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Carrots and Sticks as Incentive Mechanisms for the Optimal Initiation of Insolvency Proceedings Cover

Carrots and Sticks as Incentive Mechanisms for the Optimal Initiation of Insolvency Proceedings

DANUBE
Volume 7 (2016): Issue 2 (June 2016)
By:  and    
Open Access
|Jul 2016
References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/danb-2016-0005 | Journal eISSN: 1804-8285 | Journal ISSN: 1804-6746 (formerly 1804-8285)
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Language: English
Page range: 79 - 103
Published on: Jul 7, 2016
Published by: European Research University
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Keywords:
Corporate Insolvency,
Trigger Mechanisms,
Incentives,
Efficiency,
Comparative Insolvency Law,
Carrots and Sticks
Related subjects:
Business and economics,
Political economics,
Macroeconomics,
Economic policy,
Law,
European law,
European law, other,
Law, other

© 2016 Jaka Cepec, Mitja Kovac, published by European Research University
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Volume 7 (2016): Issue 2 (June 2016)
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