Mediation without representation: Spinoza and the natural foundations of political society
Abstract
This article reexamines Spinoza’s political theory against Hobbesian contractualism, emphasizing its non-representational character. Refining the relationship between mediation and representation, we argue that Spinoza’s political ontology operates through affective and institutional mediations without amounting to representation in the strong sense (symbolic substitution of a will or person). Drawing on Pitkin ((1972). The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California Press), we show that Spinoza rejects the sovereign as a constructivist representative of the multitude. Instead, political unity emerges from the immanent convergence of individual powers through shared affects. While Hobbes grounds the state in a definitive act of representation, Spinoza abandons the foundational pact, concluding that political society arises from the coordination of individual powers via shared affects. In Spinoza, power (potentia) and right (jus) are coextensive and persist within the civil state. His concept of natural right is unique: purely descriptive (right = power), not normative as in the Scholastic or Lockean tradition, nor a descriptive-normative hybrid as in Hobbes. The word “right” is almost redundant – a strategic borrowing. Political unity is forged through affective imitation, not representation. Institutions stabilize conflictual impulses but do not represent transcendent authority; they mediate collective power without substituting for it. This article argues for a conception of the State as a non-representational formation emerging not from a break with nature, but from its continuous, organized expression.
© 2026 Albano Pina, published by Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences
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