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Carrots and Sticks as Incentive Mechanisms for the Optimal Initiation of Insolvency Proceedings Cover

Carrots and Sticks as Incentive Mechanisms for the Optimal Initiation of Insolvency Proceedings

By: Jaka Cepec and  Mitja Kovac  
Open Access
|Jul 2016

Abstract

The pursuit of ex-ante efficiency in bankruptcy law has been widely discussed in recent law and economics literature. However, the exact incentive mechanisms inducing the optimal commencement of bankruptcy proceedings have generally been exempted from the current scholarly debate. Using the law and economics tools and comparative analysis, this paper seeks to identify insolvency-specific optimal incentive mechanisms, while using the general theory on carrots and sticks in legal regulations. The paper suggests the employment of mixed-sticks-and-carrots incentive mechanisms for managers’ prompt proposals of insolvency proceedings as an optimal regulatory response. Moreover, the article provides comparative evidence that exclusive use of sticks or carrots in French, German, US, English, and Slovenian legal systems results in sub-optimal initiation of insolvency proceedings and may also induce adverse effects on prompt initiation.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/danb-2016-0005 | Journal eISSN: 1804-8285 | Journal ISSN: 1804-6746
Language: English
Page range: 79 - 103
Published on: Jul 7, 2016
Published by: European Association Comenius - EACO
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 4 issues per year

© 2016 Jaka Cepec, Mitja Kovac, published by European Association Comenius - EACO
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.