In recent years, European societies have faced an overlapping series of crises – economic stagnation, the Covid-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and the ongoing cost-of-living and housing crises. This convergence, sometimes referred to as a polycrisis, has deepened socio-economic vulnerabilities, disproportionately affecting disadvantaged populations. At the same time, political trust across Europe has been eroding, especially among those who perceive themselves as economically excluded (Dimock 2019; Bobzien 2023).
In the Czech Republic, one particularly acute and underexplored aspect of this broader phenomenon is the crisis of over-indebtedness – often experienced through the mechanism of debt enforcement (exekuce). As of 2025, over 600,000 individuals are affected by enforcement actions, where private bailiffs are legally entitled to seize income and property beyond a subsistence minimum (Exekutorská komora ČR 2025). Scholars have described the system as punitive, profit-driven, and insufficiently regulated (Hořeni Samec 2021; Hoření Samec, Trlifajová 2023; Šitera 2023).
The political consequences of this situation are significant. People facing debt enforcement consistently report lower levels of political trust and institutional confidence. Only 27% consider democracy to be the best form of government, while nearly half (49%) express indifference to whether the political system is democratic or authoritarian (Median 2018). By contrast, in the general population, democratic support ranges between 51–58%, and only 14–18% express such indifference (CVVM 2021). Those affected by debt enforcement also report lower trust in the judiciary, the European Union, and even in their fellow citizens (Median 2018). This constellation of data points to a politically alienated demographic – a group whose marginalisation may carry implications for democratic legitimacy.
This article explores substantive political representation of this social group within the Czech parliament by analysing two crucial changes in legislation directly affecting this social group. Specifically, we examine to what extent did Czech political parties substantively represent the interests of citizens facing debt enforcement during the 2017–2021 parliamentary term? Our hypothesis is that left-leaning parties would more likely advocate for parameters of these laws benefiting over-indebted citizens.
However, the findings challenge this assumption. While some traditional left-wing parties (e.g. ČSSD) offered partial support for debtor-friendly amendments, the Czech Pirate Party emerged as the most consistent advocate of legislative changes benefiting debtors. Conversely, certain populist or radical-right parties that rhetorically claim to represent the economically left-behind provided limited substantive support.
The article proceeds as follows. First, we outline the conceptual and theoretical framework, focusing on substantive representation. Next, we present the research area and methods, followed by a detailed empirical analysis of legislative votes. We then discuss the findings in light of broader theoretical and political implications, before concluding with a summary and suggestions for future research.
This section introduces the theoretical framework guiding this study, with a focus on the concept of substantive political representation. Drawing on the work of Pitkin (1967) and related scholarship, we define what it means for parties to act in the interests of economically disadvantaged citizens. We also connect this to the issue of political trust, especially as it relates to marginalized social groups. Together, these concepts form the foundation for the subsequent analysis of parliamentary voting behaviour in the Czech Republic.
While it is true that not everyone facing poverty in the Czech Republic is subject to debt enforcement, in this article we focus explicitly on insights gathered from existing research into the political representation of the impoverished because this perspective is particularly relevant to the scope of this study. Much of the research in this field originates in the United States. Numerous studies there have identified significant gaps in the political representation of the economically disadvantaged (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2005; Jacobs, Page 2005). While their authors recognise that perfect equality in political representation is unattainable, Gilens concludes the report of his research with the following strong words: “representational biases of this magnitude call into question the very democratic character of our (US) society” (2005: 778), though some studies challenge Gilens’s findings, primarily on methodological grounds (Branham, Soroka, Wlezien 2017; Enns 2015).
In the European context, research indicates a bias favouring the wealthy (Giger, Rosset, Bernauer 2012; Pereira 2021; Rosset, Nathalie, Bernauer 2013). Giger and her collaborators research in 21 parliamentary democracies, including the Czech Republic, covering 2002–2006, revealed political under-representation of the poor (Giger, Rosset, Bernauer 2012). Rosset and colleagues’ conducted a similar study, analysing the disparity between voter and political party positions across 24 democracies from 1996 to 2007 (Rosset, Nathalie, Bernauer 2013). They found that countries with greater economic inequality exhibited weaker political representation of the poor. This is noteworthy considering a recent rise in economic disparity (Piketty 2014; Stiglitz 2012) and the interplay between economic and social inequalities (Bartels 2008). The Czech Republic was found to be relatively good at representing the poor in these studies (Giger, Rosset, Bernauer 2012; Rosset, Nathalie, Bernauer 2013), though it is important to note that these pre-date the development of debt enforcement in the Czech Republic over the past 15 years.
Lupu and Warner conducted a comprehensive analysis of variances in political representation across a broad spectrum of countries globally. Their research indicates that individuals with higher economic status tended to have greater representation in economic matters, while those from lower economic backgrounds had more influence in cultural issues (Lupu, Warner 2022).
The question arises: What leads to the potential under-representation of the economically disadvantaged, whether in general or specifically in economic issues? Pereira’s study on elected officials in Sweden and Switzerland suggests that this disparity might stem from politicians interpreting public opinion through the lens of their own socio-economic background (Pereira 2021). Given that most politicians are wealthier than the average voter, their perceptions are consequently skewed. Essentially, politicians tend to project their own experiences into their understanding of the electorate’s needs.
Multiple studies have also consistently shown that economically disadvantaged individuals tend to have lower levels of political trust. Poorer citizens often perceive political systems and institutions as primarily serving the wealthy, leaving them feeling excluded and underrepresented. This perception leads to diminished trust in politicians and institutions (Bobzien 2023; Bargsted et al. 2023). Data from Pew Research Center confirm that economically vulnerable individuals are less likely to trust government institutions and are more indifferent towards democratic governance (Dimock 2019). This erosion of trust among disadvantaged groups poses a challenge for democratic legitimacy and stability across different contexts.
In the preceding part, we outlined the primary focus of this article on the substantive political representation of people subject to debt enforcement in the Czech Republic. Hana Pitkin defines substantive representation as “acting in the interests of the represented in a manner responsive to them” (Pitkin 1967: 209), identifying this as the most crucial aspect of representation.
Substantive representation is commonly interpreted as merely policy responsiveness (e.g. Eulau, Karps 1977; Stimson, Mackuen, Erikson 1995). However, as Sabl notes, many authors, especially empiricists, tend to narrow this concept down to simply meeting the desires of a constituency (Sabl 2015). This perspective is prevalent in the literature on the political representation of economically disadvantaged groups, where most studies conceptualise it in this limited way. Accordingly, the analysis of substantive political representation predominantly reflects the views and desires of voters.
Nevertheless, we concur with Pitkin’s broader view that substantive representation encompasses not only the “wishes” but also the “needs” and “interests” of constituents (Pitkin 1967). This aligns implicitly with Wahlke’s perspective, which acknowledges that voters often lack extensive knowledge on specific policy issues (Wahlke 1971). This is also in line with the findings of qualitative research on the political preferences of those facing debt enforcement, which show that such people are unfamiliar with the complicated details of debt enforcement legislation (Šmatera, Pinková 2024).
In this vein, it is pertinent for us to define the agent-representative distinction, also introduced by Pitkin. A representative, unlike an agent, does not merely echo the will of their constituents but independently strives to address their needs and interests (Pitkin 1967). This approach is vital in democratic politics nowadays, given the unrealistic expectation for citizens to be well informed about every intricate detail of complex legislative proposals (Burstein 2014; Lax, Phillips 2011; Wahlke 1971).
In line with this approach, for this study, we assessed the extent to which Czech political parties have substantively represented individuals facing debt enforcement, based on their voting behaviour on key legislative measures. Adopting Pitkin’s agent-representative dichotomy, in this article, we treat Czech political parties as representatives (Pitkin 1967).
Our analysis focuses on two critical laws passed during the 2017–2021 parliamentary term and examines their substantive political representation of individuals facing debt enforcement. The various components of each law were subject to separate votes, allowing an evaluation of whether each aspect aligns with the interests of those affected. The voting patterns of political parties on these components were analysed to gauge their level of substantive representation.
Aware of potential biases in evaluating these law components, we have carefully justified why each is considered beneficial or not for those under debt enforcement. Consequently, the extent of substantive representation of affected people by political parties in the Czech Republic was ascertained based on their votes on these legislative components.
This qualitative research primarily relies on legislative documents as its source of data, encompassing records of political party votes, draft laws, amendments, explanatory memoranda, and recordings of parliamentary proceedings. Tables setting out the voting patterns of each political party on the examined law components are provided, culminating in a summary chart of the findings. This study, while retrospectively assessing the impacts of individual policy components, incorporates elements of policy evaluation and policy analysis, drawing upon methodologies outlined in works by Dunn (2004), Durnová (2011), and Shafritz (2004).
During the electoral term examined, 2017–2021, the Chamber of Deputies (the lower chamber of the Czech parliament) was constituted of nine distinct political parties. The number of their representatives elected during this tenure is stated in Table 1. (The number of members of individual parliamentary groups changed a little during the term, but never to the extent that it would in any way change the distribution of power in the Chamber of Deputies.) It is important to note that voting discipline within parties was very strong in the case of these analysed laws. Thus, even if it occasionally happened that some deputy did not vote with the rest of his or her party, it did not affect the result of the vote.
Number of seats in Chamber of Deputies.
| Party | Number of seats | Description |
|---|---|---|
| ANO | 78 | Action of Dissatisfied Citizens |
| ODS | 25 | Civic Democratic Party |
| Pirates | 22 | Czech Pirate Party |
| SPD | 22 | Freedom and Direct Democracy |
| KSČM | 15 | Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia |
| ČSSD | 15 | Czech Social Democratic Party |
| KDU-ČSL | 10 | Christian Democratic Party |
| TOP 09 | 7 | Tradition Responsibility Prosperity |
| STAN | 6 | Mayors and Independents |
Subsequent to the 2017 election, a coalition government was established, comprising ANO and ČSSD. This minority government garnered the backing of KSČM. Thus, KSČM voted with the government in an absolute majority of pivotal legislative decisions (e.g. votes of confidence and votes on the budget) throughout the duration of the electoral term.
The RILE index (Table 2) was employed by Czech political scientists Eibl and his collaborators to categorise nine political parties along a left–right scale (Eibl, Gregor 2019). The index is based on an analysis of parties’ manifestos and political parties are ranked on the scale from –100 to +100. (Political parties addressed the issue of debt enforcement in their 2017 election manifestos very briefly and in broad terms. Thus, for the purposes of this research, the RILE index is the best possible choice.) It is widely recognised that a propensity towards egalitarianism is exhibited by left-leaning political parties to address the needs of people who are economically worse off (Ball, Bellamy 2003; Hloušek, Kopeček 2018; Perottino, Polášek 2013). Consequently, it is plausible to infer that advocacy for the interests of the impoverished – in the context of this study, people facing debt enforcement – will be seen in the political agendas predominantly of these parties.
Czech political parties – RILE index.
| KSČM | ČSSD | SPD | STAN | KDU-ČSL | Pirates | ANO | ODS | TOP 09 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| −36.6 | −33.3 | −25.8 | −23.6 | −21.3 | −19.6 | −12.6 | +3.2 | +3.8 |
Considering the emphasis on economic and social issues in the policy frameworks of these parties, as highlighted by (Eibl, Gregor 2019), a research hypothesis can be formulated:
The substantive political representation of Czech citizens affected by debt enforcement is more likely to be undertaken by parties situated towards the left end of the political spectrum.
To elucidate, it is anticipated that parties with a strong left-wing orientation, notably KSČM and ČSSD, will exhibit a higher degree of advocacy for individuals facing debt enforcement. Conversely, parties anchored more firmly on the right side of the spectrum, such as ODS and TOP 09, are presumed to demonstrate a lesser degree of substantive representation for this demographic. Parties occupying a centrist position are expected to provide a level of substantive representation that is intermediate between the extents exhibited by KSČM and ČSSD, and the more right-leaning parties such as ODS and TOP 09.
This section presents the core empirical findings of the study. It examines how each of the nine parliamentary parties voted on specific amendments that either supported or restricted the interests of citizens facing debt enforcement. The section also quantifies these findings using a scoring system based on party votes.
A detailed analysis was conducted of the distinct parameters of two legislative enactments, elucidating the extent to which political parties presented in the Chamber of Deputies substantively represented the interests of individuals facing debt enforcement. (The lower chamber of the Czech parliament is the more powerful; by an absolute majority, it can outvote the upper chamber, the Senate.) To understand the subject matter, the essential characteristics of the two statutes whose parameters were scrutinised are explained.
The first statute consists of a significant amendment to the insolvency act, setting out the prerequisites for debt relief, primarily tailored for people grappling with debt enforcement (Chamber of Deputies 2018; Parliamentary file 71/0 2018). The second statute includes extensive revisions to multiple acts governing debt enforcement (Chamber of Deputies 2021; Parliamentary file 545/0 2019).
In the process of adopting both statutes, there were significant deviations from the typical legislative processes. Although they were initiated by the government, as is normal for complex legislative matters, in neither instance did the representatives of any parliamentary party, including those in power, concur entirely with the bill as proposed by the government. Consequently, substantial modifications were made during the proceedings in the Chamber of Deputies (Chamber of Deputies 2018; Chamber of Deputies 2021; Parliamentary file 71/0 2018; Parliamentary file 545/0 2019).
Generally speaking, all political parties showed an inclination to amend the legislation in a manner favourable to people facing debt enforcement. The first statute introduced the possibility of a shorter debt relief process: from the previous 5 to 3 years. Furthermore, it abolished the minimum percentage of debts that need to be repaid in the debt relief process. The second statute regulating the area of debt enforcement introduced the so-called milostivé léto – literally “gracious summer,” but more accurately referring to a Jubilee in the Biblical sense – and opened up the possibility of a statute of limitations. All the political parties agreed with these new parameters of the laws that were for the benefit of people facing debt enforcement (Parliamentary file 71/0 2018; Parliamentary file 545/0 2019). Hence, it can be inferred that these legislative proposals universally served the interests of those facing debt enforcement. Thus, it is reasonable to assert that, to some extent, all political parties substantively represented citizens facing debt enforcement.
Certain amendments aimed to curtail some advantageous modifications for people facing debt enforcement as envisioned in the original governmental proposals. In contrast, others advocated for additional legislative reforms favourable to those under debt enforcement. (Other amendments were also tabled, but they were of a legislative-technical nature, much less significant, or there was all-party agreement on them. Therefore, they were not the subject of this analysis.) The evaluation of the voting patterns of political parties on these amendments provides insights into their substantive representation of individuals facing debt enforcement. Consequently, if a political party supported a proposal beneficial to these individuals, it is indicative of their substantive political representation, and vice versa.
The insolvency bill provided for the introduction of three debt relief options. In other words, it introduced three ways in which people facing debt enforcement could get rid of their debts. This particular amendment then proposed increasing the minimum share of repaid debts in the shortest possible time of debt relief. Specifically, this amendment would require people under debt enforcement to pay at least 60% of their debts – not the 50% proposed by the government – in the shortest possible time (3 years) if they wanted to be debt-free. However, it would be in the interest of the people facing debt enforcement to set the percentage limit for debt relief as low as possible. Thus, this was an amendment going against the interests of people facing debt enforcement (Amendment No. 1366 2018).
Five parliamentary groups out of nine voted in favour of this amendment, namely ANO, ODS, SPD, KDU-ČSL and TOP 09. Three – Pirates, ČSSD and the STAN parliamentary party – voted against it. All members of the KSČM abstained. A large majority, therefore, approved the proposal (Vote on Amendment No. 1366 2018).
As mentioned, the submitted version of the insolvency legislation proposed three distinct approaches to debt relief. The first approach involved a 3-year plan, in which the debtor would achieve debt-free status after clearing at least 50% of their debts, a threshold later increased to 60% through Amendment 1366 as discussed above. The second approach was to require the repayment of a minimum of 30% of the debt over a span of 5 years. The third approach, also spanning 5 years, entailed a final review by the court to assess if the debtor had made all reasonable efforts to repay the debt, following which any remaining debt would be waived (Chamber of Deputies 2018; Parliamentary file 71/0 2018).
This amendment sought to consolidate the two 5-year debt relief options into a single framework. It stipulated that, provided the debtor’s debt relief was not revoked during this period, the court would not need to deliberate on the case at the conclusion of the 5 years. It is noteworthy that the initial proposal mandated both court and insolvency administrator oversight over the debtor throughout the 5-year duration, a requirement unchanged by this amendment (Amendment No. 1326 2018; Chamber of Deputies 2018; Parliamentary file 71/0 2018).
The submitter of this amendment primarily contended that the provision could lead to legal uncertainties. There was a concern that inconsistent court decisions could leave a debtor, who had undergone a strenuous 5-year debt relief process, still burdened by debts due to stringent judicial rulings (Amendment No. 1326 2018). Therefore, as this proposal aimed to improve the position of debtors in the debt relief process, it can be clearly stated that it was in the interests of people facing debt enforcement. However, only members of STAN and the Pirates voted for this amendment. ČSSD, KSČM, and TOP 09 abstained. The other political parties, ANO, ODS, SPD, and KDU-ČSL, voted against (Vote on Amendment No. 1326 2018).
This amendment proposed more favourable conditions for debt relief (brought by the proposed insolvency act), for people who came under debt enforcement before 1 December 2016, when another law came into force. This (1 December 2016) law significantly regulated late payment penalties and arbitration clauses noted above, in favour of people facing debt enforcement. While the submitter recognised the past legislative inadequacies contributing to some people becoming entrapped in debt enforcement, he opposed the amendment’s provision for simplified debt relief measures for all people facing debt enforcement (Amendment No. 1376 2018).
Thus, the essence of this amendment went against the interests of people facing debt enforcement. It failed to be adopted by the Chamber. Examination of the voting shows support from the right-wing opposition parties – ODS, TOP 09 and populist SPD. However, the remaining members of the Chamber voted en bloc against the amendment (Vote on Amendment No. 1376 2018).
This amendment aimed to abolish the limit of the maximum amount of debt for entering into debt relief. This limit was set in the original version of the proposed law at 1,000 times the monthly subsistence level, i.e. at 2.2 million Kč (approximately €87,000) (Amendment by Jan Farský II). With 130 deputies voting in favour of the amendment, it would seem that this was not a controversial issue (Chamber of Deputies 2018; Parliamentary file 71/0 2018). However, in the early stages of the proceedings, some political parties were in fact in favour of lowering the limit, arguing that it was set too high and allowed people who had incurred a truly excessive amount of debt to receive debt relief.
Presumably, they were subsequently persuaded by arguments that the high debts described were often not the result of debtors borrowing large sums of money and then failing to repay them, but that most of such dues arose from smaller debts accompanied by a significant increase in accessories, which consisted of various fees or penalties. In other words, even loans of only tens of thousands of crowns could become debts of hundreds of thousands or even millions within the former legal limits, and that is why the deputies decided to allow these people to enter debt relief as well (Amendment No. 1327 2018; Chamber of Deputies 2018; Parliamentary file 71/0 2018).
As already mentioned, this proposal, which is clearly in favour of people facing debt enforcement, eventually received considerable support from six political parties. The only parties that did not support the proposal and abstained were TOP 09, SPD, and KSČM (Vote on Amendment No. 1327 2018).
This amendment marked a move from the insolvency act to the second crucial comprehensive law that has significantly changed debt enforcement in the Czech Republic. The essence of this amendment was to establish a so-called private-law “gracious summer” (Amendment No. 5466 2020).
In practical terms, this implies that individuals subject to debt enforcement could be eligible for debt forgiveness, provided they repaid the initial sum owed, along with an additional amount equivalent to the initial sum (Amendment No. 5466 2020; Parliamentary file 71/0 2018; Parliamentary file 545/0 2019). The rationale behind this amendment stems from an earlier Czech legal framework that permitted substantial penalties to be exercised on overdue debts. For instance, a debt of 10,000 Kč (approximately €400) could, due to non-payment, escalate to several times its original value, potentially reaching 100,000 or 200,000 Kč (approximately €4,000–€8,000) – or even more, as we noted above (Hábl et al. 2021).
It is noteworthy that part of the comprehensive proposed change in the laws – for which this proposal was only an amendment – included a similar principle. Specifically, it allowed for the settlement of debts that had increased over time, but solely for individuals indebted to the state and facing debt enforcement (e.g. debts for non-payment of health or social insurance, waste collection or travelling on public transport without a ticket) (Chamber of Deputies 2021; Parliamentary file 545/0 2019).
Consequently, it is evident that this proposal was designed to benefit individuals confronted with debt enforcement. Regarding the legislative fate of this amendment, it ultimately did not garner sufficient support. Despite endorsement from five parliamentary parties (Pirates, KDU-ČSL, ČSSD, TOP 09, and SPD), the majority threshold was not met. Four parties (ANO, ODS, STAN, and KSČM) chose to abstain. Although there were no opposing votes, the proposal failed to secure passage, as it required a majority vote from the deputies present, which was not achieved (Vote on Amendment No. 5466 2021).
As noted in the introduction, a substantial segment of the Czech population is grappling with debt enforcement issues. A notable proportion of these people have ceased attempting to repay their debts, resorting instead to illicit employment for income (Median 2018; Trlifajová, Hurrle 2018). In response to this situation, legislators proposed integrating a debt limitation mechanism into a broader legislative overhaul targeting debt enforcement procedures. The crux of this proposal is that debts that are not paid at all for a period of at least 6 years would be subject to legal extinction. Should a creditor wish to pursue the recovery of such a debt, a nominal fee (about €20) would be required, which would subsequently be appended to the existing debt of the debtor. In the absence of such action, the debt would stand absolved (Chamber of Deputies 2021; Parliamentary file 545/0. 2019).
However, it is imperative to note that the enactment of this law does not imply an automatic forgiveness of debts that have not been paid for 6 years immediately on the date of enactment of this law. The proposed legislative amendment stipulates a 3-year grace period, post-enactment, before such debts could qualify for potential forgiveness (Chamber of Deputies 2021; Parliamentary file 545/0 2019).
Nonetheless, the submitter of this amendment advocated for an extension of this grace period from 3 to 6 years (from the law’s effective date). Given that a shorter timeframe for the absolution of long-standing debts would benefit those under debt enforcement who have abandoned efforts to repay, this proposed amendment went against the interests of people facing debt enforcement (Amendment No. 7366 2021).
A review of the vote on this amendment reveals a split. Despite the endorsement of only three parties (ANO, ODS, and KSČM), the amendment passed due to their collective numerical strength in the Chamber. Meanwhile, ČSSD and TOP 09 chose to abstain, and four other parties (Pirates, STAN, KDU-ČSL, and SPD) opposed the proposal (Vote on Amendment No. 7366 2021).
Currently, in the Czech Republic, it is a widespread practice for a person confronted with debt enforcement and simultaneously owing multiple creditors to face claims filed by each creditor with a different bailiff (Chamber of Deputies 2021; Parliamentary file 545/0 2019).
This situation necessitates the debtor’s engagement with multiple bailiffs concurrently for the settlement of their obligations, significantly complicating the debt repayment process. The proposed amendment introduced the principle of one debtor-one bailiff. Practically, this implies that in cases of over-indebtedness where a creditor escalates the debt collection procedure by submitting it to a court, the court would assign a single bailiff responsible for recovering the debt. Any subsequent debts incurred by the individual would be directed to this appointed bailiff. Crucially, this bailiff would be required to operate within the debtor’s own region (Amendment No. 4518 2020).
By requiring debtors to interact with only one bailiff, this amendment can be regarded as favourable to people facing debt enforcement. Despite receiving widespread backing from six political parties in the Chamber of Deputies (Pirates, SPD, KSČM, ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, and STAN), the proposal did not garner sufficient support for enactment. Deputies from ANO and TOP 09 abstained, while ODS deputies voted against it, outnumbering those in favour of the amendment (Vote on Amendment No. 4518 2021).
This subsection provides a detailed summary of the study’s analytical findings. Substantive political representation of parties is summarized in Table 3. Each instance where a political party cast a vote in support of citizens facing debt enforcement was awarded one positive point, while each instance of voting against the interests of these citizens resulted in a deduction of one point. No points were assigned if a party abstained. Consequently, parties with higher cumulative points were assessed as having provided more substantive representation for individuals under debt enforcement, with the opposite true for lower-scoring parties. The Czech Pirate Party was identified as offering the highest level of substantive political representation for citizens under debt enforcement, whereas the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) was situated at the opposite end of the spectrum.
Political parties in representing debt-enforcement citizens.
| Amendment | KSČM | ČSSD | SPD | STAN | KDU-ČSL | Pirates | ANO | ODS | TOP 09 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Am. 1366 | 0 | + | − | + | − | + | − | − | − |
| Am. 1326 | 0 | 0 | − | + | − | + | − | − | 0 |
| Am. 1376 | + | + | − | + | + | + | + | − | − |
| Am. 1327 | 0 | + | 0 | + | + | + | + | + | 0 |
| Am. 5466 | 0 | + | + | 0 | + | + | 0 | 0 | + |
| Am. 7366 | − | 0 | + | + | + | + | − | − | 0 |
| Am. 4518 | + | + | + | + | + | + | 0 | − | 0 |
| Total score | 1 | 5 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 7 | −1 | −4 | −1 |
In Chart 1, political parties are ranked based on both the research hypothesis and their actual substantive representation of citizens facing debt enforcement. The anticipated levels of representation are derived from the RILE index, previously discussed. According to the hypothesis, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) was expected to provide the most substantive representation, with TOP 09 anticipated to offer the least. The actual levels of substantive representation achieved by each party are presented in the visualization, indicated in grey.
Expected vs actual ranking of substantive representation by party.
Chart 2 indicates the variance between a party’s actual and expected representation (it indicates how much its actual substantive representation differed from the expected). Notably, the Pirates surpassed expectations significantly (+5), meaning that they were initially predicted to rank sixth among nine parties in terms of representation but ended up first, thus moving up five places. In contrast, KSČM, originally projected to be the most substantive representative of people under debt enforcement, fell by four places (−4), as four other parties advocated more for these citizens’ interests. This method of comparison was applied to all political parties.
Variance between a party’s actual and expected representation.
The research presented in this article evaluated a specific hypothesis concerning political parties’ substantive representation of people facing debt enforcement. The findings indicate that this hypothesis was validated for four out of nine of the political parties. The hypothesis was deemed confirmed if a party’s actual representation of this demographic did not deviate from the expected representation by more than one.
The hypothesis was confirmed for the ANO, which substantively politically represented individuals confronting debt enforcement slightly less. Similarly, the hypothesis was validated for ODS, which showed the least substantive representation of this group. ČSSD also confirmed the hypothesis, ranking second in expected representation and third in actual representation, slightly under-performing the expectation. KDU-ČSL, unlike other parties that validated the hypothesis, demonstrated a higher actual representation than anticipated. In the case of TOP 09, the hypothesis was tightly not confirmed when this party substantively represented people facing debt enforcement slightly more than was envisioned. SPD and KSČM did not confirm the hypothesis, as their actual representation of those facing debt enforcement was notably lower than anticipated. On the contrary, STAN and, more significantly, the Pirates exceeded expectations in substantively representing this group.
This section discusses the key findings presented in the previous chapter. First, we reflect on the paradoxical voting behaviour of indebted citizens. We then relate our findings to existing research on populism and neoliberalism in Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, we outline the limitations of our study and propose avenues for future research.
Looking among the four parties that substantively represented the interests of citizens facing debt enforcement the least are the populist ANO and SPD. A study examining the 2017 election, which produced the parliament that voted on these legislative changes, shows that citizens facing debt enforcement paradoxically voted more often for these two political parties (Grossmann, Jurajda 2025), which represented their interests (quite) poorly in comparison to other political parties. However, this counter-intuitive finding is in line with a growing body of literature examining the very fact described above, i.e. that people often vote for political parties that do not represent their economic interests (e.g. Kinder 1997; Kruglanski, Molinario, Sensales 2021; Marcos-Marne, Plaza-Colodro, Freyburg 2019; Rovny 2015). This paradoxical voting behaviour can also be situated within a broader European trend, in which populist radical right parties increasingly appeal to voters traditionally associated with the left. Research has shown that these parties have successfully positioned themselves as rhetorical defenders of the “left-behind,” that is, citizens economically and socially marginalized by structural transformations (Etzerodt, Kongshøj 2022; Abou-Chadi, Wagner 2021). In the Czech context, this shift has taken on a somewhat unique form. While the SPD aligns clearly with the PRR model, the ANO party has adopted populist strategies that blur traditional ideological lines.
Analyses of debt enforcement in the Czech Republic show that it was representatives of populist parties SPD and ANO, alongside representatives of the left, who brought this topic into the political discourse (Hoření Samec, Trlifajová 2023; Šitera 2023). Our study complements these discourse-oriented analyses (see also Hořeni Samec 2021; Šitera 2021) of Czech debt governance by examining how these discoursive positions materialized when parties were confronted with specific legislative proposals affecting the indebted population. Our contribution lies in tracing whether those who spoke on behalf of the people facing debt enforcement also acted in their favour through parliamentary votes. The empirical voting data presented in this article suggest a mismatch between these commitments and actual parliamentary voting behaviour. This discrepancy aligns with the classic distinction introduced by Pitkin (1967) between symbolic and substantive political representation.
Our article also speaks to Scheiring (2021), which examines the influence of neoliberalism on populism in the V4 countries. The author paints a somewhat rosy picture of the situation in the Czech Republic. He writes that the Czech Republic is economically and socially very little disintegrated. However, he uses only general economic indicators such as the Gini index to justify this claim, which does not take into account wage garnishments of people facing debt enforcement. The form of Czech neoliberalism is, to some extent, different from that in other countries in Eastern Europe (e.g. Dale, Fabry 2018, Mikuš, Rodik 2021, Šitera 2021).
This difference was, for example, noticeable in connection to personal debt crises in the Eastern European region, due to loans taken out in foreign currencies, which appreciated against their own (Bohle 2013; Bohle 2018; Gagyi, Mikuš 2023; Johnson, Barnes 2014; Rodik 2015; Rodik, Mikuš 2023). This was not an issue in the Czech Republic. In the Czech Republic, many people were unable to repay their loans in the national currency, often due to high interest rates and late payment penalties.
The limitation of our article lies in its focus on the 2017–2021 electoral term, which marks an important period during which many debates and discourses around debt enforcement translated into actual legislative change. Although our analysis shows how party voting patterns shaped the legislative outcomes, we recognize that the ideological and political groundwork had been to some extent laid in the preceding term. It is also important to state that this study examines only a single parliamentary term. Future research should examine whether and how the 2021–2025 legislature has continued, reversed, or reinterpreted this trajectory.
Certain limitation of the research lies also in the fact that people facing debt enforcement are not a totally homogeneous group; some citizens are affected by some of the analysed amendments more than others. In other words, the terms of debt relief are significant for some debtors; for others, the critical issue is the length of the debt limitation period; and yet others would most benefit from the introduction of the one debtor–one bailiff principle. Nevertheless, the primary objective of this study was to comprehensively identify which political parties, in a general sense, substantively represented the interests of people facing debt enforcement.
This article has examined how Czech political parties substantively represented citizens facing debt enforcement during the 2017–2021 parliamentary term. Drawing on legislative analysis of key parameters of the law, we assessed the extent to which each party acted in the interest of economically disadvantaged citizens. Contrary to the initial hypothesis that left-leaning parties would offer the strongest support, the Czech Pirate Party emerged as the most consistent advocate for this group. Conversely, some parties commonly associated with populist or anti-establishment rhetoric, such as ANO and SPD, provided relatively little substantive support in legislative practice.
Our findings highlight a broader paradox: citizens affected by debt enforcement often support parties that do not substantively represent their economic interests. This dissonance between political behaviour and party performance reflects a growing challenge for democratic representation, particularly in times of socio-economic distress.
Future research should therefore examine in greater depth the electoral behaviour and political attitudes of this specific socio-economic group, as well as comparable marginalized groups in other European and non-European countries. We consider this line of inquiry particularly important given the observed erosion of trust in democratic institutions and politics in recent years. Understanding the political trajectories of structurally disadvantaged citizens is essential for addressing the legitimacy deficits facing contemporary democracies.
Authors state no funding involved.
Václav Šmatera developed the theoretical framework and wrote the manuscript. Both authors, Václav Šmatera and Michal Pink, conducted the analysis. The author contributions are as follows: Václav Šmatera 90%, Michal Pink 10%.
Authors state no conflict of interest.