Abstract
While Aristotle counts many things as members of the category of substances that seem intuitively to be substances, one wonders whether Aristotle is right not to include social entities like families, city-states, or mobs, in any of his explications of substances. According to Aristotle, the persons who are in a social entity bear active powers, but he is silent on whether the social entity itself can. In this paper, I examine whether Aristotle rightly and intentionally does not include social entities in his list of things that are substances and can thus have active powers. I argue that either communities are substances in virtue of their status as bearers of powers or Aristotle is wrong that only substances are the bearers of powers. To make this argument, I begin with a primer on Aristotle’s discussion of active powers, followed by an account of how Aristotle regards social entities in the Politics. Next, I discuss one contemporary view on the ontology of social entities with an eye for how this account shapes our understanding of the actions and powers of social entities. Putting these pieces together, the paper will articulate Aristotle’s plural power problem, which will require defenders of Aristotle to pick a horn of the dilemma to make Aristotle’s views compatible with a more accurate understanding of social entities.