1. Introduction
In his major political writings – the Theological-Political Treatise (TTP) and the Political Treatise (TP) – Spinoza approaches the formation of political order from a distinctive premise: human beings never fully relinquish their natural right, even within civil society. Contrary to classical contractualist theories, which understand the social contract as a voluntary renunciation of rights in exchange for peace, Spinoza argues that the transition from the state of nature to civil life results not from abdication but from the redirection of individual power through collective affective and cognitive dynamics. The collective power of the political body (potentia multitudinis) thus emerges from the unstable and ever-shifting composition of singular forces.
In recent years, Spinoza’s political philosophy has undergone a significant reappraisal, with renewed attention to the role of affects and political imagination as central to the constitution of social order. Scholars such as Sharp (2011), Jaquet (2005), and Gatens (2011) have emphasized that common affects are not merely obstacles to reason but foundational mechanisms of political cohesion. This reading aligns Spinoza with contemporary concerns about embodiment, emotional politics, and the social production of belief. In particular, the notion of affectuum imitatio – first elaborated in the Ethics and arguably carried into the TP, albeit implicitly – has become key to understanding how individuals, through mutual affectivity, co-construct shared modes of life and institutional forms.
A major challenge for any interpretation of Spinoza’s political theory concerns the conceptual relationship between “mediation” and “representation.” In this article, we address this challenge directly. Following Pitkin (1972), we distinguish between different modalities of representation: “standing for” (symbolic, descriptive) and “acting for” (substantive, authorizing). Hobbes’s sovereign operates a constructivist representation that actually constitutes the political unity of the multitude ex nihilo. Spinoza, by contrast, never needs such a representational act because his political unity emerges immanently from the affective composition of singular powers. However, this does not mean that Spinoza rejects all forms of mediation. Institutions, customs, and shared imaginaries mediate collective power – they channel, stabilize, and reproduce it – but they do not represent the multitude in the sense of substituting a distinct will for that of the individuals. In Spinoza, the political body has no head that “stands for” the people; it is a distributed network of powers. Thus mediation without representation is not a contradiction, but the precise formula of Spinoza’s anti-representationalism.
This article investigates the hypothesis that, in Spinoza, the political pact does not entail the renunciation of natural right but its affective reorganization through the institutionalization of common affects. Accordingly, we propose to reinterpret the notion of the pact as an affective-institutional operation. This reading allows us to synthesize two key interpretive lines emerging in recent Spinoza scholarship: (i) the central role of imagination and passion in securing political obedience (Lordon 2013; Steinberg 2018), and (ii) the persistence of natural right (jus naturale) as an ongoing expression of individual power within the state (Sharp 2011). Exploring this tension contributes to a conception of political order as the provisional outcome of affective compositions, rather than a stable system founded on norms or contracts.
To develop this argument, the article begins by examining Spinoza’s conception of natural right and its continuity across the transition to civil society, emphasizing how jus naturale continues to operate as a measure of each individual’s power of acting, even under sovereign rule. It then turns to the role of affects and imagination in producing political cohesion, analyzing the mechanisms through which individuals are led to form shared beliefs, resonate affectively, and sustain a sense of collective identity. From there, the discussion moves to a reinterpretation of the political pact as an affective-institutional process, rather than a juridical agreement, focusing on the institutional structures that organize, stabilize, and mediate (without representing) collective affects.
2. The Bellum Omnium Contra Omnes and the initial reproduction of the hobbesian pact
Men are, according to Spinoza, relational beings. However, this doesn’t mean they’re sociable. Their interactions may be cooperative or conflictual. In fact, conflict is a necessary consequence of the self-affirming conatus (the universal drive to persist). While it is true that everything strives, as much as it can, to persevere in being (E III P6), it’s also true that “there is in Nature no individual thing that is not surpassed in strength and power by some other thing” (Spinoza 2002: 323). As a result, the effort to persevere always collides with external forces that can limit or even destroy it. This leads to a conflict involving all beings, including humans. It is this constant threat to survival that leads individuals to abandon the state of conflict caused by themselves:
there is nobody who does not desire to live in safety free from fear, as far as is possible. But this cannot come about as long as every individual is permitted to do just as he pleases, and reason can claim no more right than hatred and anger. For there is no one whose life is free from anxiety in the midst of feuds, hatred, anger and deceit, and who will not therefore try to avoid these as far as in him lies. And if we also reflect that the life of men without mutual assistance must necessarily be most wretched and must lack the cultivation of reason, […] it will become quite clear to us that in order to achieve a secure and good life, men had necessarily to unite in one body. They therefore arranged that the unrestricted right naturally possessed by each individual should be put into common ownership, and that this right should no longer be determined by the strength and appetite of the individual, but by the power and will of all together. (Spinoza 2002: 528)
Though man is often ruled by passions, he has a natural desire for the benefits of reason. What are these benefits? First, the possibility of living safely, without the constant fear of death. Additionally, the ability to live ‘as well as possible’, which means enjoying the advantages of a rationally organized society. To enjoy these benefits, a pact is made in which personal rights are ceded to the collective. Under this pact, everyone commits to observing the precepts of reason, curbing hostile passions and treating others as they would like to be treated. In this way, Spinoza closely mirrors, almost word for word, Hobbes’s contractualism.
Before forming a legal community, men are at war and rely only on themselves for defense. Aware of their weakness, they agree on a ‘pact’ by which all parts renounce the unlimited exercise of jus naturae. However, a simple promise is not enough: since men always do what they think is most useful, they will only be bound by the contract while it looks advantageous, that is, while it aligns with the pursuit of a ‘greater good’ or the avoidance of a ‘greater evil’. The problem, then, becomes how to ensure the utility of the contract remains apparent. Spinoza’s solution lies in the complete relinquishment of individual power to the collective ‘society’, which is granted the authority to enforce it. Judging by chapter seventeen of the Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza seems to endorse Hobbes’ assumption that the pact involves an absolute surrender of individual powers. But later he declares “nobody can so completely transfer to another all his right, and consequently his power, as to cease to be a human being” (Spinoza 2002: 536). If people really gave away all their power, they would cease to exist, because, as stated in the Ethics, “the conatus with which each thing endeavors to persist in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself” (Spinoza 2002: 283). This suggests that the absolute concession of individual powers can only be framed as a thought experiment. In reality, people only give up a portion of their power: the part whose concession brings them more benefit than harm. Therefore, even when they deny certain potential effects of the natural laws that define them – namely, when they partially renounce the power to satisfy any desire – they still do so in accordance with those very same laws (see Moreau 1994: 418).
At this early stage, it is crucial to note what Spinoza understands by “natural right.” Unlike the Scholastic or Lockean traditions, where natural law is strongly normative (an objective “ought” that may conflict with individual convenience), and unlike Hobbes, who describes natural law as a set of prudential precepts derived from self-preservation yet still committing the naturalistic fallacy, Spinoza’s concept is purely descriptive: “whatever each man does from the laws of his own nature, he does by the sovereign right of Nature, and he has as much right over Nature as his power extends.” (Spinoza 2002: 683). Thus “right” equals “power.” Spinoza does not derive an “ought” from an “is”; rather he uses the term “right” strategically to engage with the contractualist vocabulary while emptying it of its normative force. The word “right” is almost redundant in Spinoza – a point we shall develop throughout.
3. The preservation of natural right in the civil state
At this point, we might ask: does it make sense to regard the social pact as a genuine ‘contract’? If we take the term in its usual sense, the answer must be negative. After all, the pact doesn’t impose any definite obligations on the parties involved. However, if we conceptualize the social contract as an ongoing willingness to be governed (a view found in pre-modern theorists like Marsilius of Padua and in modern sociology), then Spinoza’s position becomes less paradoxical. The validity of the agreement rests on its utility, and the contract is continuously revalidated. This does not make it a “genuine” contract in the juridical sense, but it does align with a dynamic, processual understanding of social pacts. At its core, it reduces to the provisional consensus obtained at each moment:
We may thus conclude that the validity of an agreement rests on its utility, without which the agreement automatically becomes null and void. It is therefore folly to demand from another that he should keep his word for ever, if at the same time one does not try to ensure that, if he breaks his word, he will meet with more harm than good. (Spinoza 2002: 529)
Far from being established once and for all, the pact’s ‘validity’ depends on continuous revalidation. This is for a very simple reason: no one actually transfers their power to another. The agreement individuals give to the exercise of sovereign authority must therefore be reiterated at every new moment. Certainly, Spinoza acknowledges the necessity of ceding individual powers. But this concession only occurs at imaginary level. If someone imagines they have yielded their power to another, they will view that person as more powerful and, as a result, will be inclined to obey them (Matheron 1986: 99; Visentin 2001: 165). Although imaginary, this fictitious transfer produces real effects. However, if the general belief in the sovereign’s authority weakens, the pact will lose its force and, in practice, become void:
[…] the sovereign right over all men is held by him who holds the supreme power whereby he can compel all by force and coerce them by threat of the supreme penalty, universally feared by all. This right he will retain only as long as he has this power of carrying into execution whatever he wills; otherwise his rule will be precarious, and nobody who is stronger than he will need to obey him unless he so wishes. (Spinoza 2002: 530)
From this, we can observe that the natural state continues to exist within the civil state. One would not expect otherwise, as the pact doesn’t magically alter the affective nature of men. Instead, it merely stabilizes the aggregating potential of certain affects. The affects that compel individuals to unite in a political society are precisely the same that motivated them prior to this union. Moreover, if covenants lost all their natural power upon the establishment of the pact, sovereign power could never come into being. Sovereign power (or right) is essentially the collective sum of individual powers (or rights). Should any doubts remain about this, the famous letter L will clarify them: “[…] the difference between Hobbes and myself […] consists in this, that I always preserve the natural right in its entirety” (Spinoza 2002: 891). Ultimately, the pact appears almost redundant: it lacks binding force, it doesn’t grant unchallenged authority, and it doesn’t create a genuine rupture with the natural state. This redundancy will lead Spinoza to abandon contractualism.
4. Individual power and multitude power
Despite his somewhat successful attempt to adapt contractualism to the ontology of the Ethics, Spinoza encounters a theoretical inconsistency that must be highlighted: in the Ethics, the individuum is characterized as a plural being, always embedded in multiple complex relations with others. In contrast, in the Theological-Political Treatise (TTP), Spinoza seems to embrace the atomistic individualism that underlies social contract theories. We must wait for the Political Treatise (TP) to see this contradiction resolved. In his most significant political work, the author acknowledges something always implicit in the equation jus sive potentia: it is impossible to conceive of individual right or power apart from a common right or power. More precisely, in TP, II, 15–16, Spinoza writes that when men hold their rights in common, each individual’s right is determined by the communal right. However, careful reading shows that Spinoza here refers to positive law (civil right) rather than natural right. The natural right (power) of the individual persists, but its exercise is constrained by the collective’s superior power. The common right – i.e., the set of positive laws and institutions – prevails because it is backed by the power of the multitude. This distinction between natural right (descriptive power) and positive right (instituted law) is crucial and will be explored further. In other words, individual right or power, when isolated from the collective right or power that sustains it, becomes so limited that any meaningful discussion of it is no longer possible. However, once the concept of the atomized individual – and the resolutive-compositive method – is stripped of content, how can the emergence of the state be explained? This is the problem I will now address.
In this respect, as in many others, Spinoza’s view arises from a critique of the Hobbesian system. Recall that for Hobbes, state power emerges through the surrender of individual powers: “The only way to erect such a common power as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of another, […] is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men […]” (Hobbes 1994: 109). But “because it is impossible for any man really to transfer his own strength to another, […] it is to be understood, that to transfer a man’s power and strength, is no more but to lay by, or relinquish his own right of resisting him to whom he so transferreth it” (Hobbes 1839–1841: 123). Unlike Hobbes, who grounds common power in a sum of renunciations, Spinoza grounds it on a sum of powers: “If two men come together and join forces, they have more power over Nature, and consequently more right than either one alone; and the greater the number who form a union in this way, the more right they will together possess” (2002: 686).
From this, one may infer that humans are naturally inclined to unite, insofar as it is only through the assemblage of their individual forces that personal power finds effective expression. Consequently, the state is not the result of an instant fiat, but the outcome of an ongoing process of collective power formation. This shared power, in turn, arises not through the abdication of individual rights, but through their cumulative intensification. The genesis of political society thus obeys a mechanical logic: when individuals unite, together they have more power than any one of them alone.
However, Spinoza continues to reject any notion of a social appetite. So much so that the Political Treatise begins with a description of a conflictual state of nature (TP, II, 14). But, unlike contractualists, Spinoza sees it as coexisting with the civil state: “the natural right specific to human beings can scarcely be conceived except where men have their rights in common” (Spinoza 2002: 687). This means the moment men come together marks both the beginning of society and of the natural state. Yet there was never such a ‘zero moment’. What exists instead is a complex interaction, marked by cooperation and conflict, order and disorder, law and instinct. Therefore, the state of nature is no longer seen as a condition to overcome, but as a fundamental aspect of collective existence.
Setting aside any surrender of individual power, a question remains: what is the source of the state’s might? Spinoza addresses this in Political Treatise II, 16, where he explains that the state’s power exists only insofar as it wields the combined strength of multiple individuals, making it more powerful than any single person alone:
When men hold their rights in common and are all guided, as it were, by one mind, it is certain […] that each of them has that much less right the more he is exceeded in power by the others collectively. That is to say, he has in reality no right over Nature except that which is granted him by the communal right. For the rest, he is bound to carry out any command that is laid on him by communal consensus, or else […] he may be rightly compelled to do so. (Spinoza 2002: 687)
Since no one has rights other than those recognized by the community, common rights absolutely determine positive individual right. Nevertheless, there is no essential difference between common natural right and individual natural right. Common right prevails over individual right because it is defined by the ‘power of the multitude’. Returning to the initial problem, it becomes clear that positing an absolute beginning of political society is untenable. The concept of jura communia reveals the misleading nature of the opposition between a bellum omnium contra omnes and a civil state supposedly created ex nihilo through contract. First, the primordial character of common right makes the notion of a pure anarchy populated by isolated individuals implausible. Second, there is little value in searching for an ‘original instant’ of the state, since the state has always existed – at least in germ – as common right. Third, it is mistaken to establish a ‘before’ and ‘after’ of conflict, for conflict does not vanish with the emergence of political society. Why is this the case? Because human beings continually affirm their own right; and any increase in one individual’s jus necessarily entails a corresponding decrease in the jus of others. While this mutual striving – conatus – gives rise to disputes, such disputes occur within the horizon of a shared right. In other words, even though conflict never fully disappears, human beings remain bound together by indissoluble ties of mutual dependence. These ties, or jura communia, therefore constitute the ultimate, uncreated substratum of political society – a society that will be more stable the more these shared rights prevail over the conflicts that arise within it.
5. The ‘Natural Foundations’ of the state
As we have emphasized, Spinoza’s theory of the state in the Political Treatise stands in radical opposition to Hobbes and other social contract theorists. However, it also departs significantly from Spinoza’s own arguments in the Theological-Political Treatise. The earlier work still maintains a peculiar idea of a social pact. How can we explain that Spinoza, starting from the same basic conception of jus naturale, arrives at two distinct theories of the state: one with a contractualist character and the other clearly non-contractual? The question is complex, but Lazzeri offers a plausible response: when Spinoza wrote the TTP, he had not yet developed the key concept of affective imitation – introduced for the first time in Part III of the Ethics (1998: 284).1 Another possible explanation is Spinoza’s gradual move toward Machiavelli’s republicanism via the influence of the De la Court brothers. Indeed, in the TP, Spinoza praises the “acute Florentine” (Spinoza 2002: 747) and shows strong affinities with Machiavellian institutional thinking. Both explanations are compatible: Lazzeri highlights the conceptual mechanism (affective imitation), while the Machiavellian turn points to a broader republican framework. With this concept, it becomes possible to conceive of political society without the juridical fiction of the contract. We have already seen that political society originates solely in common rights. Now, pushing the analysis further, I will examine the affective ‘substance’ from which such rights are composed.
In the Political Treatise, Spinoza warns against viewing the state solely as a product of civilized reason, when, in reality, it is a universal phenomenon found among all peoples, from the most primitive to the most sophisticated:
Since all men everywhere, whether barbarian or civilised, enter into relationships with one another and set up some kind of civil order, one should not look for the causes and natural foundations [fundamenta naturalia] of the state in the teachings of reason, but deduce them from the nature and condition of men in general. (Spinoza 2002: 682)
Rather than presenting a speculative thesis, Spinoza states here a simple fact: political societies arise naturally, without requiring any prior, rational deliberation. Men associate spontaneously because their passions present this association as useful – not because reason has ‘forced’ them to unite. But what exactly are the affects that lead individuals to form a political society? Spinoza identifies them in paragraph one of chapter six:
[…] since men, as we have said, are led more by passion than by reason, it naturally follows that a people will unite [naturaliter convenire] and consent to be guided as if by one mind not at reason’s prompting but through some common emotion, such as […] a common hope, or common fear, or desire to avenge some common injury. Now since fear of isolation is innate in all men inasmuch as in isolation no one has the strength to defend himself and acquire the necessities of life, it follows that men by nature strive for a civil order […]. (Spinoza 2002: 700–701).
At first glance, this passage can be read in a contractualist vein: fearing the risks of ‘solitude’, men ‘consent’ to submit to an authority capable of providing them security. The verb ‘convenire’ seems to suggest the notion of a legal contract. However, it is important to note that Spinoza doesn’t use ‘convenire’, but rather ‘naturaliter convenire’. This precision makes all the difference. If the multitude naturally agrees, it doesn’t need a contract to form a political society: the instituent process is determined from beginning by the blind play of affects (be they fear, hope, or the desire to avenge a common harm).
But does affectuum imitation play a major role in the TP? The term itself does not appear in the TP. While it is true that Spinoza does not explicitly repeat the Scholium from Ethics III, the mechanism of affective contagion is clearly presupposed in the TP’s account of how common affects emerge. For instance, TP, I, 5 describes how men “pity the unfortunate, envy the fortunate” and “each man wants others to live according to his way of thinking” (Spinoza 2002: 681) – all of which are effects of affective imitation. Moreover, TP, III, 3 (Spinoza 2002: 690) states that “in the civil order all men fear the same things” – not as isolated private sentiments but as socially reinforced affects. Spinoza’s point is precisely that affects spread through imitation, creating common fears and hopes. Thus, while the term is absent, the mechanism is operative. We therefore maintain that affectuum imitation is a legitimate interpretive key, provided we acknowledge its implicit presence.
So, what are we really referring to when we talk about a ‘common affect’? We must underline that the expression ‘common affect’ doesn’t refer to any kind of extraordinary or universal affect. As Aurélio clarifies, it refers to “an affect that is shared concretely by a group of men, in specific circumstances and for a longer or shorter period of time” (2014: 226). In other words, it is the passion that unites multiple individuals into a single political-affective mass, drawing a line between an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’, ‘us’ and ‘them’. Nevertheless, this definition doesn’t explain how a ‘common affect’ is formed. In fact, no one is initially tied to another by passional bonds. Such bonds are created through the process of imaginary identification that Spinoza calls ‘affective imitation’. The theory of affectuum imitatio (E III P27 Sch.) is first introduced in the Ethics to describe the contagious logic of intersubjective affectivity. Later, in his second treatise, Spinoza applies this theory to the study of the genesis of the multitudo. He summarizes this theory of affective mimesis as follows in Political Treatise, I, 5:
For this much is quite certain, and proved to be true in our Ethics, that men are necessarily subject to passions, and are so constituted that they pity the unfortunate, envy the fortunate, and are more inclined to vengeance than to compassion. Furthermore, each man wants others to live according to his way of thinking, approving what he approves and rejecting what he rejects. Consequently, since all men are equally desirous of preeminence, they fall to quarrelling and strive their utmost to best one another; and he who emerges victorious is more elated at having hindered someone else than at having gained an advantage for himself. (Spinoza 2002: 681, emphasis added)
As Spinoza explains in the Ethics (E III P 27), men are naturally inclined to share the same affects as their peers: by simply imagining that someone experiences a certain feeling, we are affected by the same feeling that we perceive in them. Now, if this process repeats itself several times, a common affect forms with enough strength to unite many people. Given the natural tendency for affective imitation, there is no need for the artifice of ‘representation’. While in Hobbes, a common will existed only if personified by the sovereign (see Leviathan, XVI); here, affectuum imitatio enables a true convergence of individual wills, resulting in a set of ‘norms’ which embody common law. Certainly, the multitude wants to be ‘guided as if by one mind’. But this unity doesn’t result from a representative unification. Rather, it is an ‘affective composition’ which manifests politically as a unity of consensus – and nothing more. This means it suffices that there is an objective coincidence among various individual affects for the political body to develop:
every man’s natural right (if we consider the matter correctly) does not cease in a civil order; for in a state of Nature and in a civil order alike man acts from the laws of his own nature and has regard for his own advantage. In both these conditions, I repeat, man is led by fear or hope to do or refrain from doing this or that. The main difference between the two conditions is this, that in the civil order all men fear the same things, and all have the same ground of security, the same way of life. (Spinoza 2002: 690, emphasis added)
This excerpt confirms the point made earlier: ‘Political unification’ occurs when a group of individuals share common affects. It does not require that each individual affectively mirrors every other; rather, the convergence of fears and hopes (e.g., fear of foreign invasion or of civil chaos) produces a de facto coordination. This fear is not necessarily the product of imitation, but imitation reinforces it and makes it collective. This affective community, ‘massified’ by imitation, builds the consensus needed to establish common laws. The sovereign, in Spinoza’s account, loses any distinct, subjective identity. Instead, sovereignty is a field of circulating, mass-power relations. Unlike in contractualism or modern constitutionalism, where the law derives from the will of a concrete political entity (such as ‘the people’ or ‘the nation’), in Spinoza, law doesn’t issue from a singular author but from an anonymous source, diffused in the affective interplay of the multitude.
However, while affective imitation fosters unifying passions, it also fuels divisive ones, such as hatred, envy, and ambition. Thus, while the mimetic process can unify a political society, it can also cause its collapse. It is, therefore, an ambivalent mechanism, simultaneously capable of reinforcing and undermining the unifying bonds of the multitude. This raises a critical question: if conflict is intrinsic to the multitude, how does society retain cohesion and stability? The answer lies in institutions. By organizing and channeling conflictual impulses within society, institutions provide it a stable substrate that persists despite divisions. In doing so, they ensure that even as conflicts arise, there is a continuous foundation for collective existence. But what kind of institutions does Spinoza have in mind? The TP primarily discusses formal political bodies: councils, assemblies, laws, and the mechanisms of dominion. However, Spinoza also refers to “customs” (mores) and the “way of life” that shapes collective behavior. While he does not explicitly list “languages, practices, and symbols” as institutions, it is plausible to infer that such cultural forms are included under the broad notion of instituta that organize social life. To remain faithful to the text, we should say that Spinoza’s institutions are primarily juridic-political, but they rest on and reproduce a common affective and imaginative substrate – a substrate that may indeed encompass customs and shared practices. Thus, without overclaiming textual evidence, we argue that the stabilizing function of institutions goes beyond formal structures and includes habitual ways of acting and feeling that are culturally transmitted.
Through institutions, potestas becomes impersonal and enduring. Power is dispersed across a network of shared reasons and interests, a network that incorporates collective memory and experience into its structures. This imparts a sense of continuity, linking past to present and reducing the risk of power vacuums, as institutions, in contrast to individuals, do not ‘die’ (Aurélio 2014: 270). In this way, institutions operate as self-regulating mechanisms for the power of the multitude, sustaining the forces that fuel it.
6. Conclusion
Reexamining Spinoza’s political theory through the prism of affects and the persistence of natural right allows us to conceptualize a mode of political order that fundamentally diverges from classical representational models of the State. Rather than envisioning the political as a domain structured by transcendental norms, Spinoza constructs a theory rooted in the immanent and dynamic interplay of individual powers, affective circulations, and collective imagination. His thought provides an ontology of the political that precedes and exceeds the juridical framework of representation – a model in which political authority does not stem from the delegation of will to a sovereign figure, but from the capacity of institutions to mediate and organize common affects without standing for the multitude in a representational sense.
We have thus refined the conceptual framework by distinguishing explicitly between mediation (the functional channeling of power) and representation (the symbolic substitution of a will or person). Spinoza’s institutions mediate; they do not represent. This allows us to avoid a simplistic opposition between representation and its absence and to engage with Pitkin’s (1972) modalities: Hobbes’s constructivist representation actively constitutes the people, whereas Spinoza’s multitude is always already a composite of singular powers that never requires an external act of representation. This difference does not reduce to the simple absence of representation; it is a different ontological logic.
Traditional theories of political representation – from Hobbes to Rousseau and beyond – typically presuppose a moment of rupture between the multitude and the political form: a contractual event that represents the people, either as a unified will or as a passive subject of law. In these paradigms, political legitimacy resides in the capacity of the state to stand for the people, whether through electoral mechanisms, constitutional systems, or the embodiment of sovereignty in a singular figure. Spinoza’s theory subverts this schema. The state, in his view, does not represent the multitude in any transcendent sense; rather, it is constituted by the ongoing composition of singular powers.
Spinoza thus offers a radically non-representational account of political life – one that treats the state not as an abstract entity with authority over its subjects, but as a provisional arrangement of human affects, imaginaries, and practices. Authority is neither conferred from above nor delegated from below; it is generated immanently within the web of social interactions. Political stability, in this framework, does not stem from rational assent to a representative structure; it results instead from affective resonance – the ability of institutions to harmonize with the desires, fears, and hopes of individuals.
By foregrounding the affective and immanent dimensions of political order, Spinoza’s theory aligns with contemporary critiques of representation in political philosophy, particularly those emerging from post-foundational and radical democratic traditions. His model anticipates later concerns with the limits of representation, the embodiment of political life, and the constitutive power of collective imagination. In doing so, Spinoza offers not only a critique of classical political metaphysics but also a constructive alternative: a politics grounded in the capacities of bodies, the circulation of passions, and the creative potential of the multitude.
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Author states no funding involved.
Author contributions
Albano Pina is the sole author and responsible for all aspects of the work, including conceptualization, research, writing, and revision.
Conflict of interest statement
Author states no conflict of interest.
Data availability statement
Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analyzed in this study.
