| T1 | One man cannot be more man than another, as that which is white may be more or less white than some other white object, or as that which is beautiful may be more or less beautiful than some other beautiful object. The same quality, moreover, is said to subsist in a thing in varying degrees at different times. A body, being white, is said to be whiter at one time than it was before, or, being warm, is said to be warmer or less warm than at some other time. But substance is not said to be more or less that which it is: a man is not more truly a man at one time than he was before, nor is anything, if it is substance, more or less what it is. (3b37–4a9)1 οἷον εἰ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ οὐσία ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔσται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ οὔτε ἕτερος ἑτέρου. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἕτερος ἑτέρου μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπος, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκόν ἐστιν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον λευκόν, καὶ καλὸν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον· καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, οἷον τὸ σῶμα λευκὸν ὂν μᾶλλον λευκὸν λέγεται νῦν ἢ πρότερον, καὶ θερμὸν ὂν μᾶλλον θερμὸν καὶ ἧττον λέγεται· ἡ δέ γε οὐσία οὐδὲν λέγεται, —οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος μᾶλλον νῦν ἄνθρωπος ἢ πρότερον λέγεται, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν, ὅσα ἐστὶν οὐσία·— ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐπιδέχοιτο ἡ οὐσία τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. |
| T2 | On whether the substances of destructible things are separable nothing is yet clear, though it is clear that some cannot be. Substances such as a house or an implement cannot exist apart from the particular houses and implements. Perhaps (isōs) indeed these are not even substances, and nor is anything which is not formed by nature; one might well hold that the only substance to be found in destructible things is their nature. (1043b18–23) εἰ δ᾽ εἰσὶ τῶν ϕθαρτῶν αἱ οὐσίαι χωρισταί, οὐδέν πω δῆλον πλὴν ὅτι γ᾽ ἐνίων οὐκ ἐνδέχεται δῆλον ὅσα μὴ οἷόν τε παρὰ τὰ τινὰ εἶναι οἷον οἰκίαν ἢ σκεῦος ἴσως μὲν οὖν οὐδ᾽ οὐσίαι εἰσὶν οὔτ᾽ αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὔτε τι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μὴ ϕύσει συνέστηκεν τὴν γὰρ ϕύσιν μόνην ἄν τις θείη τὴν ἐν τοῖς ϕθαρτοῖς οὐσίαν. |
| T3 | Things which come to be do so either by nature or by skill or spontaneously; and they all come to be something, and come from something and are brought to be by something. (When I say that they come to be something, I mean the ‘something’ to apply in any category; they may come to be a this, or to be somehow quantified or qualifed or placed.) Natural generation applies to those things whose generation is due to nature. What they come from is what we call matter; what they are brought into being by is something that exists naturally; and what they come to be is a man or a plant or something else of this sort, which we call substance most of all (malista). (1032a2–19) τῶν δὲ γιγνομένων τὰ μὲν ϕύσει γίγνεται τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, πάντα δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα ὑπό τέ τινος γίγνεται καὶ ἔκ τινος καὶ τί: τὸ δὲ τὶ λέγω καθ᾽ ἑκάστην κατηγορίαν: ἢ γὰρ τόδε ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πού. αἱ δὲ γενέσεις αἱ μὲν ϕυσικαὶ αὗταί εἰσιν ὧν ἡ γένεσις ἐκ ϕύσεώς ἐστιν, τὸ δ᾽ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται, ἣν λέγομεν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ὑϕ᾽ οὗ τῶν ϕύσει τι ὄντων, τὸ δὲ τὶ ἄνθρωπος ἢ ϕυτὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἃ δὴ μάλιστα λέγομεν οὐσίας εἶναι. |
| T4 | Of the several ways in which substance is spoken of, there are at any rate four which are the most important; the substance of a thing seems to be (a) what being is for that thing, and (b) its universal and (c) its genus, and fourthly (d) the substratum. The substratum is that of which the rest are predicated while it is not itself predicated of anything else. For this reason we must first determine its nature, for the primary substratum seems most of all (malista) to be substance. (1028b33–29a2) Λέγεται δ᾽ ἡ οὐσία, εἰ μὴ πλεοναχῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τέτταρσί γε μάλιστα: καὶ γὰρ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ γένος οὐσία δοκεῖ εἶναι ἑκάστου, καὶ τέταρτον τούτων τὸ ὑποκείμενον. τὸ δ᾽ ὑποκείμενόν ἐστι καθ᾽ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα λέγεται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ αὐτὸ μηκέτι κατ᾽ ἄλλου: διὸ πρῶτον περὶ τούτου διοριστέον: μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐσία τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρῶτον. |
| T5 | If, then, we proceed on this basis [i.e. taking as a mark of a substance that it is a substratum], matter turns out to be a substance. But this is impossible, for separability and thisness seem to belong most of all (malista) to substance; and for this reason the form and the compound would seem to be substance more than matter is. (1029a26–30) ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων θεωροῦσι συμβαίνει οὐσίαν εἶναι τὴν ὕλην: ἀδύνατον δέ: καὶ γὰρ τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι ὑπάρχειν δοκεῖ μάλιστα τῇ οὐσίᾳ, διὸ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμϕοῖν οὐσία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον τῆς ὕλης. |
| T6 | This [contrast between natural objects and artifacts] suggests that nature is a sort of source and cause of change and remaining unchanged in that to which it belongs primarily and of itself, that is, not by virtue of a concommitant attribute. (What do I mean by that qualification? Well, a man who is a doctor might come to be a cause of health in himself. Still, in so far as he is healed he does not possess the art of medicine, but being a doctor and being healed merely concur in the same person. Were the matter otherwise, the roles would not be separable.) Similarly with other things which are made. They none of them have in themselves the source of their making, but in some cases, such as that of a house or anything else made by human hands, the source is in something else and external, whilst in others the source is in the thing, but not in the thing of itself, i.e. when the thing comes to be a cause to itself by a concommitant attribute. (192b20–32) ὡς οὔσης τῆς ϕύσεως ἀρχῆς τινὸς καὶ αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἠρεμεῖν ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει πρώτως καθ’ αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (λέγω δὲ τὸ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτι γένοιτ’ ἂν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ τις αἴτιος ὑγιείας ὢν ἰατρός· ἀλλ’ ὅμως οὐ καθὸ ὑγιάζεται τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ συμβέβηκεν τὸν αὐτὸν ἰατρὸν εἶναι καὶ ὑγιαζόμενον· διὸ καὶ χωρίζεταί ποτ’ ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων). ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν ποιουμένων· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἔχει τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῆς ποιήσεως, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ ἔξωθεν, οἷον οἰκία καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν χειροκμήτων ἕκαστον, τὰ δ’ ἐν αὑτοῖς μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐ καθ’ αὑτά, ὅσα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἴτια γένοιτ’ ἂν αὑτοῖς. |
| T7 | Again, is there anything besides the concrete whole (I mean the matter and the form in combination) or not? If not, all things in the nature of matter are perishable; but if there is something, it must be the form or shape. It is hard to determine in what cases this is possible and in what it is not; for in some cases, e.g. that of a house, the form clearly does not exist in separation. (1060b23–28) ἔτι πότερον ἔστι τι παρὰ τὸ σύνολον ἢ οὔ λέγω δὲ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ μετὰ ταύτης; εἰ μὲν γὰρ μή, τά γε ἐν ὕλῃ ϕθαρτὰ πάντα: εἰ δ᾽ ἔστι τι, τὸ εἶδος ἂν εἴη καὶ ἡ μορϕή: τοῦτ᾽ οὖν ἐπὶ τίνων ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ τίνων οὔ, χαλεπὸν ἀϕορίσαι: ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων γὰρ δῆλον οὐκ ὂν χωριστὸν τὸ εἶδος, οἷον οἰκίας. |
| T8 | if we had to define a threshhold we should say a ‘wood or stone arranged so-and-so (hōdi keimenon) and a house, ‘bricks and timbers arranged so-and-so (hōdi keimena)’ or there is a final cause (to heneka) as well in some cases…. And so, of the people who go in for defining, those who define a house as stones, bricks, and timbers are speaking of the potential house, for these are the matter; but those who propose ‘a receptacle to shelter goods and bodies’, or something of the sort, speak of the actuality. (1043a5-18) οἷον εἰ οὐδὸν δέοι ὁρίσασθαι, ξύλον ἢ λίθον ὡδὶ κείμενον ἐροῦμεν, καὶ οἰκίαν πλίνθους καὶ ξύλα ὡδὶ κείμενα ἢ ἔτι καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων ἔστιν … οἱ μὲν λέγοντες τί ἐστιν οἰκία, ὅτι λίθοι πλίνθοι ξύλα, τὴν δυνάμει οἰκίαν λέγουσιν, ὕλη γὰρ ταῦτα: οἱ δὲ ἀγγεῖον σκεπαστικὸν χρημάτων καὶ σωμάτων ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον προτιθέντες, τὴν ἐνέργειαν λέγουσιν. |
| T9 | It is impossible for a substance to be composed of substances present in it in actuality. For what is in actuality two things cannot also be in actuality one thing, though a thing may be one and at the same time potentially two. (For instance, a line that is double another line is composed of two halves, but only potentially; for the actuality of the two halves separates them from each other.) (1039a3–7) ἀδύνατον γὰρ οὐσίαν ἐξ οὐσιῶν εἶναι ἐνυπαρχουσῶν ὡς ἐντελεχείᾳ: τὰ γὰρ δύο οὕτως ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδέποτε ἓν ἐντελεχείᾳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν δυνάμει δύο ᾖ, ἔσται ἕν (oἷον ἡ διπλασία ἐκ δύο ἡμίσεων δυνάμει γε: ἡ γὰρ ἐντελέχεια χωρίζει) |
| T10 | This result, however, involves a problem. For if no substance can be composed of universals (since a universal signifies such a kind of thing, and not a this), and if also no substance can be composed of substances present in it in actuality, then every substance must be incomposite and so indefinable. Yet everyone thinks—and we have long ago asserted—that it is only or chiefly substances that can be defined. (1039a14–20) ἔχει δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἀπορίαν. εἰ γὰρ μήτε ἐκ τῶν καθόλου οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι μηδεμίαν οὐσίαν διὰ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀλλὰ μὴ τόδε τι σημαίνειν, μήτ᾽ ἐξ οὐσιῶν ἐνδέχεται ἐντελεχείᾳ εἶναι μηδεμίαν οὐσίαν σύνθετον, ἀσύνθετον ἂν εἴη οὐσία πᾶσα, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ λόγος ἂν εἴη οὐδεμιᾶς οὐσίας. ἀλλὰ μὴν δοκεῖ γε πᾶσι καὶ ἐλέχθη πάλαι ἢ μόνον οὐσίας εἶναι ὅρον ἢ μάλιστα. |
| T11 | The question might be raised why some things are generated both artificially and spontaneously—e.g. health—and others not; e.g. a house. The reason is that in some cases the matter—which is the starting-point of the process in the production and generation of artificial things, and in which some part of the result is already existent—is such that it can initiate its own motion, and in other cases it is not. (1034a9–14) ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις διὰ τί τὰ μὲν γίγνεται καὶ τέχνῃ καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, οἷον ὑγίεια, τὰ δ᾽ οὔ, οἷον οἰκία. αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι τῶν μὲν ἡ ὕλη ἡ ἄρχουσα τῆς γενέσεως ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν καὶ γίγνεσθαί τι τῶν ἀπὸ τέχνης, ἐν ᾗ ὑπάρχει τι μέρος τοῦ πράγματος, ἡ μὲν τοιαύτη ἐστὶν οἵα κινεῖσθαι ὑϕ᾽ αὑτῆς ἡ δ᾽ οὔ. |