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Can rewards for environmental services benefit the poor? Lessons from Asia Cover

Can rewards for environmental services benefit the poor? Lessons from Asia

Open Access
|Apr 2009

Figures & Tables

Table 1

Action sites for testing reward mechanisms.

SiteFocus of ESCurrent status
Indonesia
 BungoJungle rubber for conservation of the diversity of local plant species and wildlife habitat• Testing mini hydropower as intermediate reward for biodiversity conservation
• A private buyer (automotive wheel industry) showing interests for rubber for “green” vehicles
 Singkarak• Water quality for hydropower, native fish conservation and ecotourism
• Carbon sequestration for voluntary markets under CDM setting
• Conservation fund from local government to revitalize organic coffee in the upstream watershed
• Carbon market negotiated with private buyer (consumer goods distributor)
 Sumberjaya• Water quality for hydropower
• Watershed rehabilitation for the District Forestry Service
• Conditional tenure rewarded to farmer groups
• Hydroelectric Power company (HEP) royalty agreements signed for River Care groups along the river
The Philippines
 BakunWater quality for hydropowerHEP royalty agreements signed
 KalahanCarbon sequestration under voluntary marketCarbon market initial agreement with private buyer (automotive industry)
Nepal
 KulekhaniWater quality for hydropowerHEP royalty agreements signed
Table 2

Sample respondents representing the households of environmental service providers at each site.

SitesTargeted respondentsNumber of respondentsPercentage of households
Indonesia
 Bathin III Ulu, BungoFive groups in sub-villages at jungle rubber locations9028
 Paninggahan, SingkarakEight groups in two Nagari or village levels8043
 SumberjayaThree community groups:10327
1) two community forestry groups;
2) one River Care group;
3) one land conservation group
The Philippines
 BakunThree main clusters based on elevation:12439
1) lower (1 barangay or village);
2) middle (4 barangays); and
3) upper (2 barangays)
 Kalahan Ancestral
Domain
Two community groups based on elevation:4027
1) high elevation – (3 barangays); and
2) low elevation – (4 barangays)
Nepal
 KulekhaniSeven village development committees or VDCs9778
Total53436
Table 3

Downstream/upstream ratios of population density and areas covered by agroecosystem combinations found in Indonesia (adapted from Hadi and Noordwijk 2005).

Population DensityAreaFactor (Population
Pd Pu–1Ad Au–1Density × Area)
Lowland: rice/urban;1.60.360.58
Upland: intensive mixed
Lowland: rice/urban;110.060.66
Upland: forest
Lowland: intensive mixed;60.261.56
Upland: forest
Lowland: tree crop mixed;0.60.560.34
Upland: intensive mixed plantation
Lowland: tree crop mixed;3.60.792.84
Upland: forest
Table 4

Ratio of downstream/upstream population density in agroecosystem combinations that occur in various areas of Indonesia (adapted from Hadi and Noordwijk 2005).

Population density ratioJawa/BaliSumatraSulawesiKalimantanNTT/ NTB/ Papua
(down stream/upstream)Maluku
Downstream: rice/urban; 2.20.61.8
Upstream: intensive
mixed crops
Downstream: rice/urban; 6.420.06.8
Upstream: forest
Downstream: intensive mixed; 3.76.35.88.0
Upstream: forest
Downstream: tree crop mixed; 0.70.6
Upstream: intensive mixed
plantation
Downstream: tree crop mixed; 2.54.6
Upstream: forest
Table 5

Multiplying factors for targeting payment of 5 percent of upstream income.

ijc2009-200908-001.jpg
Table 6

Outcomes from different scenarios on area, population density and welfare.

ScenarioAd.Au–1Id.Iu–1Pd. Pu–1 βd.TαuTPu
Default1220.010.30.50.0140
ES providers occupied large area0.2220.010.30.50.0028
ES buyers occupied large area4220.010.30.50.0560*
Poor downstream buyers10.520.010.30.50.0035
Rich downstream buyers1520.010.30.50.0350
Highly populated upstream area120.750.010.30.50.0053
Highly populated downstream area12100.010.30.50.0700*
Low willingness and ability to pay of buyers1220.0030.30.50.0042
High willingness and ability to pay of buyers1220.050.30.50.0700*

[i] Note: *indicating that such scenarios have potential for downstream–upstream ES transactions.

Table 7

Local perspectives on factors contributing to poverty.

Capital/SiteBungoSingkarakSumberjayaBakunKalahanKulekhani
FinancialLow incomeLow incomeLow incomeLow incomeLow incomeLow income
Lack of financial investmentLack of financial investment No financial planning
No savings
Low prices of farm products
PhysicalPoor road infrastructureNot mentionedPoor living condition Poor living condition
Poor access to road
Lack of farm irrigation and farm inputs (fertilizer, good quality seed)
Small number of livestock
Poor access to road
Poor living condition
Poor road infrastructure
No access to market
HumanLack of knowledge
Laziness
Lack of future planning
Lack of creativity
Poor health services
Low education levelLow education level
Poor nutrition status
No access to job market
Poor access to children education
Poor health services
Low education level
Laziness
Unmotivated and bad working attitude
Low education level
Laziness
Low education level
No access to job market
Poor health services
Insecure food supply
Large family size
NaturalSmall land size
Disturbance of pests and disease to rubber plantation
Not mentionedNo access to good quality of landSmall land sizeSmall land sizeSmall land size
SocialNot mentionedInsecure land ownershipLow social participationNot mentionedNot mentionedNot mentioned
Table 8

Local perspective of constraints at each RES development stage.

Stages/SiteBungoSingkarakSumberjayaBakunKalahanKulekhani
ScopingNot mentionedLimited land size to provide ESNot mentionedLack of information about types of land management practicesNot mentionedNot mentioned
Stakeholder analysisDifficult to identify (international) buyersNot mentionedWeak local institutionsNot mentionedIndividual rights/local equityNot mentioned
Ensuring transparency of decision
NegotiationLengthy and cumbersomeLengthy and cumbersome
Unbalanced power of negotiation, low capability of sellers to negotiate
Conflict existing with potential buyers
Time consuming
Limited funding from buyers
Unsure that rewards will flow back to the communityAsymmetric information available between sellers and buyers
Unclear negotiation rules
Potential risk that the poor's concerns neglected
Lengthy and cumbersome
Monitoring and implementationDifficult to monitor ESNot mentionedNot mentionedNot mentionedPayment not sustainableNot mentioned
Table 9

Expected environmental service rewards by locals.

Capital/SiteBungoSingkarakSumberjayaBakunKalahanKulekhani
FinancialNot mentionedNot mentionedCashNot mentionedFinancial assistanceNot mentioned
Non-direct financialCooperative for credit accessReduction in electricity billAccess to soft loansReduction in electricity billAccess to soft loanReduction in electricity bill
Forming of a farmer cooperative
PhysicalMicro-hydropowerFarming tools Road infrastructureRoad infrastructureRoad infrastructureRoad infrastructure
Supply of rubber seedlingsRoad infrastructure Access to marketAccess to market
Road infrastructure
Integrated pest management tools
HumanTraining and cross-site visitTrainings for alternative small businessAgricultural extension
Information on agricultural technology
Access to labour market
Health services
Access to labour market
Educational services
Trainings for alternative small business
Public servicesTrainings for alternative small business, such as ecotourism management and non-timber forest product
NaturalNot mentionedNot mentionedNot mentionedNot mentionedNot mentionedNot mentioned
SocialRecognition as environmental championRecognition as environmental championCommunity forest permitSecurity of land tenureTrust from government (to maintain good environment)Recognition as environmental champion
DOI: https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.121 | Journal eISSN: 1875-0281
Language: English
Published on: Apr 3, 2009
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 1 issue per year

© 2009 Beria Leimona, Laxman Joshi, Meine van Noordwijk, published by Igitur, Utrecht Publishing & Archiving Services for IASC
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.