References
- Ajdukiewicz K. (1967). Intensional Expressions. Studia Logica, 20, 63–86.10.1007/BF02340029
- Brogaard B. (2007). Span Operators. Analysis, 67(1), 72–79.10.1093/analys/67.1.72
- Brown S. C. (1964–65). Intentionality without Grammar. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 65, 123–146.10.1093/aristotelian/65.1.123
- Carnap R. (1947). Meaning and Necessity. University of Chicago Press.
- Chalmers D. (2011). Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account. Nous 45(4), 595–639.10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00788.x
- Chisholm R. C. (1955–56). Sentences about Believing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series, 56, 125–148.10.1093/aristotelian/56.1.125
- Chisholm R. (1957). Perceiving. Ithaka.
- Chisholm R. (1986). Bibliography. In R. J. Bogdan (ed.) Roderick M. Chisholm (pp. 219–233). D. Reidel Publishing Company, Springer.
- Church A. (1954). Intensional Isomorphism and Identity of Belief. Philosophical Studies, 5(5), 65–73.10.1007/BF02221771
- Dąbrowski A. (2013). Intencjonalność i semantyka [Intentionality and Semantics]. Universitas.
- Dennett D.C. (1969). Content and Consciousness. Routledge.
- Dennett D.C. (1989)a. Evolution, Error, and Intentionality. In D. C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance pp. 287–321). The MIT Press.
- Dennett D.C. (1989)b. Making Sense of Ourselves. In D. C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance (pp. 83–101). The MIT Press.
- Fodor J. (1987). Psychosemantics. The MIT Press.10.7551/mitpress/5684.001.0001
- Foxall G. R. (2007). Intentional Behaviorism. Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 1–55.
- Hocutt M. O. (1972). Is Epistemic Logic Possible?. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 13(4), 433–453.10.1305/ndjfl/1093890705
- Kenny A. (2003). Action, Emotion and Will. 2nd edition, Routledge (first edition: 1963).10.4324/9780203711460
- Kim J. (2003). Chisholm’s Legacy on Intentionality. Metaphilosophy, 34(5), 649–662.10.1111/j.1467-9973.2003.00299.x
- Łukasiewicz J. (1910). O zasadzie sprzeczności u Arystotelesa, Studium krytyczne. [On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle. A Critical Study.] Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności.
- Marras A. (1968) Intentionality and Cognitive Sentences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 29(2), 257–263.10.2307/2105856
- Matthews R.J. (2007). The Measure of Mind. Propositional Attitudes and their Attribution. Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211258.001.0001
- Marcus R.B. (1993). Modalities. Oxford University Press.
- Morick H. (1971). Intentionality, Intensionality and the Psychological. Analysis, 32(2), 39–44.10.1093/analys/32.2.39
- Olafson F. (1975). Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality in Contemporary Perspective. Nous, 9(1), 73–83.10.2307/2214342
- Prior A.N. (1968). Intentionality and Intensionality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 42, 92–106.
- Putnam H. (1975). The Meaning of Meaning. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7, 131–193.10.1017/CBO9780511625251.014
- Salmon W., Soames S. (1988). Introduction, In N. Salmon & S. Soames (Eds.), Propositions and Attitudes (pp. 1–6). Oxford University Press.
- Searle J. (1983). Intentionality. Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139173452
- Sendłak M. (2016). Alternative Frameworks and Counterpossibles. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 93, 24–41.10.1163/18756735-09301002
- Stalnaker R.C. (1984). Inquiry. The MIT Press.
- Stich S. (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
- Tałasiewicz M. (2010). Philosophy of Syntax. Springer Netherlands.10.1007/978-90-481-3288-1
- Vendler Z. (1972). Res Cogitans. Cornell University Press.
- Yoder J. L. (1987). Chisholm’s Criteria of Intentionality. Philosophia 17, 297–305.10.1007/BF02455050