Do Auctions Improve Public Procurement? Evidence from the Czech Republic
By: Michal Kvasnička, Rostislav Staněk and Ondřej Krčál
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/danb-2015-0015 | Journal eISSN: 1804-8285 | Journal ISSN: 1804-6746 (formerly 1804-8285)
Language: English
Page range: 241 - 257
Published on: Jan 6, 2016
Published by: European Research University
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
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© 2016 Michal Kvasnička, Rostislav Staněk, Ondřej Krčál, published by European Research University
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.