Introduction
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) was adopted by the United Nations in 2006 to ensure the human rights of all persons with disabilities, including those with intellectual disabilities (IDs). Article 12 recognises that persons with disabilities have legal capacity on an equal basis with others. At its core, legal capacity is the right to make legally significant decisions for oneself and to have those decisions recognised and respected (Arstein-Kerslake 2016; Devi 2013; Werner and Chabany 2016). However, it is still unclear how this right can be translated into practice, and there is a significant lack of information on its actual implementation (Skarstad 2018).
Sweden ratified the CRPD and its optional protocol on 15 December 2008 without any reservations or interpretative declarations. Unlike some other state parties (e.g., Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway), it did not clarify its stance on Article 12 or its implications for substitute decision-making, maintaining instead that Swedish law was already consistent with the CRPD (see Government bill 2008/09:28, pp. 42, 44, 49). Notably, Sweden still retains substitute decision-making through legal guardianship, making the role and practices of guardians central to how legal capacity is realised in practice.
Guardianship has a dual role: it can support individuals in exercising legal capacity, but it can also restrict capacity to prevent harmful decisions or exploitation (Arstein-Kerslake 2016; Devi, Bickenbach and Stucki 2011). Regardless of how guardianship and related support systems are legally structured, research consistently highlights the challenge of balancing protection with respect for self-determination (Dunn, Clare and Holland 2010; Holmqvist, Eriksson and Tideman 2023). It is not uncommon for guardianship to significantly restrict an individual’s autonomy. People with ID report that their views are often overlooked and decisions are instead shaped by external values, time pressures, or resource limitations (Skarstad 2023). Some individuals also experience rigid oversight by their guardian, particularly with regard to spending (Hultman, Tideman and Eriksson 2022). Rather than enabling self-determination, guardianship risks functioning as a restrictive system that undermines autonomy and legal capacity (Bigby, Bowers and Webber 2011; Carney et al. 2023).
References to the principle of ‘best interests’ are common within guardianship systems. In practice, ‘best interests’ often takes precedence over the individual’s own will (Wiesel et al. 2022). Typically, when an adult is deemed mentally capable of making a decision, their choice is respected as an expression of autonomy. However, if they are judged to lack the mental capacity to decide, a guardian may intervene and make a substitute decision on their behalf, supposedly in their best interests (Clough 2017). This means that autonomous choices can be overridden in the name of avoiding risk, promoting beneficence, or facilitating good life choices for someone perceived as unable to choose for themselves (Elks 2020). As a result, mental capacity assessments and ‘best interests’ interpretations play a crucial role in determining whether a person’s choices will be upheld or overridden (Arstein-Kerslake et al. 2021; Harding 2020). This is particularly concerning for individuals with ID, who have historically, and often continue to be, excluded from decision-making, leaving their lives largely shaped by others (Wiesel et al. 2022).
Sweden is often seen as progressive in disability rights and services, with a strong emphasis on self-determination for persons with disabilities (Power, Lord and DeFranco 2013). Yet, despite these aspirations, the gap between the ideals of inclusion and the lived reality of individuals with disabilities remains a persistent challenge (Altermark 2018). How guardians understand and carry out their role has direct consequences for the autonomy and everyday lives of adults with ID. Their practices may diverge considerably from the ideals of autonomy and participation described in legislation and policy, instead reflecting personal interpretations of duty, responsibility, and ‘best interests’. This article explores guardianship from the perspective of those who perform it, examining how support is enacted in daily life and how guardians’ practices and perspectives shape the lived experiences of individuals with ID in Sweden.
Guardianship in Sweden
There are two categories of adult guardianship in Sweden: limited guardian (god man) and legal administrator (förvaltare) (The Parental Code SFS 1949: 381).1 The system of limited guardianship has been cited as an example of an approach intended to support the individual’s own decision-making rather than substitute decision-making (Arstein-Kerslake 2017; Doron 2002; Werner and Chabany 2016; Wiesel et al. 2022). This interpretation is largely based on the legal framework, which suggests that limited guardianship operates on the principle of consent, seemingly respecting the individual’s will and preferences. Formally, this is indeed the case: a limited guardian is principally intended to provide support, whereas a legal administrator functions as a substitute decision-maker and is regarded as a coercive measure (Fridström Montoya 2015). Limited guardians do not have the legal authority to make financial and legal decisions without the individual’s consent, unlike a legal administrator. However, in practice, guardianship may diverge significantly from this principle, a discrepancy that this article seeks to highlight.
In Sweden, the role of a guardian is voluntary and can be held by laypeople, including relatives to the individual, or by professionals, with many guardians managing multiple assignments simultaneously. They can receive remuneration for their services and compensation for expenses. The District Court appoints guardians and legal administrators, while the Municipal Council oversees their regulation and supervision through an appointed Chief Guardian (Giertz 2018). There are no formal educational requirements, although in recent years it has become more common to ask prospective guardians to complete some kind of training. These programmes, however, are often limited and only focus on economic and legal matters rather than the relational aspects of guardianship (see the Swedish Government Official Report SOU 2021:36).
Despite broader societal advancements, guardianship laws in Sweden have remained largely unchanged, with regulations governing the practice dating back to 1924 (Odlöw 2005). The reforms that have taken place have focused on the regulations surrounding the appointment of a guardian, not the nature of the assignment, the conduct of the guardian, or the individual’s influence over decisions. Notably, there are no legal requirements obligating guardians to consider the preferences of those they represent, leaving room for guardians to impose their own views on what they believe is in the individual’s best interests (Giertz 2012; Nyberg 2020).
Guardianship as a Contradictory Practice
Research on the specific practices and strategies of guardians is limited, though existing studies highlight several important characteristics of guardianship. A recurring theme is the inherent power imbalance, as guardians act in both supportive and controlling roles (Skarstad 2023). Persuasion is a key dynamic in these relationships, where the guardian’s authority makes it difficult for individuals to resist influence (Brosnan and Flynn 2017). At times, this dynamic results in undue influence or coercion, disciplining individuals into conformity with external expectations (Dunn et al. 2010; Giertz 2012). In the Nordic context, financial management is described by guardians as one of their most important tasks, while the individual’s participation in this area is viewed as less important (Giertz 2018). This can extend into control, where spending is closely monitored or restricted based on the guardian’s judgement (Hultman, Tideman and Eriksson 2022; Skarstad 2023).
More specifically, guardians’ approaches to decision-making also shape how the role is carried out. Long-term interpretations of an individual’s ‘will’ may override immediate preferences, with everyday decisions dismissed as insignificant despite their cumulative impact on self-determination (Wiesel et al. 2022). In addition, cognitive reasoning may be valued over emotional preferences, limiting opportunities for individuals to make choices based on personal desires (Ryrstedt 2014). Guardians may also shape which options are discussed and what counts as relevant knowledge, sometimes undervaluing the individual’s own expertise (Kaminskiy 2015).
Beyond the obvious restrictive practices of guardians, broader societal narratives also shape participation in guardianship. Perceptions of disability often dictate role expectations, shaping how individuals are viewed and treated. An ID diagnosis may lead to assumptions of incompetence, particularly regarding decision-making (Watson 2016). Paternalistic discourses, such as viewing persons with ID as dependent and needing childlike care, further influence how participation is supported or restricted (Shakespeare 2000; Shakespeare 2014). On the other hand, research shows that positive perceptions of an individual’s decision-making ability strongly shape the supporter’s responsiveness to their wants and wishes. Supporters who view individuals as capable are more likely to engage in dialogue, share information, and consider their perspectives (Watson 2016), whereas when individuals are judged incapable, their choices are often overridden in the name of ‘best interests’ (Clough 2017).
Thus, the ‘best interests’ standard also shapes how guardianship is applied in practice. It is grounded on the assumption that some individuals lack the mental capacity to make sound decisions and therefore need protection from their own ‘unwise’ choices (Holness 2014). Such notions may lead to the framing of individuals with ID as highly vulnerable and are closely tied to risk assessments (Jayes et al. 2020; Kohn and Blumenthal 2014; Titterton 2005). Notably, restrictive interventions are more frequently imposed on disabled individuals than on their non-disabled counterparts (Wyllie and Saunders 2018). Practitioners may limit the ‘risk space’ excessively, justifying substitute decision-making for relatively minor risks, and extending restrictions to everyday risks generally accepted as part of life (Holler and Werner 2022). Consequently, practitioners face the challenge of balancing reasonable protection with unnecessary restrictions (Ibrahim and Davis 2013). Moreover, it has been argued that ‘best interests’ judgements often lack consistency, functioning instead as flexible frameworks shaped by the personal values of guardians and supporters, obscuring subjective reasoning under the guise of objectivity (Carney et al. 2023).
While there is broad agreement that some individuals require support to exercise legal capacity, the manner in which this support should be implemented remains complex. In practice, decision-making support goes beyond legal and theoretical frameworks, involving context-dependent, real-world considerations. This highlights the need to examine how guardianship functions in practice, as its application often diverges from legislative and policy ideals (Gooding 2015). This article contributes to filling this research gap by focusing on guardians’ perceptions and experiences, which directly influence how support is enacted. Using empirical data, the article adds to previous theoretical discussions of ‘best interests’ and mental capacity assessments in guardianship by providing real-world insights. It also offers a critical perspective on supported decision-making within the Swedish guardianship system (god man), which in practice may include more restrictive elements than previously recognised or intended.
Aims
The main purpose of this article is to critically explore how guardians in Sweden interpret and carry out their role, focusing on how they handle decision-making, as well as support and control. The article also aims to analyse how perceptions of mental capacity and best interests shape their practices and influence the roles they ascribe to themselves and to the individuals they represent.
Method
This is a qualitative study, and the data consist of 16 individual semi-structured interviews with Swedish guardians, conducted between 2023 and 2024. A qualitative study does not aim for representation or generalisation, but strives for variation within the sample to obtain rich and varied empirical material. The participants were recruited through a regional association for guardians and a municipal Legal Administration Unit, aiming to include a mix of both lay and professional guardians. Twelve were laypersons, three of whom were relatives to the individual they represented. The other four were professionals. Ten women and six men aged 30–80 years participated. The majority, primarily laypersons, were over 70, whereas the younger participants were all found among the professionals.
The interviews were conducted either face-to-face or digitally via Zoom, based on the participant’s preference. For in-person interviews, participants chose the location, though most took place at the author’s office. Participants who opted for Zoom took part from their home or workplace. Conducting interviews virtually posed no significant challenges, and the conversations flowed similarly to those held in person.
The research project was approved by the Swedish Ethical Review Agency (Dnr: 2023-00749-01). All participants provided recorded verbal consent. Before recording began, they were informed of the study’s purpose, what participation would entail, and the voluntary nature of their involvement, including their right to withdraw consent. They also had the opportunity to ask clarifying questions. To ensure confidentiality, participants were assigned pseudonyms. The interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim with some adjustments for readability, and then analysed using thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006; Braun and Clarke 2021). Each transcript was coded, compared, and organised into preliminary themes. Particular attention was paid to issues of power, conceptualizations of best interests and disability, as well as concrete examples of strategies described by guardians. Through successive rounds of refinement, the most salient themes across the interviews were identified, allowing for the systematic exploration of recurring patterns in the data.
Theoretical Framework
The study adopts a critical perspective, interrogating the intentions and functions of guardianship in relation to individuals with ID and framing it as shaped by societal norms, structures, and underlying power relations. It draws on a social perspective of disability that critiques normative concepts such as normality, competence, and independence, and challenges explanations of disability that focus on deficits or a lack of ability in the individual (Barnes and Mercer 2010). In this article, individuals with ID are viewed as active agents who may sometimes need support to express their wishes, with such support not diminishing their capacity for self-determination. Relationships based on genuine support and participation can empower the individual, ensuring they retain control over their decisions (Arstein-Kerslake 2016).
Rather than viewing power solely in terms of domination or hierarchical control, power may be conceptualised as something that operates through relationships—diffuse, shifting, and embedded in everyday interactions (Foucault 1995; Watson 2000). ‘Governmentality’ refers to the ways in which power is exercised not only through laws or the state but also by shaping people’s behaviours and self-governance to align with broader social, political, and economic objectives (Foucault 2003). Power is exercised not only through overt restrictions but also through more subtle forms of guidance, persuasion, and moral shaping, often framed as support or care (Epstein 1999; Foucault 1982; Foucault 1990). This dual nature—at once supportive and disciplinary—renders it both productive and constraining. Guardianship is a particularly illustrative context, as it involves a formalised, asymmetric relationship in which one actor is assigned the role of support while also wielding significant authority over another’s decisions. Power is exercised not only through overt restrictions but also through more subtle forms of guidance, persuasion, and moral shaping (Börjesson, Palmblad and Wahl 2005).
The theoretical lens draws on perspectives that situate governmentality and power within the contemporary welfare and social work context, focusing specifically on how clienthood is shaped through ongoing classification and regulation (Altermark 2018; Börjesson, Palmblad and Wahl 2005; Hall 2003; Tremain 2005). It is used to analyse how guardians interpret and perform their roles, and how power circulates in the everyday decisions and interactions that shape the lives of those they support. Of particular interest are the normative assumptions embedded in these interactions, which frame the individual as dependent and in need of moral guidance.
Findings
In this section, the data will be presented through three themes: (1) participation perceived as inconvenient and problematic; (2) conditional financial autonomy; and (3) fostering financial diligence and moral responsibility.
Participation perceived as inconvenient and problematic
Guardians describe the individual’s abilities based on personal perceptions rather than medical diagnoses, often unaware of details in the official medical certificates. As they do not have much else to go on, they focus on perceived challenges, such as communication, comprehension, and impulse control: ‘He knows nothing. He is like a child, so to speak. And then I have another one – he’s a bit more alert, but he doesn’t talk much either’ (Marianne, layperson). Across interviews, it is clear that the guardians’ views of the individual’s mental capacity shape their approach to guardianship, particularly regarding whether to involve the individual in decision-making. If seen as lacking capacity, guardians often feel little need to inform or engage them. Many cite limited understanding, especially regarding money, to justify minimal involvement in decisions. Also, if the individual is seen as lacking comprehension, guardians consider self-determination less important, assuming it will not be missed. As one participant put it: ‘He (the individual) gets no joy from that integrity. It just becomes troublesome’ (Helena, relative). The guardian’s perspective on their mandate and responsibilities also seems to be closely tied to their assessment of the individual’s capacity. When the person is seen as lacking capacity, guardianship often functions like legal administration, with similar levels of authority.
If the person doesn’t understand what the matter is about, then you’re somewhat of a ‘light’ legal administrator (…) I’ve tried to point out that I’m the one who makes the decisions. (Markus, professional)
Several guardians note that their role becomes more complex when individuals take independent initiative, especially in purchases. These individuals are seen as harder to manage—not because they can’t make decisions, but because they are viewed as making poor ones. They have some capacity, but not enough or the right kind. Guardians often position themselves as the active decision-makers, encouraging passivity in the individual. Independent actions may therefore be perceived as problematic, potentially causing issues for the guardian and themselves. Therefore, these individuals are sometimes referred to as ‘difficult’ cases in comparison to individuals with less ability to act on their own:
Either they are severely lowly gifted and don’t fully understand how things work, or they are somewhere in between – thinking they understand but not actually grasping it. But those individuals are the most difficult. They really want to decide, but in those cases, you have to be extremely clear about what rules apply. (Patrik, layperson)
Due to such challenges and conflicts, some guardians prefer legal administration, which simplifies their role by granting full decision-making authority, especially over finances. Others advocate for a stricter form of guardianship that increases guardian control—particularly over financial matters—without fully removing the individual’s autonomy. This is often tied to concerns about individuals accessing their own accounts and the need to prevent reckless spending. Ultimately, guardians’ perceptions of the individual strongly shape their approach and interactions.
Across many of the interviews, there was both an explicit and tacit assumption that individuals who have a guardian have it for a reason. Namely, a presumed lack of decision-making ability associated with ID. Decision-making incapacity was framed as inherent, serving as the very justification for guardianship. Consequently, some guardians expressed open frustration with the emphasis on individual choice, whether this emphasis came from the individuals themselves, their relatives, or from authorities: ‘He gains nothing from it. He loses financially. I gain nothing from it. No one in society gains from it’ (Helena, relative). In this context, autonomy is viewed not as a positive value but as a potential problem for the individual, the guardian, and society as a whole.
There is a lot legal administration prevents. And it takes away the individual’s freedom. So it is a major intervention in the individual’s life. But I mean, it’s worse if that individual mismanages their finances. And ends up on the street. Becomes homeless. Or doesn’t have money for food for the day. Isn’t it better to go straight for legal administration? (…) But it sounds like this Swedish way of thinking… Or the lawmakers, who say that the individual is worth it. (Sabina, layperson)
Autonomy is often weighed against risks and notions of best interests, and at times framed through discourses of moral worth. From a guardian’s perspective, some individuals may not be worth the effort or risk that participation entails, or are simply unsuited for it, which makes Sweden’s policy emphasis on self-determination troublesome.
Conditional financial autonomy
When the individual and guardian disagree on what constitutes the individual’s best interests, conflict often arises. In such cases, the guardians tend to follow their own judgement, citing the individual’s perceived lack of mental capacity, which becomes a key rationale for exercising control in the name of protection. Guardians frequently refer to various risks, often focusing on worst-case scenarios they view as real and ongoing concerns, such as homelessness. These risks are weighed heavily against the individual’s preferences, with the person’s will rarely taking priority. While some risks may be immediate and serious, others are hypothetical, based on assumptions about vulnerability related to disability.
The best interest standard is rarely interpreted as including the individual’s right to make their own decisions. Guardians seldom argue that acting in someone’s best interest should reflect what that person would have chosen. Instead, the concept is primarily used to justify overriding the individual’s wishes, especially when the guardian’s idea of the ‘right’ decision clearly conflicts with the person’s expressed or presumed preferences: ‘There is a lot of conflict. But there’s nothing I can do about it because I know what’s best for her. She doesn’t’ (Nour, professional). In this context, best interests often reflect societal norms, such as financial responsibility or conventional behaviours, rather than the individual’s values or goals.
Conflicts also arise when individuals act in ways that challenge the guardian’s responsibilities—particularly in financial matters. The most common issue is excessive spending, which is frequently cited as a risk requiring intervention. In such cases, the individual’s independence and self-determination are framed as problematic, as they are seen to interfere with the guardian’s ability to fulfil their duties. As one guardian said: ‘The most important thing in my cases is ensuring that they don’t have the ability to access their money. (…) Otherwise, they create problems for themselves’ (Stefan, professional).
Financial management emerges as a central focus in guardianship. The guardians express that they are expected to control spending, often requiring individuals to seek permission to access their own money. A widespread practice, mentioned in every interview, involves giving individuals a fixed weekly or monthly allowance, commonly referred to as ‘pocket money’. This amount is typically deposited into a limited-access account, separate from the guardian-managed transaction and savings accounts. Accessing other accounts is often considered misbehaviour, a form of ‘tampering’, and several guardians emphasise the need to prevent such attempts.
You should have the right to a pocket money account where you can buy ice cream and hot dogs and stuff. But not mess with the other [accounts]. Because that’s what leads to being forced into legal administration unnecessarily. (Patrik, layperson)
Other administrative measures also reinforce control. A common example is redirecting the individual’s mail to the guardian through a ‘special mailing address,’ often justified as necessary for managing bills and services. However, this limits the individual’s access to personal information and is rarely discussed with them. Some guardians state that no communication or consent is required. This encouraged passivity often rests on the idea of ‘presumed consent.’ Guardians may interpret initial acceptance of guardianship as ongoing permission to manage everyday matters without consultation. Since the law only requires consent for major decisions, most day-to-day choices fall outside this requirement. As a result, participation depends largely on whether the guardian chooses to inform the individual. Some describe a ‘do first, ask later’ approach, which still relies on the guardian taking the initiative.
Too much emphasis on consent can also be perceived as troublesome for the guardian, as it can be counterproductive to achieving what they believe to be their duty, namely caring for the individual’s well-being:
I mean, they have to listen to us when we represent them. Why do they need their consent? Because when we are responsible for their care and well-being, we know what is best for them. They (the individuals) don’t know what is best for them. Yet, they are the ones who must give their consent. That’s what I find frustrating. For example, the woman who refuses all services, why don’t they listen to us? “That would be coercion”. Okay, but what type of coercion is that? There’s so much bureaucracy. (Miriam, layperson)
Taken together, these measures contribute to making the guardian’s assignment more manageable—which, from a practical standpoint, is understandable. However, this also means that the individual’s ‘best interests’ are often shaped by what is most efficient or least burdensome for the guardian, or what they perceive to be expected of them.
Fostering financial diligence and moral responsibility
As noted, many guardians see it as their duty to control the individual’s spending, often to encourage financial stability. Guardians frequently describe the individuals as financially disadvantaged, with little room for discretionary spending, making strict budgeting essential. Several express concerns over how financial hardship restricts individuals from accessing even basic needs or small personal wants. Yet financial control often goes beyond economic necessity. It becomes closely tied to the guardian’s subjective judgements about what constitutes a ‘reasonable’ or ‘useful’ purchase: ‘I’m pretty sure I would have said no. It has to be reasonable, of course, but on the other hand, it can cost money if it’s something good’ (Bengt, layperson). Individuals may only be ‘allowed’ to buy something if it aligns with what the guardian deems appropriate, regardless of whether the individual has sufficient funds. It is also worth noting that guardians’ perceptions of an individual’s needs are shaped by their views of disability and the preconceived notions that accompany them. For example, one guardian explained, ‘He is at a preschool level, about one and a half years old mentally. Only basic needs apply’ (Markus, professional).
Such value-based decisions become especially pronounced when money is tight, reinforcing the guardian’s role in shaping and limiting spending choices. The pocket money is sometimes kept deliberately low to ensure that the individual must request additional funds for certain purchases: ‘I have constant conversations every day with people asking for more pocket money and similar requests. I try to distribute it gradually, maybe 100 crowns (approximately nine euros) per day’ (Patrik, layperson). When extra money is provided, it is often limited to pre-approved purposes. Financial control thus extends to both large expenses and small, everyday purchases.
Guardians may also intervene in personal preferences that fall outside clear financial concerns. Some examples mentioned include discouraging magazine subscriptions considered ‘weird,’ expressing concern over fast food habits, or intervening in relationships viewed as financially unstable. These examples show how financial and personal oversight often overlap. In many cases, a guardian’s sense of the individual’s best interests requires involvement in broader aspects of life, particularly when financial concerns are linked to personal issues. Worries about destructive behaviours, such as addiction, or fears of exploitation, often shape the perceived need for control. At the same time, financial oversight can prompt deeper involvement in the individual’s daily life, creating a mutually reinforcing cycle of control.
I’m not supposed to tell my clients how to handle their relationships. But as long as it affects their finances and living situation, I am forced to step in and say that we need to set some rules here. (Nour, professional)
Guardians often stress the importance of the individual learning to ‘behave’ within the framework of guardianship, which typically means following the rules and expectations established by the guardian. The rationale may still be framed in terms of protection; however, the underlying goal appears to shift towards ensuring compliance and reducing what are perceived as disruptive or problematic behaviours.
They don’t get up to a lot. The guy might try, but he knows that it would be over his dead body, so he doesn’t do anything because then he’d have me on his back. It’s easy to fall back into a couple hundred thousand in debt. (Bengt, layperson)
A recurring tendency is to differentiate between individuals, categorising some as ‘nice’ and well-behaved clients, while labelling others as ‘difficult’ and in need of correction. For example: ‘The others are really nice. They behave themselves. I send pocket money once a week and call to check how they’re doing. Some function effortlessly’ (Miriam, layperson).
Guardians describe how they begin by attempting to influence the individual’s behaviours through persuasion and motivation: questioning purchases, suggesting alternatives, or encouraging different choices. However, when individuals resist or push back, guardians may escalate their approach from guidance to more coercive tactics. These tactics can include using threatening or disapproving language, withholding or restricting access to funds, or transferring the individual’s bank accounts to another bank without their knowledge—effectively ‘hiding’ the money, which one guardian described as a commonly recommended strategy. In some cases, guardians escalate to more coercive measures, including threatening or actually applying for legal administration. An action that, once approved, fully revokes the individual’s legal access to their own finances.
Most of them can see the accounts that I manage. But they are not allowed to touch them. That’s the first thing I tell them. I say, if you touch that account, you’ll get a legal administrator. And they are terrified of that. (Lisbeth, layperson)
Notably, displeasure with a guardian, or even an attempt to request a change of guardian, may result in the appointment of a legal administrator. One limited guardian explained that an individual had sought to change guardian due to perceiving them as overly controlling; however, this instead led the guardian to apply for legal administration—a request that was approved. The prospect of legal administration thus constitutes a very real threat, one that may discourage individuals from voicing their wishes and needs.
In situations where control cannot be maintained through either persuasion or coercion, guardians may resort to avoidance, refusal, or withdrawal. Some describe choosing to resign from the assignment altogether, while others petition for the guardianship to be terminated, arguing that the individual does not ‘consent to the guardianship in practice’. Guardians may also exert control by inaction, refusing to act on the individual’s behalf if they consider the request inappropriate. One guardian, for example, declined to assist when an individual wanted to appeal a government decision.
I would not have appealed that. You’ll have to do that yourself. I am careful to not see myself as a serf. Or as an assistant. This assignment is different. It is partly guided by what I believe is best. I have been deemed suitable for my role. I have been deemed suitable for this. To make this assessment. So that should stand. (Markus, professional)
Discussion
This article examined how Swedish guardians interpret and carry out their assignments, exposing the tension between formal ideals of support and the everyday practices through which control is exercised. Although framed in law as a mechanism to uphold legal capacity, guardianship often restricts autonomy through conditional participation, financial regulation, and the imposition of moral norms. Guardians’ authority is legitimised through assumptions of incapacity, which not only justify but also normalise interventions into the everyday lives of people with ID.
Enforcing self-governance
Taken together, the findings suggest that power is central to the guardianship relationship, even when framed as care or protection. Guardianship can be understood as a form of governmentality (Foucault 2003), where everyday practices of guidance, persuasion, and control shape how individuals act and choose. It is not a power that simply restrains freedom but one that incites individuals to be free in a particular way. It operates by structuring the possible field of action, encouraging certain behaviours while discouraging others. At the same time, technologies of discipline and restriction serve to contain behaviours judged as problematic or risky (Foucault 1995). Within this framework, guardians often view their role as extending beyond support, with independent action and self-determination framed less as goals to foster than as obstacles to their primary duties of financial management, protection from harm, and shaping the individual’s conduct.
At times, the emphasis on fostering financial diligence and moral responsibility borders on discipline and control. Practices such as deliberately keeping pocket money low to ensure that individuals must repeatedly request funds, or permitting purchases only if they align with the guardian’s sense of what is ‘reasonable’ or ‘useful’, keep the individual under constant supervision and with the guardian steering everyday choices. Moral judgements extend from seemingly trivial matters, such as ‘weird’ magazine subscriptions, to intimate concerns like intervening in relationships perceived as financially unstable, illustrating how financial oversight and moral judgement overlap. Individuals are monitored not to exercise free choice but to internalise acceptable norms of behaviour, responsibility, and self-management.
The power to survey and discipline is embedded in the guardian’s role, legitimised by the assumption that guardians possess abilities or competencies that the individual lacks, namely mental capacity. Guardians’ expressed frustration over the emphasis on individual choice reflects this logic, since incapacity itself is the very justification for guardianship. People with ID are categorised as subjects defined by their need for support, which prescribes both what they can and cannot do and how they relate to others, particularly guardians. Such categorisation legitimises interventions and expectations of compliance, permission-seeking, and acceptance of one’s role within guardianship. These positions are not neutral; they separate people with ID from ‘normal’ others and facilitate institutional control (Yates 2005). Individuals under guardianship are positioned within an evaluative framework that makes their conduct subject to regulation and sanction.
The conditionality of autonomy
These dynamics can be understood as part of broader features of the modern welfare state, where norms and techniques are designed to prevent attitudes and behaviours seen as disruptive to social order (Börjesson, Palmblad and Wahl 2005). Within this framework, citizenship and autonomy often appear conditional, with greater freedom afforded to those who align with prevailing norms. Those who are considered particularly hard to manage, who resist guidance or fail to demonstrate the expected self-discipline, may become subject to interventions. In such situations, guardians may act as conduct experts, guiding individuals towards socially accepted forms of conduct. Such interventions are frequently framed in emancipatory terms, presented as supporting individuals in achieving their ‘best interests’ and regaining control over their lives.
Guardians’ frequent emphasis on so-called ‘difficult’ or ‘tampering’ clients underscores the value they place on individuals’ willingness to follow their rules. This concern reflects broader tendencies in social welfare policy and care practice, where interventions are framed as efforts to motivate and reach consensus rather than to exercise overt force (Epstein 1999). Yet, the task often remains one of governing or adjusting the client, which fills the practice with inherent contradictions. Within this logic, autonomy is conditional, granted only when individuals demonstrate diligence and conformity, signalling that they are ‘good clients’ willing to adjust to the guardian’s standards (Moffat 1999). The contrast between ‘nice’ clients who require little supervision and those labelled ‘difficult’ highlights this conditionality and the way compliance is rewarded with relative freedom (see also Fernqvist 2018). Those who resist or deviate from expectations risk being cast as problematic, which can justify more restrictive interventions (Juhila 2003).
More coercive strategies further illustrate this disciplinary logic. As mentioned, guardians may withhold money, threaten or apply for legal administration, or refuse to act on behalf of the individual to enforce specific behaviours. The use of legal administration as a threat shows how fear itself becomes a regulatory tool, discouraging resistance or even requests for change of guardian. Such practices do not foster autonomy but deepen dependency within a system of behavioural regulation. Even the least restrictive strategies, like motivation, are not neutral; they encourage behaviours aligned with normative expectations and thus function as subtle forms of discipline. Given the inherent power imbalance in guardianship, the individual’s capacity to resist is limited (Brosnan and Flynn 2017).
The issue extends beyond individual guardian attitudes and is shaped by legal and policy frameworks that restrict participation and promote control. Routine practices such as redirecting mail to the guardian, limiting financial access to ‘pocket money,’ and applying presumed consent in everyday matters exclude individuals, institutionalise passivity, and place them firmly under the guardian’s supervision. These measures also serve administrative purposes, facilitating more efficient financial management. The emphasis on financial control does not originate solely from individual guardians but is embedded in a broader system in which guardians themselves are subject to oversight. They must report their actions to the Chief Guardian, who places particular emphasis on documenting transactions to demonstrate proper financial conduct. In this way, guardians are also governed, positioned as efficient agents of the state’s administrative system (Drinkwater 2005).
This study provides an empirically grounded account of how guardianship functions as a form of behavioural governance, where power operates not only through formal authority but through everyday practices of moral shaping. Beyond offering support, guardianship thus becomes a site where norms of responsibility, diligence, and proper citizenship are enacted and reinforced. It should also be acknowledged that guardianship practices are varied and that some guardians do make committed efforts to listen to and advance the will and preferences of those they support. Recognising this variation does not diminish the patterns in the findings but highlights the complexity of the role. Guardians face real challenges in balancing respect for individual choices with perceived duties of protection, yet these findings reveal how deeply support and control are entangled within the guardianship relationship. This underscores the limitations of Sweden’s current approach to legal capacity and its implementation of the CRPD, raising questions about how support can be reconceptualised beyond paternalistic protection towards genuine recognition of individuals’ will and preferences. It also raises broader questions about the purpose of decision-making support, extending from guardians’ practices to the interpretations of Article 12 of the CRPD and its General Comments (Broström, Nilsson and Fridström Montoya 2025). As reforms unfold in several countries, greater attention must be paid to how guardians interpret and enact their role, since their practices directly shape not only the autonomy but also the everyday lives of those under guardianship.
Notes
Competing Interests
The author has no competing interests to declare.
