Table 1
Framed Treatment Information.
| Framed scientific uncertainty about water recharge | |
| Control condition | “Based on the calculations of our hydrologists, 5 units of water will be replenished after each round of the game.” |
| Treatment 1: A range of estimates | “Based on the calculations of our hydrologists, 0 – 10 units of water will be replenished after each round of the game.” |
| Treatment 2: Competing hydrological models | “Our hydrologists disagree about the groundwater recharge. Based on the calculations of the hydrologist 1, there would be 1 unit of recharge per round for the group. In contrast, the hydrologist 2 suggests that there would be 10 units of water recharge per round for the group.” |
Table 2
Definition and operationalization of dependent and independent variables.
| VARIABLES | DEFINITION | OPERATIONALIZATION |
|---|---|---|
| Dependent variables | ||
| Group-level Dependent Variables | ||
| Sustainability | Shared groundwater availability | % of groundwater remaining after the end round of the game |
| Equity | Distributional equality of payoffs in each group | (1) Standard deviation of earning distributions within each group (2) Gini-coefficient of payoffs in each group |
| Individual-level Dependent variables | ||
| Cooperation | Players’ willingness to forego profit for the common good | % of corn choices in 10 rounds |
| Profit | Participant’s total rewards | Individual total earnings in 10 rounds |
| Primary independent variables | ||
| Scientific Uncertainty | A range of estimates | Water recharge units between seasons are 0~10. |
| Competing hydrological models | One hydrologist argues that the recharge unit would be 1 and the other hydrologist argues that it would be 10. | |
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics.
| VARIABLE | OBSERVATIONS | MINIMUM | MEAN | MAXIMUM | STANDARD DEVIATION |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variables | |||||
| Group-level | |||||
| Sustainability: Remaining groundwater % | 30 | .05 | 0.44 | 0.8 | 0.19 |
| Equity 1:Gini-earning | 30 | 0 | 0.06 | 0.14 | 0.04 |
| Equity 2:Earning SD | 30 | 0 | 4.15 | 9.32 | 2.41 |
| Individual-level | |||||
| Cooperation | 130 | 0.2 | 0.70 | 1 | 0.17 |
| Profit | 130 | 20 | 28.74 | 44 | 5.24 |
| Individual Covariates | |||||
| Graduate student | 130 | 0 | 0.10 | 1 | 0.31 |
| Natural Resource Major | 130 | 0 | 0.18 | 1 | 0.39 |
| Gender | 130 | 0 | 0.72 | 1 | 0.44 |
Table 4
The Difference in Collaborative Performance between Treatment and Experimental Conditions (group level). These estimates are based on equation (1).
| # OF GROUPS | SUSTAINABILITY: REMAINING GROUNDWATER % | EQUITY (SD) | EQUITY (GINI) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Control (“X unit of recharge”) | n = 9 | M = 0.32 (0.15) | M = 4.21 (2.00) | M = 0.06 (0.03) |
| Treatment 1 (“A range of estimates”) | n = 11 | M = 0.49 (0.17)*** | M = 3.69 (2.57) | M = 0.06 (0.04) |
| Treatment 2 (“Competing hydrologic models”) | n = 10 | M = 0.48 (0.21)** | M = 4.64 (2.52) | M = 0.07 (0.04) |
[i] ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1, standard deviations are in parentheses, M: mean, SD: standard deviation.
Figure 1
Remaining Groundwater (percentages).
Table 5
The Effects of Scientific Uncertainty on Collaborative Performance (individual-level). Model (1) and (2) are based on equation (2).
| (1) COOPERATION | (2) PROFIT | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Primary Independent Variable | Treatment 1 (“A range of estimates”) | 0.0811** (0.0351) | –2.432** (1.052) |
| Treatment 2 (“competing hydrologic models”) | 0.0333 (0.0470) | –0.998 (1.411) | |
| Covariates | Graduate Student | 0.0632 (0.0516) | –1.896 (1.556) |
| Natural Resource Major | 0.0963** (0.0369) | –2.888** (1.107) | |
| Gender (Female) | 0.0032 (0.0273) | –0.095 (0.794) | |
| Constant | 0.640*** (0.0356) | 30.79*** (1.067) | |
| Observations | 130 | 130 |
[i] ***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1, standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table 6
Theoretical mechanisms that explain quantitative results and supporting qualitative empirical evidence from communication analysis.
| COLLABORATIVE STRATEGY | COLLABORATIVE CAUTION STRATEGY | UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT STRATEGY |
|---|---|---|
| Example chat text from a group under competing hydrological models [g20] R1. Hello everyone! Should we all alternate which resources we pick, so we can play more rounds? I say we all go with less groundwater so we can hopefully get more rounds everyone has to be down though otherwise it wont work Perfect. Should we alternate? 2 pick rice and 2 corn? Sounds good Sure ill go corn okay Same I’ll do rice R2. Capybara and I picked corn. This round, should the two of us pick rice and Turtle and Cat pick corn? Yes okay sweet, now we rotate Ya i’ll do corn now Sounds good. Aye love this teamwork lol Same here. We want to avoid the tragedy of the commons yeaaaa | Example chat text from a group under the range of estimates treatment [g8] R2. Did that even deplete any? No it did not It looks like we earned back the same that we spent maybe if we choose the same card it doesn’t deplete any? It said in the instructions we will gain back anywhere from 0–10 each round I chose rice that time and it went down four R3. Not too bad so far I say we just stay conservative, we will be making more money in the long run compared to how much water we use. Should we maybe try and go low again? I agree Awesome I agree, maybe a rice every couple rounds just to see but not too much R4. Did anyone pick rice that time? No I didn’t I didn’t either, that’s interesting that it went down two Should we go low again? Yes Lets go low again maybe until we gain some more water? Yes Honestly, I say stay low for awhile Works for me | Example chat text from a group under certain recharge information[g19] R1. We could all choose rice this round to try to maximize our water Bet R2. Done we should do corn to maximize the water ok sounds good R5. I think we should all keep doing corn to hold out as long as possible i agree R7. We are about to do season H right R8. Should we keep doing corn we only have 6 points until the game is ended pls keep doing corn it should stay at the same # |