Abstract
The operation of a toll road typically involves an economic activity for which State aid rules apply. However, if the construction and operation of the road infrastructure is bundled and they are tendered out together, they usually fall outside the State aid regime. The reason for it lies in the fact that the use of competitive procurement procedures aim to increase the efficiency of public expenditure and to ensure a level playing field for private operators to compete for public contracts. Nevertheless, based on the European Commission’s decisional practice, it transpires that an economic advantage for a concession holder cannot be ruled out automatically, in particular when there are amendments made to the original agreement. On the example of the Autostrada Wielkopolska S.A. case, critical State aid issues are discussed, among others, the application of State aid rules to public financing of infrastructure, the amendments made to a concession contract in the light of the risk assignment problem, as well as the existence of State aid in the form of overcompensation for a concession holder. The considerations are carried out on the canvas of a concrete case; however, they are enriched by the analysis of relevant legal provisions as well as conclusions from the EU courts and the European Commission decisions made in similar cases.