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Carrots and Sticks as Incentive Mechanisms for the Optimal Initiation of Insolvency Proceedings Cover

Carrots and Sticks as Incentive Mechanisms for the Optimal Initiation of Insolvency Proceedings

By: Jaka Cepec and  Mitja Kovac  
Open Access
|Jul 2016

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/danb-2016-0005 | Journal eISSN: 1804-8285 | Journal ISSN: 1804-6746
Language: English
Page range: 79 - 103
Published on: Jul 7, 2016
Published by: European Association Comenius - EACO
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 issues per year

© 2016 Jaka Cepec, Mitja Kovac, published by European Association Comenius - EACO
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.