Community-level natural resource management institutions: A noncooperative equilibrium example

Figures & Tables

Match	Show
Match	6,2	0,0
Show	0,0	2,6

Match	Show
Match	0.5	0
Show	0	0.5

Solutions to the battle of the sexes game.

Solution type	Equilibrium	Exp. payoffs	Value
PSNE	(Match, Match)	(6,2)	8
	(Show, Show)	(2,6)	8
MSNE	0.75M, 0.25M	(1.5, 1.5)	3
CE-public	0.5(M, M), 0.5(S, S)	(4,4)	8

Assignment game.

Site 1	Site 2
Site 1	v₁/2, v₁/2	v₁, v₂
Site 2	v₂, v₁	v₂/2, v₂/2

Site 1	Site 2
Site 1	6, 6	12, 6
Site 2	6, 12	3, 3

Site 1	Site 2
Site 1	4, 4	8, 6
Site 2	6, 8	3, 3

Site 1	Site 2
Site 1	4, 4 (π₁₁ = 0)	8, 6 (π₁₂ = 0.5)
Site 2	6, 8 (π₂₁ = 0.5)	3, 3 (π₂₂ = 0)

General assignment game.

Site 1	Site 2
Site 1	r₁v₁, r₁v₁	v₁, v₂
Site 2	v₂, v₁	r₂v₂, r₂v₂

Site 1	Site 2
Site 1	6, 6 (π₁₁ = 0)	12, 6 (π₁₂ = 0.5)
Site 2	6, 12 (π₂₁ = 0.5)	3, 3 (π₂₂ = 0)

Assignment game with property rights: (a) Fisher 1 draws Site 1; (b) Fisher 1 draws Site 2.

S1 – illegit	S2			S1	S2
S1	r₁v₁ − m₁, (1 − p_d)r₁v₁	v₁ − m₁, v₂			S1 – illegit	(1 − p_d)r₁v₁, r₁v₁ − m₁	v₁, v₂
S2	v₂, v₁	r₂v₂, r₂v₂			S2	v₂, v₁ − m₁	r₂v₂, r₂v₂

General assignment game with rotation.