
On Disgust and Moral Judgments: A Review
Abstract
While there is a continuing debate on whether cognitive or emotional mechanisms underlie moral judgments, recent studies have illustrated that emotions—particularly disgust—play a prominent role in moral reasoning. This review explores the role of disgust in moral judgments. I distinguish between three relevant claims regarding its involvement in moral cognition and argue that the least appealing (i.e., disgust is just anger in disguise) is also the one with the least empirical support.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/jeps.cq | Journal eISSN: 2222-6931
Language: English
Page range: 25 - 36
Published on: Apr 30, 2015
Published by: Ubiquity Press
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Keywords:
© 2015 Cristina-Elena Ivan, published by Ubiquity Press
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.