Table 1
Global Moran’s I for PV, market incentive schemes, by tenure (2012–24).
| YEAR | OWNER-OCCUPIED AND PRIVATE RENTAL | SOCIAL HOUSING | SIGNIFICANCE | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| I | P | Z | I | P | Z | ||
| 2012 | 0.560 | 0.001 | 20.0 | –0.000 | 0.146 | 0.09 | Owner only |
| 2013 | 0.642 | 0.001 | 18.2 | –0.008 | 0.465 | –0.28 | Owner only |
| 2014 | 0.580 | 0.001 | 17.0 | –0.005 | 0.251 | –0.11 | Owner only |
| 2015 | 0.714 | 0.001 | 21.7 | 0.233 | 0.001 | 12.1 | Both |
| 2016 | 0.725 | 0.001 | 23.2 | 0.299 | 0.001 | 10.8 | Both |
| 2017 | 0.467 | 0.001 | 14.8 | 0.109 | 0.008 | 8.1 | Both |
| 2018 | 0.512 | 0.001 | 17.4 | –0.003 | 0.255 | –0.03 | Owner only |
| 2019 | 0.543 | 0.001 | 15.9 | –0.006 | 0.087 | –0.43 | Owner only |
| 2020 | 0.199 | 0.001 | 5.9 | –0.007 | 0.134 | –0.25 | Owner only |
| 2022 | 0.087 | 0.020 | 3.4 | –0.006 | 0.115 | –0.55 | Neither |
| 2023 | 0.476 | 0.001 | 13.9 | –0.009 | 0.076 | –0.60 | Owner only |
| 2024 | 0.255 | 0.001 | 7.6 | –0.013 | 0.054 | –0.4 | Owner only |
[i] Note: Moran’s I was computed using row-standardised Queen contiguity weights across 349 LAs. Significance based on 999 permutation simulations.
Table 2
Within-tenure spatial lag coefficients by technology and scheme type (own-channel β).
| SCHEME | OWNER β | P | SOCIAL β | P | R2U | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PV | Market incentive | 0.0037*** | 0.002 | 0.0062† | 0.063 | 0.20/0.06 |
| Supplier obligation | –0.0008 | 0.722 | –0.0002 | 0.960 | – | |
| WI | Market incentive | 0.0114*** | <0.001 | –0.0023 | 0.243 | – |
| Supplier obligation | 0.0039*** | <0.001 | 0.0028** | 0.035 | – | |
| HP | Market incentive | –0.0030** | 0.016 | 0.0026 | 0.215 | – |
| Supplier obligation | –0.0027 | 0.122 | –0.0014 | 0.542 | – |
[i] Note: Two-way FE (LA + year), clustered SE by LA, N ≈ 4,600–4,700 (349 LAs × 13 periods). R2 (within) shown for PV market incentive models only as illustration. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; † p < 0.10.
Table 3
Cross-tenure spatial lag coefficients by technology and scheme type.
| SCHEME | OWNER → SOCIAL β | P | SOCIAL → OWNER β | P | ASYMMETRIC? | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PV | Market incentive | +0.0017** | 0.021 | –0.0054*** | <0.001 | Yes – strong |
| Supplier obligation | +0.0025 | 0.313 | +0.0016 | 0.492 | No | |
| WI | Market incentive | +0.0024 | 0.538 | –0.0022 | 0.447 | No |
| Supplier obligation | –0.0010 | 0.151 | +0.0031*** | <0.001 | Yes – social → owner | |
| HP | Market incentive | –0.0048*** | <0.001 | –0.0016 | 0.349 | Negative |
| Supplier obligation | –0.0026† | 0.085 | –0.0085*** | 0.001 | Negative |
[i] Note: Two-way FE (LA + year), clustered SE by LA. Cross-tenure β is the coefficient on the spatial lag of the opposite tenure channel. Bold indicates significance at p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; † p < 0.10.