Varieties of Social Necessity
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/met.247 | Journal eISSN: 2515-8279
Language: English
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Submitted on: Jun 29, 2025
Accepted on: Jan 22, 2026
Published on: Mar 5, 2026
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