Table 1
Livestock and land ownership among five case study cooperatives in Eastern Cape Province, South Africa.
| Metric | Cooperative | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TVPC | BKPC | CNPC | ITPC | UMPC | |
| Number of farmers (n = 155) | 34 | 28 | 28 | 35 | 30 |
| Mean cattle (±SEM) | 79 ± 6.5 | 38 ± 4.9 | 77 ± 13.5 | 51 ± 7.9 | 69 ± 7.9 |
| Min–max cattle numbers | 10–250 | 9–115 | 4–398 | 5–185 | 11–168 |
| Mean sheep (±SEM) | 126 ± 20.1 | 70 ± 13.5 | 114 ± 31.6 | 44 ± 13.7 | 28 ± 21.5 |
| Min–max sheep numbers | 0–486 | 0–350 | 0–700 | 0–328 | 0–425 |
| Mean land size (ha ± SEM) | 457 ± 41.2 | 310 ± 23.8 | 429 ± 49.1 | 442 ± 61.3 | 433 ± 43.6 |
| Min–max land size (ha) | 9–850 | 120–520 | 315–1200 | 4–1600 | 179–839 |
Table 2
Key indicators of legitimacy, transparency and accountability among five case study cooperatives in Eastern Cape Province, South Africa.
| Indicator | TVPC | BKPC | CNPC | ITPC | UMPC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Membership | Cooperative membership officially determined by farm location, but some socio-politically connected actors are also members of other cooperatives. | Cooperative membership officially determined by farm location. Some socio-politically connected actors have also benefitted from programmes from other cooperatives. | Membership of cooperative based solely on geographic location of farm. | Membership of cooperative based solely on geographic location of farm. | Membership of cooperative based solely on geographic location of farm. |
| Access to services and benefits by members | Overall there was equitable access to resources and programmes by members. Members participated in the process of selecting those who benefitted from each programme | Committee members capture most of the benefits and services (multi-programme access). Members participate in selecting beneficiaries, but this is not honoured by the committee. | The committee and members who are closely linked to the committee members accessed most of the programmes. | Committee members captured most of the programmes. Some members were unaware of some of the programmes that the cooperative benefitted from. | Committee members accessed most of the few programmes that the cooperative engaged with. The cooperative accessed fewer programmes than the other cooperatives. |
| Selection of leaders | Leaders are selected by regular elections. Term lengths are adhered to. Non-performing leaders can be recalled by members | Leaders are selected by regular elections. Term lengths are not adhered to. Members do not have ability to recall leaders. | Elections and term lengths are irregular. Elections were poorly participated in by members. Members do not have power to recall leaders. | Elections are attended poorly attended and were irregular. Term lengths are irregular and variable. Members lack power to recall leaders. | Leaders are selected by elections. Elections and term lengths are irregular. No record of members recalling committee members |
| Democratic member control | Cooperative meetings held regularly. Constitution and rules amended by those who attend meetings, but this often does not include more marginalised members. Disciplinary procedures are implemented but outcomes are not always enforced. | Meetings are irregular. Constitution and rules amended by those in attendance at meetings. The members do not have the power to enforce disciplinary procedures. | Meetings are irregular. Attendance at meetings is poor, hence constitution and rules amended by the few who actually attend the meetings. There are no records of disciplinary cases. | Meetings are regular, but poorly attended. The committee amends the constitution and rules with minimum consultation with members. Members disregard disciplinary action; the committee does not have power to enforce procedures. | Meetings are irregular and poorly attended. Crucial decisions are made by committee members without consultation of members. No record of any disciplinary procedures. |
| Leadership value and legitimacy | Members respect power of leaders. Leaders were able to deliver multiple programmes. Financial and administrative powers are separated and delegated to non-committee members i.e. the role of the committee is transparent. | Leaders have limited legitimacy amongst membership and a generally poor record of programme delivery. Financial and administrative powers are controlled by the committee, and rarely delegated. Limited delegation of power and responsibilities to other members | Members do not respect power of leaders. Leaders had a poor record of programme delivery. Power and responsibilities lie entirely with committee members; hence committee is not transparent. | Members do not respect power of leaders. Leaders performed poorly in delivering programmes. Power and responsibilities centralised in leadership. Administrative and financial functions are not separated. | Members do not respect power of leaders. Members did not expect programme delivery from leaders. Administrative and financial functions are centralised and controlled by committee members. No functions are delegated to other members. |
| Responsibility | Multiple accountability layers: Financials are audited regularly. Committee provides members access to financial and audit records. Members are involved in decision making. Each committee has clear key assigned roles and duties, and members have the power to recall committee members who do not perform. | Accountability was partial, limited to financials only: Financial records were available but not audited regularly. Members had no knowledge of financial matters. A few selected members were involved in decision making. Duties and roles for committee members were not clearly defined. Members did not have the power to audit committee member performance or recall non-performing committee members. | There were no accountability measures in place. Financials were controlled by committee and no records of audits were available. Committee roles were not clearly defined, and members did not have the power to recall non-performing committee members. | Financial transactions were not transparent and there were no records of audits. Members could not hold the committee accountable e.g. in terms of suspected financial or resource distribution irregularities. | There were no mechanisms for members to hold committee members accountable. Financial control was limited to committee members. No records of audits were available. |
Table 3
Comparison of service delivery among five case study cooperatives in Eastern Cape Province, South Africa.
| Indicator | TVPC | BKPC | CNPC | ITPC | UMPC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number of programmes accessed | Eight programmes | Five programmes | Four programmes | Four programmes | Four programmes |
| Level of programmes accessed | National, provincial and local programmes | Only local programmes | Local programmes only through secondary cooperative. | Only programmes through secondary cooperative were accessed by the cooperative. | Cooperative accessed local programmes only |
| Access mode | Programmes were accessed through ‘connections’ of the leader to national unions i.e. leadership utilised socio-political ‘connections’ to access programmes. | Programme access was based on socio-political ‘connections’ of the leader i.e. chieftaincy, and his active lobbying for programmes | Leaders were socially connected, but this had no political influence on access to programmes | Leadership had no socio-political influence and did not lobby independently for programmes | The cooperative leadership did not independently lobby for any programmes and had no socio-political connections. |
| Beneficiaries | 58% of interviewed members benefitted from programmes. At-least half of the beneficiaries were ordinary members. | 41% of interviewed members benefitted from programmes. Most beneficiaries were committee and other influential members of the cooperative | 33% of interviewed members benefitted from programmes. Most beneficiaries were committee members | 29% of interviewed members benefitted from programmes. Most beneficiaries were committee members | About 25% of interviewed members benefitted from programmes. Most beneficiaries were committee members |