Abstract
Leniency policy is an essential instrument of public enforcement of competition law, which promotes the detection of economic cartels through cooperation with the offenders, who serve as whistle-blowers. This study analyses the effectiveness and challenges of this policy in the European Union (EU) and Albania. Leniency policy has been one of the main reasons for the success in detecting cartels in the EU. On the other hand, although Albania has approximated the rules on leniency with those of the EU, leniency policy has not been successful. This article focuses on exploring the reasons for this phenomenon. The methodology used to answer the research question combines desk-review of EU legislation, Albanian legislation on competition and leniency, as well as the doctrine regarding the effectiveness of this policy. Another methodology used to address the research question is the comparative one between the reasons for the success of the leniency policy in the EU and the lack of success of the same policy in Albania. This study elaborates three key recommendations to improve Albanian leniency policy: improving the legal certainty and confidentiality of this policy, criminalizing cartels, and improving public awareness.