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Resource asymmetry and property rights in agricultural drainage systems: Implications for collective action Cover

Resource asymmetry and property rights in agricultural drainage systems: Implications for collective action

By: Pranay Ranjan and  Tomas Koontz  
Open Access
|Apr 2018

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.772 | Journal eISSN: 1875-0281
Language: English
Published on: Apr 23, 2018
Published by: Uopen Journals
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 1 issue per year

© 2018 Pranay Ranjan, Tomas Koontz, published by Uopen Journals
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.