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How does context affect self-governance? Examining Ostrom’s design principles in China Cover

How does context affect self-governance? Examining Ostrom’s design principles in China

Open Access
|Apr 2019

Figures & Tables

Table 1:

Three groups of the design principles for CPR self-governance institutions.

DP GroupDPDescription
DPG1: Rules1AClearly defined user boundaries
1BClearly defined resource boundaries
2ACongruence between local ecological and social conditions
2BCongruence between provision and appropriation conditions
DPG2: Rule enforcement4AEffective monitoring users by other accountable users
4BEffective monitoring resources by accountable users
5Graduated sanctions for users who disobey the collective rules
6Effective and low-cost mechanism of conflict resolution
DPG3: Rule-making arena3Participation of users in collective decision-making
7Minimal recognition of rights to self-governance
8Multiple layers of nested enterprises

Source: Based on Ostrom (1990) and Cox et al. (2010).

figures/ijc2019-2019020_fig_001.jpg
Figure 1:

Organization structure of the HIA.

figures/ijc2019-2019020_fig_002.jpg
Figure 2:

Theoretical framework.

Note: Based on Ostrom (2005, 15) and Clement (2010).

Table 2:

Measurements of outcome dimensions and descriptive statistics.

DimensionSurvey questions (5 points: 1=absolutely no; 5=very yes)MeanS.D.
Provision – infrastructureThe status of irrigation infrastructure is good3.481.28
The status of irrigation infrastructure is constantly improving3.731.38
Appropriation – sufficiencyThe water use is adequate to me3.331.39
The rule of water allocation can be complied efficiently3.581.37
Appropriation – equityThe process of water allocation is fair to me3.771.44
There are few disputes related to water use4.061.39
The water use is usually timely for my irrigation needs4.201.27
Table 3:

Variables of the DPs, descriptive statistics and the results of Barnard’s test.

DPGDPVariableDefinitionN% of Present casesPASAE
DPG1 rulesDP1A clear user boundaryDP1AThe group of users is according to a traditional village (0=no; 1=yes)967%n
(4 DPs, 8 Var.)DP1B clear resource boundaryDP1BThe resource boundary is according to statistics of basin area (0=administrative; 1=hydraulic)944%p
DP2A social-ecological fitDP2A1The WUA was established by whom (0=top-down pushed; 1=made by user-selves)944%
DP2A2Plans of water allocation and crops are made by whom (0=intervened or made by top-down authorities; 1=made by user-selves)967%
DP2A3Plans of maintenance are made by whom (0=intervened or made by top-down authorities; 1=made by users themselves)956%
DP2B cost-benefit fitsDP2B1The tasks of management are assigned by whom (0=intervened or made by top-down authorities; 1=made by user-selves)956%
DP2B2The rules of service fees for users are made by whom (0=intervened or made by top-down authorities; 1=made by user-selves)956%p
DP2B3The rules of mainly financial issues for the whole WUA are made by whom (0=intervened or made by top-down authorities; 1=made by users themselves)933%pp
DPG2 rule enforce-mentDP4A good resource monitoringDP4AThere is monitoring on irrigated lands in accordance with bases of water pricing (0=no; 1=yes)933%
(4 DPs, 6 Var.)DP4B good user monitoringDP4B1Water payments are announced to WUA users (0=no; 1=yes)9100%
DP4B2The WUA is self-monitored by internal monitors (0=no; 1=yes)956%
DP5 graduated sanctionsDP51There are sanction measurements for water theft or interruption (0=non; 1=exist)944%pn
DP52There are compulsory measurements for collecting water payments (0=non; 1=exist)922%n
DP6 low-cost conflict solutionDP6There is a final mechanism for solving conflicts (0=non; 1=exist)9100%
DPG3 local rule-making arenasDP3 collectively rule makingDP31The leader of the WUA was elected by (0=administrative appointment; 1=voting)978%
(3 DPs, 5 Var.)DP32A total users conference was organized when the WUA was established (0=no; 1=yes)978%
DP7 external recognitionDP7How long is the work duration for the WUA staff (0=shorter; 1=longer)967%pp
DP8 nested multiple governanceDP81The water supply contract is made with external water supply organization (0=no; 1=yes)956%p
DP82There is collaboration with other organizations (0=no; 1=yes)911%
DPG1Average presence of DPG1956%
DPG2Average presence of DPG2956%
DPG3Average presence of DPG3967%

Note: The columns of P, AS and AE are the results of the one-tail Barnard’s test (1945) between the DP variable presence and successful outcome dimensions, where “P” stands for “Provision”; “AS” stands for “Appropriation – Sufficiency”; “AE” stands for “Appropriation – Equity”; the p-values of the Barnard’s test (p<0.1) are marked there; “p” means significant positive correlation, while “n” means significant negative correlation. The full results of tests on the relations between each DP variable and outcomes can be found in Table A4.

Table 4:

Variables of the context, descriptive statistics and the results of Barnard’s test.

ContextVariableDefinitionN% of Present casesPASAE
Biophysical attributesWater scarcityC1WSWater resource conditions are good in the WUA (0=no; 1=yes)967%
Community attributesGroup sizeC2GSThe number of users in the WUA is relatively small (0=no; 1=yes)944%
Agricultural dependencyC2ADThe agricultural income of farmers in the WUA has a higher percentage in the total income (0=no; 1=yes)*44%n
AuthoritarianismResource interventionC3RFThe WUA has financial support from government (0=no; 1=yes)933%nn
C3RPThe property of infrastructure belongs to the government or the HIA (0=no; 1=yes)956%n
C3RWThe place of working is provided by the government or the HIA (0=no; 1=yes)956%
C3RThere is resource input externally. (0=no; 1=yes)967%n
Leadership interventionC3LThe identity of the leader of the WUA is the farmer or the cadre (0=farmer; 1=cadre)944%pp

Note: The columns of P, AS and AE are the results of the one-tail Barnard’s test (1945) between the DP variable presences and successful outcome dimensions, where “P” stands for “Provision”; “AS” stands for “Appropriation – Sufficiency”; “AE” stands for “Appropriation – Equity”; the p-values of the Barnard’s test (p<0.1) are marked there; “p” means significant positive correlation, while “n” means significant negative correlation. The full results of tests on the relations between each DP variable and outcomes can be found in Table A4.

*The data are calculated from the 332-user questionnaire surveys. They were asked of their agricultural income and the total income. Then, the agricultural dependency of the 9 WUAs averaged the user data by each WUA, came to divide the two and it is transferred into binary one, assigning as 1 when the value is larger than the average and as 0 when smaller.

figures/ijc2019-2019020_fig_003.jpg
Figure 3:

The Outcomes (Rotated Factor Scores) and the DPGs of the WUAs.

Note: “P” stands for “Provision”; “AS” stands for “Appropriation – Sufficiency”; “AE” stands for “Appropriation – Equity”; “DPG” stands for “design principle group”.

Table 5:

Difference in success rating depending on outcome dimensions and number of DPs.

Provision – InfrastructureAppropriation – SufficiencyAppropriation – Equity
Less than 60.00%20.00%0.00%
More than 8100.00%60.00%80.00%
figures/ijc2019-2019020_fig_004.jpg
Figure 4:

Number of successful and unsuccessful cases by number of DPs, and by outcome dimension.

Table 6:

Percentage of present cases contributing to the significance by authoritarian interventions.

TotalRLBRLBRLBRLB
DP1A67601000Success331000
Failure100100
DP1B4440670Success100670
Failure250
DP2B2564067100Success67100100
Failure050
DP2B33301000Success0100001000
Failure000
DP514440670Success1006703300
Failure25050100
DP52224000Success000
Failure50
DP76740100100Success1001000100100100
Failure25025
DP81566033100Success10033100
Failure00

Note: (1) The variable definitions, the direction and the significances of the Barnard’s test can be found in Tables 3 and 4 and Table A4. (2) The “P”, “AS”, “AE”, “R”, “L” and “B” stand respectively for “Provision”, “Appropriation – Sufficiency”, “Appropriation – Equity”, “Resource Intervention”, “Leadership Intervention” and “Both”. (3) WUAs intervened by resource interventions are wTC, wXJ, wDJ, wBY and wHT, by leadership interventions are wRM, wXD and wMY. The WUA of wTE is intervened by both. (4) The variables of highlight blanks are significantly negative related to the outcome; others are significantly positive to the outcome. (5) The % of present cases contributing to the significance is counted based on the original data in Table A2; For each significant DP variable, the value is the number of DP present and success/failure cases divided by the number of total success/failure cases under the intervention.

Table 7:

Success configurations for each outcome dimension by interventions.

InterventionsProvisionAppropriation – SufficiencyAppropriation – Equity
Only resourceNon-self-crafting rules(1) Non-self-crafting rulesNon-self-crafting rules
ANDANDAND
Internal rule enforcementInternal rule enforcementInternal rule enforcement
ANDANDAND
Nested autonomous rule-making arenaNested autonomous rule-making arenaNested autonomous rule-making arena
OR
(2) Self-crafting rules
AND
Nested autonomous rule-making arena
Only leadership(1) Self-crafting rulesSelf-crafting rules(1) Self-crafting rules
ANDANDAND
Non-internal rule enforcementNon-internal rule enforcementNon-internal rule enforcement
ANDANDAND
Loose autonomous rule-making arenaLoose autonomous rule-making arenaLoose autonomous rule-making arena
(2) Internal rule enforcement mechanisms(2) Internal rule enforcement mechanisms
ANDAND
Nested autonomous rule-making arenaNested autonomous rule-making arena
BothNon-self-crafting rulesNon-self-crafting rules
ANDAND
Non-internal rule enforcementNested autonomous rule-making arena
AND
Nested autonomous rule-making arena
Table A1:

Information of the case WUAs and related users.

CountyTownAdmin. stationWUANumber of usersAdmin. villageNumber of sampled usersDate of field researches
WXGZaZHwRM2915YL44A.M., July 22, 2015
TEHaFJwTE4702CG1414P.M., July 22, 2015
LWLTKaYGwXJ5467DX2231A.M., July 23, 2015
XG9A.M., July 23, 2015
WLTKwDJ2974XM2323P.M., July 23, 2015
WLTK & XHaYJwTC2704LS& LQ9494ALL, July 24, 2015
XHwMY2385LS1313A.M., July 24, 2015
DDKaDFwXD3165XD2148A.M., July 25, 2015
YS27A.M., July 25, 2015
LSHwHT2850HTTH3361P.M., July 25, 2015
XC6P.M., July 25, 2015
HZY14P.M., July 25, 2015
HQ8P.M., July 25, 2015
SJTHaWSwBY3416BYMD4444A.M., July 26, 2015
3 Counties7 Towns6 Stations9 WUAs14 Villages332 Users

Note: (1) The dataset includes 332 questionnaires of farming households and 9 questionnaires of WUA leaders along with in-depth interview transcripts of 9 WUA leaders and 6 administrators. (2) They were collected by China Institute for Rural Studies (CIRS) of Tsinghua University at the Hetao Irrigated Area (HIA) in Inner Mongolia province in July 2015. (3) The source of the number of users of each WUA was provided by the HIA in 2015.

Table A2:

Rotated factor loadings for the outcomes of the WUAs.

N=332MeanS.D.InfrastructureSufficiencyEquity
The status of irrigation infrastructures is good.3.481.280.815
The status of irrigation infrastructures is constantly improved.3.731.380.851
The water using is adequate to me.3.331.390.800
The rule of water allocation can be complied efficiently.3.581.370.780
The processes of water allocation are fair to me.3.771.440.761
There are few disputes in water using.4.061.390.698
The water using are usually timely for my irrigation needs.4.201.270.551
Cronbach’s alpha (internal consistency)α0.609α0.458α0.409
Variance explained (total: 60%)30%13%17%

Note: Bartlett test of the sphericity=199.534, p=0.000, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistic=0.674.

Extraction method: principal component analysis. Rotation method: varimax with Kaiser normalization.

Table A3:

Crisp-set values of all the authoritarian context, the DPs and the outcomes.

DimensionVariablewTCwXJwDJwBYwHTwTEwRMwXDwMY
Outcomes (rotated factor scores)
ProvisionP1.440.640.710.950.650.331.821.241.19
AppropriationAS1.171.291.240.460.981.570.870.891.25
AE1.040.760.770.590.821.331.671.371.36
Outcomes (transferred to crisp sets)
ProvisionPcs100000111
AppropriationAScs111001001
AEcs100001111
DPs
RulesDP1A001110111
DP1B101000011
DP2A1110011000
DP2A2011001111
DP2A3011000111
DP2B1011000111
DP2B2011001011
DP2B3000000111
Rule enforcementDP4A001100100
DP4B1111111111
DP4B2110010010
DP51100100110
DP52001100000
DP6111111111
Local rule-making arenaDP3111110/11110
DP32111110110
DP7101001111
DP81111001001
DP82100000000
No. of DP presence8611657998
DPs’ grouping
DPG1R0.250.630.750.130.250.380.630.750.88
DPG2RE0.670.500.830.830.500.330.670.670.33
DPG3LRA1.000.600.800.400.200.600.600.600.40
DPs’ grouping (transferred to crisp sets)
DPG1011000111
DPG2101100110
DPG3111001110
Context
BiophysicalC1WS111010011
CommunityC2GS101010001
C2AD100110010
AuthoritarianismC3RF010110000
C3RP110111000
C3RW111100000
C3R111111000
C3L000001111

Note: (1) The calculation of the outcome dimensions can be found in Appendix 2; (2) The contents of the independent and contextual variables can be found in Tables 3 and 4 of the main text.

Table A4:

Relation between each DP, DPG, context and outcome in the cases analyzed.

101010
DP1ASuccess310.3956%1.3230.04*22%0.3320.4144%0.8
Failure324031
DP1BSuccess310.09*78%3.5320.2067%2.0320.2067%2.0
Failure141313
DP2A1Success130.2033%0.5320.2067%2.0230.4644%0.8
Failure321322
DP2A2Success310.3956%1.3410.2567%2.0410.2567%2.0
Failure322222
DP2A3Success310.2067%2.0320.4656%1.3320.4656%1.3
Failure232222
DP2B1Success310.2067%2.0320.4656%1.3320.4656%1.3
Failure232222
DP2B2Success220.4644%0.8410.09*78%3.5320.4656%1.3
Failure321322
DP2B3Success310.01*89%8.0140.2533%0.5320.04*78%3.5
Failure052204
DP4ASuccess130.3944%0.8140.2533%0.5140.2533%0.5
Failure232222
DP4B1Success400.5044%0.8500.5056%1.3500.5056%1.3
Failure504040
DP4B2Success220.4656%1.3230.4644%0.8230.4644%0.8
Failure232222
DP51Success310.09*78%3.5140.09*22%0.3320.2067%2.0
Failure143113
DP52Success040.5056%1.3140.5044%0.8050.06*22%0.3
Failure051322
DP6Success400.5044%0.8500.5056%1.3500.5056%1.3
Failure504040
DP31Success310.4644%0.8410.5056%1.3410.5056%1.3
Failure413131
DP32Success310.4644%0.8320.1333%0.5320.1333%0.5
Failure414040
DP7Success400.05*78%3.5410.2567%2.0500.01*89%8.0
Failure232213
DP81Success220.4644%0.8500.00*100%320.4656%1.3
Failure320422
DP82Success130.1867%2.0140.3256%1.3140.3256%1.3
Failure050404
DPG1Success310.2067%2320.4656%1.25320.1756%1.25
Failure232222
DPG2Success310.2067%2230.2033%0.5320.1756%1.25
Failure233122
DPG3Success310.3956%1.25410.2567%2410.0567%2
Failure322222
101010
C1WSSuccess310.39410.25320.46
Failure322231
C2GSSuccess220.46320.20230.46
Failure231322
C2ADSuccess220.46140.09*230.25
Failure233122
C3RFSuccess040.05*140.25050.41
Failure322231
C3RPSuccess130.09320.46230.46
Failure412231
C3RWSuccess130.20*320.20140.46
Failure321331
C3RSuccess130.01*410.25230.01*
Failure502241
C3LSuccess310.09*230.46410.20
Failure142204

Note: (1) The “DP” stands for “design principle”, whose variables were formulated following the of Cox et al. (2010) and the contents of the variables can be found on Tables 3 and 4 of the main text. (2) the column of “p-values” is one-tail Barnard’s test (1945) between the DP variable presences and successful outcome dimensions and “*” is marked as “p<0.1”; the p-values are produced by an online calculator (https://scistatcalc.blogspot.com/2013/11/barnards-test-calculator.html). (3) The “Conformity” means the ratio of supportive case number (main diagonal) to the total case size (9 case WUAs) according to the DP theory. (4) The “ratio” means the number of supportive cases (main diagonal) to unsupportive cases (off-diagonal).

Table A5:

Truth table (1).

DPG1DPG2DPG3PASAE
1DPGsÔP
1113C0.667wRM, [wDJ], wXD
101100.000wXJ
100111.000wMY
011111.000wTC
010100.000wBY
001100.000wTE
000100.000wHT
2DPGsÔAS
1113C0.333[wRM], wDJ, [wXD]
101111.000wXJ
100111.000wMY
011111.000wTC
010100.000wBY
001110.000wTE
000100.000wHT
3DPGsÔAE
1113C0.667wRM, [wDJ], wXD
101100.000wXJ
100111.000wMY
011111.000wTC
010100.000wBY
001110.000wTE
000100.000wHT

Note: The square brackets in the column of cases stands for that the outcome of the case is 0, and “C” in the column of outcomes means a contradictory configuration.

Table A6:

Truth table (2).

DPG1DPG2DPG3C3RC3LPASAE
100011111wMY
111012101wRM, wXD
111101010wDJ
011101111wTC
001111011wTE
101101010wXJ
010101000wBY
000101000wHT

Note: All the consistency of the configural conditions are 1.

Table A7:

Configurations leading to the outcomes.

P1P2P3AS1AS2AS3AS4AE1AE2AE3AE4
DPG1
DPG2
DPG3
C3R
C3L
Solution formulasP←AS←AE←
dpg1*DPG2*DPG3DPG2*DPG3*C3R *c3ldpg1*DPG2*DPG3*C3R
+DPG2*DPG3+DPG1*DPG3*C3R *c3l+DPG1*DPG2*DPG3
*c3r *C3L+DPG1*dpg2*dpg3 *c3r*c3r *C3L+DPG1*dpg2*
+DPG1*dpg2**C3L+dpg1*dpg2*DPG3dpg3*c3r *C3L+dpg1*DPG3
dpg3*c3r *C3L*C3R *C3L*C3R *C3L
Number of Cases12122111211
CaseswTCwRMwMYwTCwXJwMYwTEwTCwRMwMYwTE
wXDwDJwDJwXD
Consistency11111111111
Raw coverage0.250.50.250.40.40.20.20.20.40.20.2
Unique coverage0.250.50.250.20.20.20.20.20.40.20.2
Overall solution consistency111
Overall solution coverage111

Note: (1) ● indicate the presence of a condition, and ⊗ indicate its absence. Blank spaces indicate “don’t care”. (2) On the solution header, “P”, “AS” and “AE” stands respectively for the outcome dimensions: “Provision”, “Appropriation – Sufficiency” and “Appropriation – Equity”; the numbers stand for the number of solutions for each outcome dimension. (3) On the row header, “DPG” stands for “design principle groups”; “C3R” and “C3L” stands for resource and leadership interventions. (4) This form reports the intermediate solutions. (5) conditions shown by lowercase means “absent” while by uppercase means “present”.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.916 | Journal eISSN: 1875-0281
Language: English
Published on: Apr 29, 2019
Published by: Uopen Journals
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 1 issue per year

© 2019 Yahua Wang, Minghui Zhang, Jingning Kang, published by Uopen Journals
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.