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Open Access
|Oct 2017

Abstract

Backward induction (BI) was one of the earliest methods developed for solving finite sequential games with perfect information. It proved to be especially useful in the context of Tom Schelling’s ideas of credible versus incredible threats. BI can be also extended to solve complex games that include an infinite number of actions or an infinite number of periods. However, some more complex empirical or experimental predictions remain dramatically at odds with theoretical predictions obtained by BI. The primary example of such a troublesome game is Centipede. The problems appear in other long games with sufficiently complex structure. BI also shares the problems of subgame perfect equilibrium and fails to eliminate certain unreasonable Nash equilibria.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/slgr-2017-0016 | Journal eISSN: 2199-6059 | Journal ISSN: 0860-150X
Language: English
Page range: 9 - 24
Published on: Oct 31, 2017
Published by: University of Białystok
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 issues per year
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© 2017 Marek M. Kamiński, published by University of Białystok
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.