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Where Do the Cultural Differences in Dynamics of Controlling Parenting Lie? Adolescents as Active Agents in the Perception of and Coping with Parental Behavior Cover

Where Do the Cultural Differences in Dynamics of Controlling Parenting Lie? Adolescents as Active Agents in the Perception of and Coping with Parental Behavior

Open Access
|Jul 2016

Figures & Tables

figures/Fig01_web.png
Figure 1

Hypothesized Integrated Model.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations between The Study Variables Across Situations.

M (SD) BelgiumM (SD) China12345
Perceived controlling parenting3.00 (0.98)2.91 (0.85)1.77***–.12*.39***.06
Need frustration2.76 (0.79)2.74 (0.78).60***1–.04.35***.01
Compulsive compliance2.65 (0.74)2.85 (0.98).34***.36***1–.35***–.28***
Oppositional defiance2.06 (0.79)1.99 (0.95).25***.36***–.051–.14**
Negotiation3.84 (0.72)3.52 (1.08)–.36***–.34***–.10–.30***1

[i] Note. Above diagonal are correlations in the Belgian data; below diagonal are correlations in the Chinese data.

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Table 2

Main Effects of Situation and Interaction with Country (MANCOVA).

Dependent variablesM (SD)Between-vignette differencesCountry x Vignette effects
Autonomy-supportGuilt-inductionGenerally controllingF(2,n−2)F(2,652)
Perception of the situation
Controlling parentingTotal2.32 (0.70)a3.13 (0.76)b3.31 (0.70)b83.06***12.12***
Belgium2.09 (0.86)a3.30 (0.85)b3.34 (0.82)b83.58***
China2.55 (0.97)a2.96 (0.92)b3.29 (0.85)c16.54***
Need frustrationTotal2.32 (0.86)a2.89 (0.82)b3.00 (0.80)b55.65***15.90***
Belgium2.04 (0.51)a3.01 (0.72)b2.91 (0.70)b68.59***
China2.60 (0.80)a2.77 (0.76)a3.09 (0.70)b12.11***
Coping responses
Compulsive complianceTotal2.63 (0.83)a2.80 (0.84)ab2.84 (0.92)b4.31*6.76**
Belgium2.75 (0.69)a2.71 (0.73)a2.64 (0.80)a0.35
China2.51 (0.95)a2.89 (0.94)b3.05 (0.98)b9.75***
Oppositional defianceTotal1.89 (0.82)a2.08 (0.82)ab2.13 (0.93)b4.47*0.79
Belgium1.85 (0.72)a2.07 (0.73)ab2.19 (0.92)b4.48*
China1.93 (0.90)2.09 (0.94)2.06 (0.95)0.70
NegotiationTotal3.66 (0.95)a3.63 (0.87)a3.70 (0.94)a0.072.06
Belgium3.71 (0.71)3.82 (0.71)3.94 (0.74)2.21
China3.61 (1.14)3.45 (1.02)3.47 (1.07)0.65

[i] Note. Means within rows with different superscripts are significantly different (post hoc Tukey contrasts; p < 05).

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Table 3

Tests of Path Coefficient Equivalence between the Belgian and Chinese Samples.

ModelSBSX2dfCFISRMRRMSEAModel Comparisons
ComparisonΔ SBSX2
Model 1: No constraints (baseline model)715.62***401.93.07.05
Model 2: Fully constrained model815.45***407.91.10.06vs. model 199.83***
Model 3: Fixed path from AS vs. Guilt-induction to PC761.96***402.92.07.05vs. model 146.34***
Model 4: Fixed path from Control vs. Guilt-induction to PC720.33***402.93.07.05vs. model 14.71*
Model 5: Fixed path from PC to Need Frustration719.00***402.93.07.05vs. model 13.38
Model 6: Fixed path from Needs to Compliance743.93***402.92.08.05vs. model 128.31***
Model 7: Fixed path from Needs to Defiance716.04***402.93.07.05vs. model 10.42
Model 8: Fixed path from Needs to Negotiation740.53***402.93.08.05vs. model 124.91***

[i] Note. AS = Autonomy-Support; PC = Perceived Controlling style.

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

figures/Fig02_web.png
Figure 2

SEM Model. Note. *p < .05; **p < .01, ***p < .001. The first coefficient refers to the Belgian sample and the second coefficient refers to the Chinese sample. SBS-χ2 (403) = 719.54, p < .01; CFI = .93; SRMR = .07; RMSEA = .05; AS = Autonomy-Support.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/pb.306 | Journal eISSN: 0033-2879
Language: English
Published on: Jul 13, 2016
Published by: Ubiquity Press
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 1 issue per year

© 2016 Beiwen Chen, Bart Soenens, Maarten Vansteenkiste, Stijn Van Petegem, Wim Beyers, published by Ubiquity Press
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.