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Believe It or Not – No Support for an Effect of Providing Explanatory or Threat-Related Information on Conspiracy Theories’ Credibility Cover

Believe It or Not – No Support for an Effect of Providing Explanatory or Threat-Related Information on Conspiracy Theories’ Credibility

International Review of Social Psychology
Volume 34 (2021): Issue 1
By: Marcel Meuer,  Aileen Oeberst and  Roland Imhoff  
Open Access
|Oct 2021

References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/irsp.587 | Journal eISSN: 2397-8570
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Language: English
Submitted on: Feb 25, 2021
Accepted on: Aug 19, 2021
Published on: Oct 19, 2021
Published by: Ubiquity Press
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 1 issue per year
Keywords:
conspiracy theories,
conspiracy mentality,
explanation,
threat,
reception

© 2021 Marcel Meuer, Aileen Oeberst, Roland Imhoff, published by Ubiquity Press
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

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