Have a personal or library account? Click to login
Conflict and Cooperation in Global Commons: Theory and Evidence from the Caspian Sea Cover

Conflict and Cooperation in Global Commons: Theory and Evidence from the Caspian Sea

Open Access
|Oct 2019

Figures & Tables

Table 1

Comparison of local and global commons.

Local natural resourcesGlobal commons
1Geographic scaleLocalGlobal
2Number of resource usersTens to thousandsMillions to billions
3Salience: actors’ awareness of degradationResource use is conscious purpose: resource provides major portion of livelihoodResource degradation is unintended byproduct of intentional acts; actions causing degradation are of low importance for most users
4Distribution of interests and powerBenefits and costs mainly internal to group of appropriatorsSignificant externalities between appropriators and others across places and generations; differences of interest and power among classes of appropriators
5Cultural and institutional homogeneityHomogeneousHeterogeneous
6Feasibility of learning:GoodLimited
6aRegeneration of degraded resourceRenewable over less than a human generationRegeneration over more than a human generation
6bEase of understanding resource dynamicsFeasible without extensive scientific trainingScientifically complex with limited predictive ability
6cStability of resource dynamicsStable, though variableDynamic systems with changing rules
6dAbility to learn across placesPossibleDifficult

[i] Source: Stern (2011).

ijc-13-2-914-g1.png
Figure 1

Caspian Sea with oil and gas deposits and claimant countries.

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.php?RegionTopicID=CSR.

Table 2

Prisoner’s dilemma.

Prisoner B (cooperating)Prisoner B (not cooperating)
Prisoner A (cooperating)Each will serve one yearPrisoner A: serves 3 years in prison
Prisoner B: released
Prisoner A (not cooperating)Prisoner A: released
Prisoner B: serves 3 years in prison
Each will serve 2 years
Table 3

Stylized comparison of factors affecting cooperation and non-cooperation in the Caspian Sea.

Cooperation determinantsNorth Caspian states (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan) (successful cooperation)South Caspian states (Iran, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan) (non-cooperation as of July 2018)
Economic interestAll three states suffered from severe depression in the mid-1990s; both badly needed hard currency; this motivated them to strike a compromise.
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan were motivated to secure a deal with Russia as all their oil export pipelines traversed through Russian territory.
All northern states needed political stability in the region to attract investments and reinvigorate their economies.
Sanctions against Iran prevented the neighboring countries to trade with each other and engage in joint investment projects.
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan could not secure investment for building oil export pipelines via Iran.
Iran and Turkmenistan were generally known to be hostile towards foreign direct investment.
Geopolitics (security interest)Both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are landlocked countries that heavily rely on Russia in terms of trade, oil exports, and regional security.
For Azerbaijan, the ongoing conflict with Armenia meant that the country attempted to build alliances with Caspian neighbors to maintain their support.
Iran was alienated in the international arena and became an isolated player in the region.
In foreign policy, Turkmenistan upholds ‘positive neutrality’ position, according to which the country does not participate in any regional or global security organizations.
Cultural distance (historical and personal ties)All three northern states are Former Soviet Union (FSU) republics as well as members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Well-established trade links between the North Caspian states.
State leaders are former Communist party members
Iran is not an FSU country, nor is it a member of CIS, while Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are FSU states and members of CIS.
No established trade links between South Caspian states.
Rivalrous and non-cooperative relations between leaders of states.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/ijc.914 | Journal eISSN: 1875-0281
Language: English
Submitted on: Jun 18, 2018
Accepted on: Jun 20, 2019
Published on: Oct 30, 2019
Published by: Ubiquity Press
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 1 issue per year

© 2019 Serik Orazgaliyev, Eduardo Araral, published by Ubiquity Press
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.