Why Humans Fail in Solving the Monty Hall Dilemma: A Systematic Review

Lore Saenen; Mieke Heyvaert; Wim Van Dooren; Walter Schaeken; Patrick Onghena

doi:10.5334/pb.274

Abstract

The Monty Hall dilemma (MHD) is a difficult brain teaser. We present a systematic review of literature published between January 2000 and February 2018 addressing why humans systematically fail to react optimally to the MHD or fail to understand it.

Based on a sequential analysis of the phases in the MHD, we first review causes in each of these phases that may prohibit humans to react optimally and to fully understand the problem. Next, we address the question whether humans’ performance, in terms of choice behaviour and (probability) understanding, can be improved. Finally, we discuss individual differences related to people’s suboptimal performance.

This review provides novel insights by means of its holistic approach of the MHD: At each phase, there are reasons to expect that people respond suboptimally. Given that the occurrence of only one cause is sufficient, it is not surprising that suboptimal responses are so widespread and people rarely understand the MHD.

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Why Humans Fail in Solving the Monty Hall Dilemma: A Systematic Review

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