Table 1
List of 35 public good arrangements.
| Economic development | Water quality |
|---|---|
| CWC Education | Alternate Septic |
| Good Neighbor Payments | CWC Septic Program |
| Grant Programs | East of Hudson Watershed Plan |
| Job Creation | Enhanced Monitoring |
| Loan Programs | Flood Program |
| Local Consulting | Forest Conservation Easement |
| Miscellaneous Payments | MOA New Storm-water |
| Miscellaneous Procedures | NYC Land/Easement Acquisition |
| MOA Economic Development | NYC Watershed Agricultural Easement |
| MOA Education | Riparian Buffers Program |
| Qualified Economic Development | Sand and Salt Program |
| State Funding | Septic Program |
| Tax Consulting Fund | Sewerage Diversion Study |
| Tax Liability Assessment Program | Small Business Septic Program |
| Storm-water Retro Fit | |
| Stream Corridor | |
| Total Maximum Daily Loads | |
| Waste Water Treatment | |
| Water Conservation | |
| West of Hudson New Storm-water | |
| WSP NYC Watershed Easements |
Table 2
Key variables, organized by hypotheses.
| Dependent Variable | |
|---|---|
| Public good type | Economic development public good (1) or water quality public good (0) |
| Independent variables | |
| H1: Water quality public goods will exhibit more safeguards overall than economic development goods. | Total number of monitoring, compliance, consequence safeguards |
| H2a: Water quality public goods will exhibit more monitoring, review, and consequence safeguards than will economic development goods. | Number of each type of safeguard (monitoring, review, consequence) |
| H2b: Water quality goods will exhibit more strict consequences (penalties will be greater for rule violations) than economic development goods; and economic development goods will exhibit more mild consequences (penalties will be mild for rule violations) than water quality public goods. | Number of each type of consequence safeguard (severe, mild) |
| H3: Water quality public goods will exhibit more actors engaged in monitoring, more actors triggering review processes, and more aggregation rules which require multiple actors to participate in decision processes compared to economic development goods. | Number of monitors, number of actors triggering compliance reviews, number of aggregation rules |
| H4a: Federal and state agencies, which issue water quality permits, are more likely to address shirking through monitoring and reviewing safeguards targeting water quality goods. | Counts of public goods in which federal and state actors act as monitors and reviewers regarding water quality and regarding economic development goods |
| H4b: The CWC and WPPC will use monitoring and reviewing safeguards to address shirking by the city in relation to water quality public goods; and will use monitoring and reviewing safeguards to address shirking by the watershed towns in relation to economic development public goods. | Counts of public goods in which CWC and WPPC act as monitors and reviewers of the city and watershed towns regarding water quality and regarding economic development goods |
| H5: Watershed jurisdictions and the city will monitor and review each other to prevent burden shifting for providing economic development and water quality goods. | Assessment of public goods in which watershed towns and New York City monitor or review each other regarding water quality and economic development public goods |
| H6: Watershed jurisdictions and the city will monitor and review state and federal agencies more than the CWC or WPPC. | Assessment of public goods in which the city and watershed jurisdictions monitor or review federal or state agencies and the CWC or WPPC |
Table 3
T-test results for saliency hypotheses.
| Variable | Water quality mean (Std. Dev.) | Economic development mean (Std. Dev.) | Probability | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| H1 | Number of safeguards | 3.81 (4.5) | 1.93 (0.99) | 0.135 |
| H2a | Number of monitoring safeguards | 1.71 (1.87) | 0.79 (0.89) | 0.094 |
| Number of reviewing safeguards | 1.14 (1.98) | 0.36 (0.84) | 0.172 | |
| Number of consequence safeguards | 0.95 (1.56) | 0.79 (0.58) | 0.706 | |
| H2b | Number of severe consequence mechanisms | 0.14 (0.36) | 0 | 0.147 |
| Number of mild consequence mechanisms | 0.29 (0.46) | 0.71 (0.47) | 0.012 | |
| H3 | Number of monitors | 1.86 (1.9) | 0.86 (0.95) | 0.079 |
| Number of actors triggering compliance reviews | 1.38 (1.8) | 0.43 (0.85) | 0.075 | |
| Number of aggregation rules | 1.14 (1.59) | 0.143 (0.36) | 0.028 |
Figure 1
Federal and State as monitors and/or reviewers.
Figure 2
Regional actors as monitors and/or reviewers.
Table 4
Burden-shifting directed safeguards.
| Public good | Description | Good type | Safeguard type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tax Litigation Avoidance Program | Watershed community property assessors may object to city choice of property tax assessment experts. | Economic development | Review by watershed jurisdictions |
| Enhanced Monitoring | The city shall provide watershed jurisdictions (and other parties) rationale if it does not adopt enhanced monitoring recommendations. | Water quality | Monitoring by watershed jurisdictions |
| Flood Program | Watershed jurisdictions sponsoring city-funded flood control construction projects shall provide the city notice of completion and right to inspect. | Water quality | Monitoring by the city |
| Good Neighbor Payments | The city may audit project fund spending in watershed jurisdictions at any time. | Economic development | Monitoring by the city |
Table 5
Encroachment directed safeguards.
| Public good | Description | Good type | Safeguard type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Watershed Agricultural Easements | If the city is prosecuting a violator of easement, the state may not prosecute at the same time, and must give the city adequate time to pursue their case. | Water quality | Review of the state by the city |
| Tax Litigation Avoidance Program | CWC shall notify the city of choice of tax assessor; the city shall approve any property tax assessor that the CWC hires to do independent appraisals. | Economic development | Review of the CWC by the city; Monitoring of the CWC by the city |
| Good Neighbor Payments | The city shall review disbursements of the project funds by CWC. | Economic development | Monitoring of the CWC by the city |
| Enhanced Monitoring | All parties may access and make suggestions on an independent report about enhancing the State-led water quality monitoring program. | Water quality | Monitoring of the state by the city, watershed jurisdictions |
| State Funding | The city may see which municipalities have applied for state funds and how much they received, to aid in its own funding decisions. | Economic development | Monitoring of the state by the city |
| Storm-water Retro Fit | Municipalities are notified of the completion of storm-water retrofit projects by CWC and given an opportunity to inspect them. | Water quality | Monitoring of the CWC by the watershed jurisdictions |
| Total Maximum Daily Loads | Pollutant load allowances are determined collaboratively between city, State and EPA, but city gets substantial input on the process. | Water quality | Monitoring of the state and EPA by the city |