body Name | Established As | Key Features | Structure and Composition | Functions and Strategic Focus | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The United States | National Security Council | Advisory Body | Centralized decision-making, President-led | President, Vice President, Secretaries of State, Defense, others | National security and foreign policy | Bank & Valbjørn, 2010 |
| Russia | Security Council | Constitutional Advisory | Coordination and advisory focus | President, senior officials, security advisors | Strategic coordination of national security | Alkhawaldeh et al., 2023 |
| The United Kingdom | National Security Council | Evolved Institution | Broad coverage via subcommittees | Prime Minister, senior ministers, officials | Wide-ranging security issues | Devanny, 2015; Zardo & Cavatorta, 2019 |
| France | National Security Council | Advisory Manager and Executive | Centralized, strong defense/intelligence role | President, key ministers, security officials | Defense, crisis management, counterterrorism | DiCicco, 2014; Eder, 2011 |
| Türkiye | National Security Council | Advisory Body | Strategic coordination and policy making | President, senior government, military leaders | Policy formulation and implementation | Gurpinar, 2013; Yorulmazlar & Turhan, 2018 |
| Egypt | National Security Council | Advisory Body | Crisis management and strategy | Senior government and security experts | Crisis management, threat assessment | Badarin, 2021 |
| Algeria | Supreme Council for National Security | Advisory Body | Coordination with diverse expertise | President, ministers, security advisors | Strategic security challenges | AlMomani, 2020 |
| Morocco | Supreme Security Council | Advisory Body | Institutionalizing security governance | King, ministers, security officials | Security strategy, crisis management | Hussein, 2019; Seeberg & Zardo, 2023 |
This conceptual triangulation provides links to empirical international formulas in the conclusions of the article. Observations are the diagnosis of their strengths and weaknesses at this stage, as well as specific evidence-based characters. This exercise provides specific, practical ways to improve the management of public affairs in Jordan and increases our overall understanding of the security consequences for small strategically oriented states.
This part develops hypotheses by interconnecting study research into an observable institutional reality in Jordan. Based on the literature on administrative authorization, institutional reform, and management of national security, it emphasizes the main dimensions where structural deficiencies, coordination gaps, mismatch of development, and lack of responsibility persist. Every subsection discusses how these problems provide reasons for formulation of hypotheses on the role of administrative strengthening of the position in strengthening institutional capacity and legitimacy. In accordance with this, hypotheses arise from the anticipation that the mechanisms of authorization can mitigate centralization risks, increase cooperation, align safety with development objectives, strengthen democratic supervision, and promote proactive political learning.
The phase suggests that the Jordan security sector, while it seems competent and cohesive due to its great centralization, hides a substantial institutional weakness. The primary method includes these small networks, many associated with the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) and the Jordanian military forces that offer strategic cohesion but lack explicit directives, resulting in ambiguous mandates and limited access to information. Centralization is effective for solving acute crisis but does not support sustainable institutional immune defense and clarification of roles and duties. The basic tension is to respond with authoritative supervision and explicit directives.
Despite the efforts to change rooted institutions, the authority in Jordan is excessively consolidated within the security forces and the army, leading to institutional uncertainty that soothes insufficient supervision. This imbalance undermines long-term institutional adaptation and openness while allowing decisive measures during emergencies.
These findings emphasize that current safety problems, including irregular migration and cyber threats, require a unified center. However, a formal centralized mechanism of cooperation between the Jordanian security authorities is missing. This leads to functional overlapping (e.g., between the Public Security Director and the Center for Civic Emergency Operations) with unnecessary resource allocation. Specific attributes are limited to the symbolic role of the NSC, which lacks a definitive mission and the power to promote coordination within the ministry or facilitate political support. This rooted hostility and the absence of proactive cooperation were obviously evident during the Covid-19 pandemic: they prevented bureaucratic disputes by effective intervention.
The lack of established and formal coordination mechanism for national safety in Jordan has fragmented internal cooperation, creating overlapping missions, ineffectiveness of resources, and the impaired system's ability to respond to complex cross-sectional problems.
The phase claims that security is no longer a matter of defense of its borders from the invasion but also about threat solving such as youth unemployment, lack of water, and macroeconomic chaos. Although national political documents, such as the Jordan Vision 2025, explicitly state that security is less about militarization than about development, the gap between planning and implementation remains. This divorce is the main cause of popular frustration and can lead to radicalization and social isolation. Fragmented security state and social and economic planners form obstacles to integrated, cross reactions to these basic problems.
The great divergence lies in the Jordanian National Security Strategy and the rest of its socioeconomic development plans. This vacuum thus created by the lack of institutional synergy and cooperation has expanded its social distance and at the end of the year eroded legitimacy; it is not a gap but a gap in promotion that leads to social alienation leading to lease in configuration.
Democratic supervision and institutional responsibility
The final reason is that the Jordanian walls are part of “democratic supervision” or not so democratic security administration. Written laws and established institutions are often suppressed by the force of an unwritten tradition and network forces in shadow behind the scenes. This “dominant connection” between military and intelligence elites monopolizes decision-making and sidelines institutions such as parliament, debate on public, and civil society. This lack of responsibility TM transparency undermines public confidence and prevents performance from verifying. The result is a safety model that is well designed to solve short-term crises but structurally unable to raise democratic resistance and institutional legitimacy.
Informal concentrations of power on the “dominant link” within the security constituency, the formal supervision mechanisms in this democratic state and earn institutional responsibility. This causes a lack of confidence between the public and undermines the Jordanian long-term democratic resistance in its safety management system.
Reform of momentum and policy learning
The phase concludes that Jordan must move from the defensive and reactive attitude of “leg rights” to an aggressive, proactive approach to solving numerous emerging and persistent security problems. Transformation of institutions is necessary. However, bureaucratic inertia prevented this development. It requires more than a political statement. It requires investment in three areas: infrastructure resistant to cybernetics, qualified human capital, and strategic predictivity. The primary comparative elements are that Jordan must maintain its sovereignty while maneuvering through the increasingly complex landscape of threats.
Problems facing Jordan are also shaped by the emerging unconventional security threats, limited by institutional slowness and bureaucratic culture of risk aversion. To deal with this, governments must invest in instruments, specialized human resources, and strategic predicts before assessing to create a more resistant state that actively confronts the future.
Description statistics, correlational analysis, and testing the internal reliability using SPSS were applied to analyze public policy and national security governance in Jordan. In more detail, the assessment was organized around five main issues: (i) institutional strength and weaknesses in the structure and functioning of the security sector in Moldova, (ii) coordination between security actors, (iii) alignment with national development goals, (iv) democratic oversight and parliamentary oversight, and (v) main areas of institutional reform. While overall ratings were above the midpoint of the scale (above a score of 5), participants, on average, seemed to rate all four dimensions positively, and thus, it is likely that perception of performance on these aspects was not unfavorable, but more favorable. Effects of institutional effectiveness are also found, with implications for the governance outcomes introduced in Figure 1 of perceptual analysis (compare with Webber et al., 2004 Seeberg, 2016 Azam, 2024), following that antenatal exposure are consistent with several prior studies.
Descriptive statistics, VIFs, and Cronbach's alpha for the items of the five governance dimensions are shown in Table 3. These are important statistics to help gain a basic understanding of how survey ratings, or items per se, are viewed.
Summary Statistics
| Governance Dimension | Item | Mean | SD | Median | Mode | Variance Inflation Factor | Cronbach's α |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Institutional Structure and Functionality | SF1 | 3.55 | 0.53 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 1.2 | 0.89 |
| SF2 | 3.45 | 0.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 1.22 | 0.86 | |
| SF3 | 3.6 | 0.42 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 1.18 | 0.87 | |
| SF4 | 3.3 | 0.58 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 1.26 | 0.73 | |
| Coordination Among Security Agencies | IC1 | 3.5 | 0.47 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 1.22 | 0.87 |
| IC2 | 3.55 | 0.53 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 1.2 | 0.85 | |
| IC3 | 3.4 | 0.56 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 1.23 | 0.78 | |
| IC4 | 3.35 | 0.59 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 1.26 | 0.71 | |
| Alignment with National Development Objectives | PA1 | 3.6 | 0.52 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 1.19 | 0.86 |
| PA2 | 3.5 | 0.58 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 1.22 | 0.72 | |
| PA3 | 3.55 | 0.49 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 1.24 | 0.75 | |
| PA4 | 3.35 | 0.59 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 1.21 | 0.71 | |
| Democratic Governance and Parliamentary Oversight | DG1 | 3.75 | 0.5 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 1.23 | 0.91 |
| DG2 | 3.6 | 0.53 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 1.21 | 0.88 | |
| DG3 | 3.5 | 0.56 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 1.18 | 0.75 | |
| DG4 | 3.45 | 0.58 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 1.22 | 0.71 | |
| Key Institutional Reform Areas | KR1 | 3.7 | 0.55 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 1.25 | 0.83 |
| KR2 | 3.75 | 0.51 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 1.27 | 0.82 | |
| KR3 | 3.8 | 0.48 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 1.29 | 0.84 | |
| KR4 | 3.85 | 0.56 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 1.31 | 0.8 |
For example, the scale Institutional Structure and Functioning yielded evidence of satisfactory internal consistency (α = 0.89) with item means ranging from 3.3 to 3.6 and from 0.42 to 0. The obtained reliability for item SF4 (α = 0.73) was the lowest one obtained but still acceptable according to the generally considered minimum value for this coefficient. And that's the essence: People have some level of confidence that Jordan's very core institutions of national security remain intact.
Cooperation between Security Agencies also had good internal reliability (α = 0.87), like the subsequent analysis of the subscales. However, ic4 item may have lower reliability (α = 0.71) and higher VIF (1.26) but considered to be acceptable. Cross-agency partnering is an option; however, previous findings and achievements might need to exceed this level of collaboration considering these heightened requirements, especially in the context of horizontal communication (Forester, 2024; Seeberg & Zardo, 2023).
For the size of the match of the program with the country's development objectives, this coefficient was between 0.72 and 0.86 (refer to Table 6). The mean scores were 3.6 and 3.35, respectively. It shows also that the co-ordination of national security planning with general developmental planning is still low. I echo Badarin (2021) and Cooper and Nimer (2024) here by showing the necessity of including development to render security strategies successful.
Heterogeneity in internal consistency was highest for Democratic Governance and Parliamentary Oversight (total α = 0.78)—individual item α values ranged from 0.71 to 0.91. In-depth: Democratic Governance and Parliamentary Oversight (4 items) — Common Standards No. Concerning item 10, action in Article 24, the scores ranged from 3.45 to 3.75 indicating non-negative attitude on the Item 2. Despite this positive attitude, however, institutional actual reach effectiveness has not been well documented by Nastarawin (2025) nor by Jonasson and Mezagopian (2017).
The average scores (mean) for the scale Key Institutional Reform Areas were high (ranging from 3.65 to 3.85), and the reliability (Cronbach's alpha) was between 0.82 and 0.85 (Table 1). It all illustrates strong agreement among the stakeholders over how urgent it is time to do so, politically speaking in terms of modernization, institutional fitness, and making more structural changes. Of course, this perspective dovetails very nicely with Csicsmann (2022) and Youngs (2013), who argue that reform is the necessary part of good security governance.
The average scattering extracted from all constructs is greater than their relevant correlation with another construction listed in Table 4, suggesting that constructions are different but related dimensions of public affairs. This also supports the model discriminatory validity. Smooth correlations provide support for the idea that both institutions work and align politicians, agencies coordinating and controlling parliament. For example, a positive link between coordination between security agencies (0.64) and democratic management and parliamentary supervision (0.60) suggests that a higher level of coordination is associated with higher supervision efficiency.
| Constructs | ISF | CSA | ANDO | DGPO | KIRA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Institutional Structure and Functionality | 1 | 0.66 | 0.64 | 0.67 | 0.69 |
| Coordination Among Security Agencies | 0.66 | 1 | 0.6 | 0.64 | 0.66 |
| Alignment with National Development Objectives | 0.64 | 0.6 | 1 | 0.62 | 0.62 |
| Democratic Governance and Parliamentary Oversight | 0.67 | 0.64 | 0.62 | 1 | 0.66 |
| Key Institutional Reform Areas | 0.69 | 0.66 | 0.62 | 0.66 | 1 |
Note: ISF: institutional structure and functionality; CSA: coordination between security agencies; Ando: matching of national development objectives; DGPO: Democratic Administration and Parliament supervision; Kira: Key areas of institutional reform.
Given the existence of the efficient and effective system of National Security Administration (RQ1), evidence of such a conclusion is available because we are witnessing strategic efficiency and efficiency based on the current centralized model from the top. A high estimate based on a 0.77 sample (p <0.001) emphasizes that such a model traditionally and subjected to a strong military and intelligence system has proved to be resistant to politics despite external shocks and regional shocks. Such a structure supports quick decision-making and easily identifiable command chains, elements that have proved to be essential while maintaining peace. However, this centralization is also “structurally restrictive” pathology. It sets a way to the cadre of political cronyism and suppresses innovative public policy, handcuffs, including the administration of public affairs, and discourage transparency. This is the most basic compromise that scientists are worth three decades: a model that has become successful in its role has now become a long-term responsibility.
Second, the results of the coordination of the agency (RQ2) also represent an important gap. Although the estimate of high samples (0.89; p < 0.005) indicates a high degree of coordination within the agency, this cooperation is more personality led than institutionally. This means that in practice, what often becomes effective cooperation depends less on institutionalized procedures and laws than on human relations and elite discretion. This ad-hoc method, although in some situations works, is fragile and produces powerful silos. It is particularly unsuitable for solving multidimensional threats to this day, whether cyber war or instability induced by climate, or requires non-musical, protocol-based, and horizontal forms of cooperation in all sectors. The system is full of inefficiency, waste, and jurisdiction overlap because there is no clearly ordered feasible central coordination body.
Third, in terms of the relationship between the reflection of safety practices and the national goals (RQ3), we find a very strong positive association: the estimate of the high sample is 0.85 (p < 0.001). This is used to verify that the safety management at the policy level corresponds, for example, to the priorities of national development, as stated in documents, such as Jordan Vision 2025. This political framework specifically states youth unemployment and water lack as part of national security. Despite this cohesion, there seems to be a significant mismatch between politics and practice. This gap is clearer in politically sensitive arenas, where institutional inflexibility and contradictory interests exclude the operationalization of strategic goals. This repeated failure correctly combines security and development and can generate folk resentment, thus weakening the same social structure as the safety effort is to prevent.
For the fourth time in terms of democratic responsibility and legislative ties (RQ4), the results indicate a weak relationship between security management and democratic institutions. Estimation of a sample 0.82 (p < 0.001) and the visual inspection also confirm that strong presidency and non-transparency prevent parliament from performing its role of guard dog. This weak supervision undermines public confidence, weakens responsibility, and can lead to a situation where political decisions are powered by elite intrigue rather than public interest. Amenable and irresponsible institutions will soon become self-service and therefore tend to corrode long-term democratic legitimacy and sensitivity of the system.
Finally, finding out of RQ5 emphasized that the need for reform is needed for a long time. The sample diameter by 0.73 (p <0.001) increases in consolidation over time, indicating the common perception of stakeholders in Jordan, that it should move from reactive to proactive position. This requires investment in anticipating tools, such as strategic anticipation, scenarios planning, and cyber defense for non-traditional and hybrid threats. This means that although international cooperation is useful, the focus should be focused on building domestic sovereign skills for the organization of a strong national reaction.
The results were submitted a detailed description of the security management in Jordan (see Table 5). The system is characterized by its centralized structure and hierarchical approach, leading to a transient operational coherence that ensures stability in unstable environments. This strategy may endanger permanent resistance, integration and legitimacy of democracy. If Jordan is moving from crises to structural reform, it is no longer certain that assistance will be in line with the greatest interests of our nation. This requires a clear directive, a well-defined coordination structure between the agency, integrate into developmental objectives and increased supervision. This study will strengthen this area by offering a comprehensive empirical framework to evaluate the efficacy of national security and advice against uncritical acceptance of international models, regardless of specific political, cultural and institutional environment.
T-test Results for Security Governance in Jordan
| Research Question | Sample Estimate | T Statistic | P Value |
|---|---|---|---|
| What are the status and function of Jordan's national security governance system? | 0.77 | 10.25 | 0.000 |
| How well does the framework support coordination among agencies to address security risks? | 0.89 | 9.46 | 0.005 |
| How well do security practices correspond with national objectives of Jordan? | 0.85 | 15.93 | 0.004 |
| What are the linkages between security governance and democratic institutions? | 0.82 | 13.81 | 0.001 |
| What upgrades would enhance Jordan's ability to defend sovereignty and combat threats? | 0.73 | 14.66 | 0.001 |
This article emphasizes the key political relationship that will be influenced by the Jordanian selection regarding the restructuring of its national security. Extensive surveys and comparative institutional studies reveal the contradictory character of the existing system, act as a stabilization factor and a significant obstacle to permanent resistance. The results have essential consequences for other countries, especially in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which have similar challenges.
Remarkable publications reveal substantial disagreements across institutional mandates that prevent the establishment of cohesive security architecture. The regime is characterized by a significant degree of centralization, with the authority focused on the executive branch and the main security agencies, including the General Directorate of the Intelligence Information (GID), the Public Security Directorate (PSD) and the National Cyber Security Center (NCSC), which control considerable power. This paradigm facilitates the crisis reaction, but also causes inefficiency, duplication and institutional rigidity to solve non-linear threats, including misinformation, cyber attacks and climate instability.
In the absence of publicly available, clear instructions, these entities and organizations lack mutual understanding, which is almost impossible among them. This methodology provides a convincing basis for further semi-automatic and temporary solutions to integrate efficiency with democratic supervision.
The second basic problem is the persistent difference between formal coordination and practical design. Although formal entities, such as NSC, exist, they usually work on ad hoc and are influenced by more individual personalities than a stable institutional structure.
The answers indicate that the behavior has been changed, as evidenced by the absence of an accompanying command chain and a discontinuous dissemination of information. This deliberately submits the ability of states to solve complex, interconnected threats from terrorism to irregular migration. Cooperation between agencies exceeds mere committees. It includes institutional working groups dealing with news platforms within enforceable legal standards. Consolidation and simplification of the command chain would not only clarify the Jordanian reaction but also serve as a paradigm for other nations that will face contradictory duties and bureaucratic divisions.
The third dimension is the escalating conflict between planning of national security and wider socioeconomic objectives of development. While contributions such as Jordan's vision 2025 and Vision 2033 are recognized, the field of youth employment, reforms of education, and digital transformations require comprehensive supervision, and their implementation remains insufficiently supervised. Crisis policies and external conditions of partners such as the EU often depart long-term goals. Following short-term stabilization without a developmental goal is the risk of rooting long-term disputes and reducing public belief in cyclic patterns. Security policies should be considered an integral part of the National Development Plan than an addition to it.
The Jordan Security Administration is inherently undemocratic. The strength is centralized within the executive branch, with limited means for external supervision of legislative authorities or groups of civil society. Voting data and current studies underline the need for greater openness and public responsibility. Proponents must focus on the institutionalization of parliamentary supervision and dispose of financial publication and independent audits of security organizations. This is not just technical repairs. These are political reforms necessary for strengthening institutional resistance and democratic foundations. There are basic lessons for central and Eastern European nations and other transitional countries that face analogous problems.
The Jordan Security Administration is a comprehensive merger of centralization, coordination, and responsibility that can sometimes contradict. In order to exceed the abyss between political aspirations and institutional abilities, Jordan must persist in its reform program on strategic cohesion and continued organizational learning. This is necessary at national, regional, and global levels. For the global community, especially in terms of records, evidence suggests that the optimal approach to maintaining safety is to achieve a reasonable balance between militarization and centralized cooperative connectivity. This includes mild intelligence concepts and the balance between control and democratic progress, which is explicitly defined within this reform initiative.
This article is structured on three aspects of evidence-based reform:
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Institutional clarity: achieved through legal mandates and defined obligations to remove redundancy.
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Organizational dexterity: hybrid challenges are solved by predictable management, strategic anticipation, and cross learning.
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Democratic legitimacy was based on transparency, supervision, and public responsibility for the purpose of permanent credibility.
The acceptance of the reformist approach to security management may only follow the regime of the Jordanian institution from the functioning in reactive capacity. Rather, it could facilitate the design of the opposition. As a result, it can provide an attractive evidence-based frame for other minor, vulnerable, and strategically significant nations around the world.