Tab. 1
The response to the fiscal stress by the municipalities in the Czech Republic, 2008–2018
| 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue, CZK bn | 269.2 | 261.3 | 283.6 | 268.6 | 241.1 | 256.2 | 272.9 | 279.5 | 279.0 | 294.2 | 330.9 |
| Expenditure, CZK bn | 253.6 | 279.4 | 287.0 | 269.8 | 235.1 | 238.7 | 263.9 | 257.6 | 239.3 | 272.8 | 322.6 |
| Debt, CZK bn | 80.1 | 80.6 | 83.3 | 82.4 | 90.0 | 92.2 | 88.9 | 86.9 | 71.9 | 69.0 | 68.6 |
| Property tax revenues of municipalities, CZK bn | 5.1 | 6.3 | 8.7 | 8.6 | 9.6 | 9.7 | 10.0 | 10.3 | 10.6 | 10.8 | 10.9 |
| Property tax as a % of municipalities revenue | 1.9 | 2.4 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 4.0 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 3.3 |
| Property tax as a % of revenue of municipalities with LC > 1 | - | 5.0 | 6.2 | 6.4 | 6.2 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.1 | 6.2 |
[i] LC = local coefficient; CZK = Czech national currency
[ii] Source: own calculations based on MFCR (2020)
Tab. 2
Application of higher local coefficient in 2009–2019
| 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mun. LC | 389 | 284 | 299 | 404 | 494 | 518 | 522 | 562 | 588 | 598 | 599 |
| Mun. LC (% of all) | 6.2 | 4.5 | 4.8 | 6.5 | 7.9 | 8.3 | 8.3 | 9.0 | 9.4 | 9.6 | 9.6 |
| MC (% of mun. LC) | 59.1 | 54.2 | 57.5 | 62.4 | 68.0 | 70.3 | 70.9 | 72.6 | 73.5 | 73.4 | 73.1 |
[i] Mun. LC = municipalities that applied higher local coefficient of property tax;
[ii] MC = mimicking coefficient
[iii] Source: own calculations
Tab. 3
Municipalities with large industrial facilities that apply the policy of higher local coefficient in 2009–2019
| 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ind. mun. LC | 191 | 147 | 154 | 204 | 236 | 248 | 248 | 268 | 276 | 279 | 279 |
| Ind. mun. LC (% of mun. LC) | 49.1 | 51.8 | 51.5 | 50.5 | 47.8 | 47.9 | 47.5 | 47.7 | 46.9 | 46.7 | 46.6 |
[i] Ind. mun. LC = municipalities applying higher local coefficient of property tax that have large industrial facility in their area of administration
[ii] Source: own calculations
Tab. 4
Industry in municipalities with the highest share of increased total revenue due to the increased local coefficient
| Municipality | Industry | Municipality | Industry | Municipality | Industry |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dukovany | Nuclear PP | Libis | CP | Stonava | Mining |
| Rouchovany | Nuclear PP | Zaben | CP, electrical substation | Dolni Nivy | Quarry |
| Temelin | Nuclear PP | Sivice | Cement plant, PPP | Vrskman | Quarry |
| Trnavka | Coal PP | Bitozeves | Industrial zone | Stare Hamry | Ski resort |
| Vresova | Steam-gas PP | Velemysleves | Industrial zone | Bila | Ski resort |
| Nizni Lhoty | MP, PPP | Uzice | Industrial zone | Vlkancice | Recreation area |
| Chrastany | MP, PPP | Modletice | Shopping zone | ||
| Nosovice | MP | Otvice | Shopping zone | Vysoka | Fuel store |
| Paskov | CP | Cestlice | Shopping zone |
[i] PP = power plant; PPP = photovoltaic power plant; CP = Chemical plant;
[ii] MP = Machinery plant
[iii] Source: own processing
Tab. 5
Municipalities within FUAs that apply the higher local coefficient policy in 2009–2019
| 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FUA mun. LC | 156 | 143 | 142 | 189 | 229 | 242 | 242 | 262 | 276 | 277 | 280 |
| FUA mun. LC (% of mun. LC) | 40.1 | 50.4 | 47.5 | 46.8 | 46.4 | 46.7 | 46.4 | 46.6 | 46.9 | 46.3 | 46.7 |
[i] FUA mun. LC = municipalities applying higher local coefficient of property tax that are located in FUA
[ii] Source: own calculations
Fig. 1
Municipalities with increased local coefficient and FUAs in 2019 core of the FUA = the densely inhabited city whose labour market is highly integrated with the commuting zone within the borders of FUA
Source: own processing
Tab. 6
Municipalities with one or both factors (industry and FUA) that apply the policy of higher local coefficient in 2009–2019
| 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IFU mun. LC | 263 | 211 | 217 | 289 | 342 | 358 | 359 | 389 | 405 | 409 | 411 |
| IFU mun. LC (% of mun. LC) | 67.6 | 74.3 | 72.6 | 71.5 | 69.2 | 69.1 | 68.8 | 69.2 | 68.9 | 68.4 | 68.6 |
Tab. 7
Results of Granger causality testing
| Null hypothesis | F-statistic | Probability |
|---|---|---|
| Large industrial facilities do not Granger cause the increase of LC in municipalities within FUAs | 16.293 | 0.010** |
| FUAs do not Granger cause the increase of LC in municipalities with large industrial facilities | 9.1567 | 0.029** |
| Mimicking behaviour do not Granger cause the increase of LC in municipalities within FUAs | 5.7500 | 0.062* |
| FUAs do not Granger cause the mimicking behaviour | 0.7862 | 0.416 |
| Mimicking behaviour do not Granger cause the increase of LC in municipalities with large industrial facilities | 0.0299 | 0.869 |
| Large industrial facilities do not Granger cause the mimicking behaviour | 1.3851 | 0.292 |