Analysing Groundwater Governance in Uzbekistan through the Lenses of Social-Ecological Systems and Informational Governance

2.1 The social-ecological systems framework

The literature acknowledges a key contribution of the SES framework to study GWG by adopting a complex system approach (Rica, Petit, and López-Gunn 2018). As such, it structures interactions between human and ecological elements, at varying temporal and spatial scales (Rica, Petit, and López-Gunn 2018). The framework decomposes system complexity, differentiating the first-level core subsystems to be analysed: Related Ecosystems, Economic and Socio-political settings, Resource systems, Resource units, Actors, Interactions, Governance systems, and Outcomes (Ostrom 2007). Most importantly, the SES framework highlights the role of governance systems that mediate the relationships between actors, their interactions, and natural resources, and guides institutional analysis. Governance systems include constitutional rules which “[…] are outputs that establish the meta-rules of the game; the policy-making level, where laws and regulations, enacted in compliance with the constitutional rules, are outputs that establish rules designed to affect individuals’ interactions at the operational level” (Cole 2017: 831).

The role of information is identified in original SES second-tier variables that affect actors’ interactions, their collective actions and lead to the Outcome: Actors – “Knowledge of the SES/mental models” and “Technologies available”; Interaction – “Information sharing among users”; Governance – “Constitutional, collective choice and operational rules” and “Monitoring and sanctioning processes”. Our selection criteria for the second-tier SES variables include their relevance for information and knowledge, which is the focus of this study. They highlight the critical role of information and knowledge in different subsystems of SES. The literature review results applicable to Uzbekistan were read to identify text segments relevant to original SES framework second-tier variables. Any original second-tier variables that were not used in our analysis did not appear to have clear and repeated relevance to the GW SES in literature results.

It is assumed that resource overexploitation can be avoided by actors’ collective actions when they can communicate and participate in decision-making, and when monitoring and sanctioning are in place (Ostrom 1990). In a more recent extension of the SES framework, social dilemmas related to knowledge commons have been explored (Hess & Ostrom 2007; Frischmann, Madison, and Strandburg 2014; Gotgelf 2022). To further explore the interplay across these important dimensions, we incorporate insights from the informational governance literature.

2.2 Informational Governance

Informational governance highlights the transformative role of knowledge in the Information Age, characterised by improved information collection, processing, transmission, and use capacities (Mol 2006; Soma et al. 2016). The literature identifies critical issues relevant to our study: while a strong reliance remains on natural science-based information, there are also growing uncertainties related to increasing world complexities. New modes of environmental governance may replace conventional powers of the state in environmental information management. Due to globalisation processes, developing countries are confronted with international requirements on information products, processes, and monitoring.

The literature also recognises a need for further research on four informational governance themes. The first theme is related to the dynamics and mechanisms of informational governance. The literature highlights a lack of understanding of the new monitoring systems and mechanisms which can appear independent from the conventional “state-run, expert-led, and natural-science-based” monitoring systems (Mol 2006: 509). The second theme focuses on structural uncertainty and multiple knowledges. The question raised here is how to deal with inherent uncertainties and multiple sources of environmental knowledge (i.e., uncertainty which cannot be resolved and epistemic uncertainties which may differ between monitoring methods). The third theme is related to power constellations – potential inequalities and monopolies in the environmental information-handling capacity (e.g., information-generation and transmission capabilities, access to information and publications). The fourth and final theme, the form and design of informational reform, can facilitate effective and democratic governance systems and requires further attention from scholars.

2.3 Informational governance of groundwater as an SES

In our study, we apply the SES framework to conduct an institutional analysis of GWG and the role of information and knowledge on GW. To do so, we incorporated new second-tier SES variables in relation to four research themes identified in the informational governance literature (Figure 1).

Figure 1

We assume that:

1. GW users interact while making strategic choices regarding resource use and management at the local, national, and transboundary levels.

2. Their interactions and lack of collective action result in outcomes related to GW overexploitation and pollution.

3. Governance systems, such as constitutional, policy-level, and operational rules, and informational governance shape actors’ interactions and outcomes. Specifically, informational governance (i.e., mechanisms, uncertainty, power constellations, and reform designs) influences actors’ interactions and collective actions which affects their GW knowledge, how they share information, and technology use.

4.1 Resource units in Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan’s vital GW resources have estimated reserves of 18.5 km³, while actual abstraction is 7.7 km³ per year (CAWater-Info). The Institute of Hydrology and Engineering Geology reports values of annual GW recharge 23–27 km³ (Alikhanov et al. 2021). Depending on the source, GW reserve and recharge estimates differ, without clear indication of how or when the numbers were collected. Around 99 major aquifers have been identified in the country, out of which 77 contain fresh GW suitable for drinking water supply (Kazbekov et al. 2007). Furthermore, there are over 25,000 GW wells in Uzbekistan (Kulmatov et al. 2021). GW recharge includes surface inflow, infiltration from rivers and lakes, and precipitation (Alikhanov et al. 2021). The predictability of dynamics, storage and location is challenging due to strong GW mobility and temporal fluctuations. While some GW changes may fail to appear for decades, temporal changes are observed within agricultural growing seasons (Anarbekov et al. 2018). Figure 3 presents the hydrogeological map of Uzbekistan.

Figure 3

4.2 Actors and interactions

Actors and their interactions are another key subsystem highlighted by the SES framework. In the groundwater context, actors include households, farmers, former Water Consumer Associations (WCA) replaced by “special services”, and industrial companies that use GW for domestic water supply and, to a lesser extent, irrigation, industrial and recreational uses:

• GW provides 50% (about 3.4 km³ per year) of drinking water demand to households (SCNP 2013).

• Households and farmers interact regarding the use of around 2.1 km³ per year of GW (ca 28%) for irrigation (CAWater-Info). GW is often an alternative source for irrigation in response to limited surface water availability. Recent and recurring droughts in Uzbekistan have diminished the volume of river water flows, resulting in new water resources being required for irrigation (SCNP 2013).

• Some sources report industrial companies using the least GW of major user groups. Industrial use is estimated at 0.7 km³ of GW per year (ca 10%) (CAWater-Info). Industrial users vary greatly, for example, the tourism industry utilises GW for recreational purposes. It is reported that 119 GW wells contain physiologically active components (i.e., bromine, boron, silica, iodine, radon, hydrogen sulphide, and iron, salts, and gas mixtures) used by resorts, sanatoriums, dispensaries, rest homes, physiotherapy clinics, and mineral water plants (Kulmatov et al. 2021).

The literature states that local indigenous knowledge is more commonly utilised by rural water users compared to external (technical) knowledge due to access issues (Hornidge, Oberkircher, and Kudryavtseva 2013). At the community level, local “masters” (such as “wise men” in mahallas¹) and family-based modes are described as being central to local knowledge reproduction (Hornidge, Oberkircher, and Kudryavtseva 2013). It is also noted that local knowledge “lies at the interface with formal, university-taught knowledge” characterised by a “linear, top-down approach to knowledge diffusion […] with little mutual exchange of ideas” (Hornidge, Oberkircher, and Kudryavtseva 2013: 269).

GW is used to meet crop water demand during water scarcity. Recent studies present evidence that GW irrigation practices secure timely irrigation, but require more intensive labour, agrochemicals, and increased energy inputs, compared to gravity irrigation (Karimov et al. 2022). Farmers are incentivised to efficiently use GW to reduce the high electricity costs of pumping water.

4.3 Governance systems

The SES framework highlights the role of governance systems that mediate the relationships between actors, their interactions, and natural resources. Governance systems include constitutional rules, policy level and operational rules and monitoring and sanctioning processes described below.

4.4 SES Outcomes

In this subsection, we present the SES outcomes that include overexploitation and pollution of GW in the study area. In Uzbekistan, about 70% of irrigated lands do not have a free outflow of GW and are exposed to salinisation (SCNP 2013). As a result of GW use for irrigation, the literature reports an increase of salinity in the GW table in irrigated areas. For instance, according to SCNP (2013), the irrigated areas with a water table between 2 m and 1 m have increased from 743.5 thousand ha (17.4% of the total area) in 2008 to 1182.9 thousand ha (27.5%) in 2010. It is assumed that GW levels above 1 m can lead to soil salinisation. The highest levels of soil salinity were observed in conditions where the GW was close to the surface, as there is a strong relationship between GW and mineralisation levels. With more evaporation from the soil surface, salt accumulation and soil salinisation occur faster (Kulmatov, Adilov, and Khasanov 2020). According to the Land Reclamation Monitoring Service of the State Committee for Land Resources, Geodesy, Cartography and State Cadastres (Uzgeodezkadastr 2015), more than 46.6% of irrigated land is affected by salinisation (2.5% strongly saline, 13.3% moderately saline, and 30.9% slightly saline).

Open drainage is used by farmers and agricultural companies to control GW levels. However, due to malfunctioning drainage conditions, rising GW levels may cause secondary salinisation of irrigated lands (Matyakubov et al. 2020). The national land inventory conducted in 2009 reports that irrigated land quality deteriorated by about 1 million ha (24.6% of the total area). Downstream provinces particularly experience problems aggravated by insufficient drainage (Kulmatov et al. 2015; Rakhmatullaev et al. 2012).

This problem has consequences not only for agriculture but also for population settlements. For example, high GW levels with high salinity damage structures, basements, and green spaces. Sherov and Soliev (2020) report that losses may range between 2.5 and 10 million US$.

Overexploitation and pollution of GW are other important outcomes. It is reported that GW resources have continuously decreased – by 40% between 1965 and 2002 (Kazbekov et al., 2007). According to Rakhmatullaev et al. (2012), in the arid western and southern provinces of Uzbekistan, GW use is twice the officially approved limits, leading to water shortages. Furthermore, the discharge of collector-drainage water into river systems and the chemical substances from agriculture contribute to GW pollution by nitrates and pesticides (Gadalia et al. 2005; Rakhmatullaev et al. 2012; Tookey 2007). As a result, fresh GW used for drinking water in Bukhara and Khorezm provinces and the Republic of Karakalpakstan does not meet state drinking water quality standards (Kulmatov et al. 2021).

The government acknowledged such problems stating that during the last 30–40 years, about 35% of GW reserves have been lost (President’s Decree No. 2954 of 4 May 2017). GW availability significantly decreased as a result of the intensive withdrawal in the zone of field distribution within Nurata, Koshrabad and Zamin districts, in Navoi, Samarkand and Djizak provinces (President’s Decree No.342 of 2 August 2022 “On Measures to Implement the Projects “Improvement of Drinking Water Supply in Chust, Pap, Namangan Districts and Construction of Sewerage Systems in District Centres of Chust and Mingbulak in Namangan Province” and “Improvement of Water Supply in Muzrabad District of Surkhandarya Province through Construction of a Water Pipeline from Groundwater Deposits “Oktosh” and “Poshkhurt” with the Participation of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development). The government acknowledges the failure to monitor GW use and enforce the legal protection framework. This resulted in 59% of GW use occurring unregulated and an increased risk of losing the majority of national GW reserves within the next ten years.

Increasing GW use is deemed to be likely based on Uzbekistan’s reliance on irrigated agriculture and in response to projected water scarcity triggered by climate change. Indications of increasing GW use suggest a greater importance in improved provision of GW-relevant information to current and future users. Uzbekistan appears to display increasing interest in GWG through the recent development of GW rules and regulations.

5.1 Dynamics and mechanisms of informational governance

In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of the conventional “state-run, expert-led, and natural-science-based” monitoring systems described earlier and argue that there is a high uncertainty over groundwater status in Uzbekistan (i.e., quantity and quality).

For instance, the reviewed literature reports several shortcomings in GW assessment and monitoring with close connection to informational governance mechanisms and practices. These include a lack of information on industrial GW use, overlap without proper coordination among the state bodies responsible for GW, and reductions in the number of observational wells used to monitor GW throughout Uzbekistan. We acknowledge that from the polycentric governance perspective such “overlap” can support the achievement of solutions tailored to local conditions, and thus, more effective governance. However, in terms of informational governance, this may contribute to high uncertainty regarding GW’s status. It is also noted that the existing observational wells are not evenly distributed.

Furthermore, a GW database operated by the State Committee for Geology and Mineral Resources publishes annual bulletins on the state of GW. This bulletin report is distributed to an estimated 40 government agencies involved in GW. However, bulletins are not publicly available outside of those 40 agencies (UNECE 2020).

The literature also describes two separate monitoring and reporting systems – formal and informal systems. A formal reporting system coordinates data and information exchange between the BISA (at the provincial scale) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (MAWR) (currently renamed as MWR at the national scale) and is used for official water use planning. An informal reporting system, at the same time, coordinates information and data sharing between the Main Canal Management, BISA (at the provincial scale), and/or municipalities and is used for daily decision-making and problem-solving purposes (Hornidge, Oberkircher, and Kudryavtseva 2013).

Finally, international development agencies active in the country complain about a lack of GW-related research and publications (Wegerich et al. 2015). Nevertheless, we identified some scientific publications which assessed GW table and mineralisation and identified potential drivers, such as irrigation, salt leaching, climatic conditions, and drainage conditions (Eshchanov 2008; Kulmatov et al. 2013; Wahyuni et al. 2009; Kulmatov, Adilov, and Khasanov 2020; Matyakubov et al. 2020).

5.2 Structural uncertainty and multiple knowledges

The question raised in this subsection is what uncertainties and multiple knowledges exist in relation to GW and how they affect use, interactions between actors, and outcomes. Our findings suggest governance complexities at various levels due to multiple knowledges.

Specifically, nugget variance (i.e., small-scale variability) was found in the readings between close monitoring wells, implying possible measurement errors. This suggests that while such observation wells are useful at national and regional levels, the observations are not sufficiently site-specific for local-level use and management decisions (Ibrakhimov et al. 2007).

This connects with another critical factor – methods used for GW assessments that provide a high level of epistemic uncertainty. The poor distribution of observation wells and a lack of precise user information contribute to this, as does the existence of parallel reporting systems and separation of local and state-collected knowledge on GW status, suggested by the lack of information exchange between such bodies.

Parallel formal and informal reporting systems, as noted above, create inefficiencies and uncertainties. Infrequent information sharing between ministries suggest poor coordination and information exchange, which is then further complicated by the amount of state authorities with GW responsibilities. This creates multiplicity and related uncertainty when records by separate organisations do not match. Different bodies being aware of registered wells also points to uncertainty between different governance levels (Knorr, Theesfeld, and Soliev 2021). Multiple knowledges, where sources record different GW relevant numbers, negatively impact the confidence of actors in reporting. Multiple conflicting knowledges existing within individual states suggest even greater uncertainty regarding transboundary status and effects. Without clear notation of reporting differences and proper guidance as to best use of data, uncertainty is increased. Comparisons between all knowledge and methods would be ideal.

GW availability or physical property information appears to be unavailable to many users. Low public communication of environmental problems is noted in literature several times. A lack of publicly available aquifer data introduces users to unnecessary uncertainties pertaining to nearby resource availability and quality, while offering low impetus for local action where users are not aware of issues. Information provision is needed to support collective action. While local knowledge is cited as available to users, it could be inclined toward epistemic uncertainties. More research on aquifer relevant local knowledge is needed, as little detail on knowledge employed by GW users exists. Further insight into the breadth of local knowledge shared between users may point to certain areas where external and local information disagrees.

Uncertainty related to GW use and management is furthermore increased due to a lack of awareness among users of relatively new formal procedures and processes. Insufficient technical knowledge and expertise among users increases lack of formal process awareness. While local knowledge is most often cited as available to users, academic literature does not discuss local conditions in detail to understand the extent of “local” GW knowledge.

However, some cases note that information sharing is greater at local levels. Knorr, Theesfeld, and Soliev (2021) found that wells were more likely registered with local authorities than the state government body. The authors also reveal the potential for knowledge sharing between new bodies, such as state bodies and local electricity providers, could offer lower investment GW abstraction monitoring information.

Low assessment and subsequent difficulty in future planning was noted in literature, in connection with current information gaps and information provision issues. Of course, a lack of future assessment implies a decreased ability to adapt to future climate conditions and societal changes.

5.3 Power constellation in information governance

Inequalities and monopolies in environmental information-handling capacities (e.g., information-generation, transmission capabilities and access to information) are explored in our analysis. The key findings are that existing power constellations and a lack of cooperation suggest increased uncertainty about groundwater use and status.

The distribution of bulletin reports on GW to a select group of government organisations implies some hierarchy in power constellations between government organisations. Hierarchy is present in WCA interactions with state organisations. While WCAs have a formal responsibility to deliver water to farmers, the delivery is controlled and monitored by state organisations (e.g., BISA). BISA staff are involved in water delivery and monitoring for irrigation areas WCAs cannot supply. While WCAs were created to allow for local-level interactions, they have weak decision-making abilities regarding water supply and monitoring. WCAs face frequent interventions by local administration leaders (Hornidge, Oberkircher, and Kudryavtseva 2013).

The authoritarian system of state control over information acquisition that existed during the Soviet period may have led to self-censorship in local information production. Such a hierarchically organised society, with coercive reciprocity, also led to limitations to formalising informal practices. The current system has kept the centralised vertical knowledge management procedures that restrict creativity and agency development (Hornidge, Oberkircher, and Kudryavtseva 2013). The dominance of the state in the water sector may limit others’ ability to engage in GWG. Self-organisation has been noted as lacking by some studies as decisions are made at higher administrative levels (Knorr, Theesfeld, and Soliev 2021). Restructuring of the water management system concentrates on the formal sphere, which interviewees often referred to as “upper people”, responsible for water delivery (Hornidge, Oberkircher, and Kudryavtseva 2013).

Expert dependence appears multiple times in the literature. Researchers, for example, must acquire insight from experts to determine locations for GW studies (Knorr, Theesfeld, and Soliev 2021). Dependence on experts implies hierarchy. When users need publicly unavailable information, they may seek it through unofficial channels if unaware of accessible formal processes. Additionally, local hierarchical structures are suggested through reference to local wise men, who act as leaders available for local conflict resolutions. Gender is also relevant in this aspect, in consideration of traditional local leadership norms.

Hierarchical local structures (e.g., large farmers as well as agricultural and mining companies) can have a connection to competition and conflicts for access to GW between different users, especially in water-scarce areas. Though these receive little explanation, further elaboration in future research would be useful.

5.4 Design of reforms

In this subsection, we describe the design of reforms in Uzbekistan that facilitate more effective informational GWG. We argue that interest in informational GWG reform is displayed, but paths toward more effective governance remain unclear.

Interest in reform is likely influenced by global shifts in relation to the increase in information accessibility through the internet and new information technologies. Furthermore, compared to other CA countries, Uzbek policymakers are well aware of the importance of the resource and GW degradation risks. Government and donor coordination meetings take place at the national level on Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM), including GW use and management and there is a legal framework for IWRM. The Uzbek government also pays great attention to the improvement of GW monitoring, planning of use and protection (Presidential Resolution No. 439 from 07.12.2022 “On Additional Measures to Protect and Streamline the Sustainable Use of Groundwater Resources”). For instance, a moratorium on well drilling and GW use has been introduced in the territories with a decreasing GW level. In territories where the water level has decreased by more than 5 m, issuance of hydrogeological land irrigation licences, agricultural production, drilling for wells and use of existing wells for irrigation without water-saving technology application (e.g., drip and sprinkler irrigation) are prohibited.

Furthermore, all GW users are obliged to be equipped with metering facilities and provide a report on the annual amount of water used to responsible authorities. Past environmental performance reviews stated interest and vision for the development of a centralised environmental database and purchasing of additional pollution source monitoring equipment. Meanwhile, there has been increasing interest in the observation of transboundary aquifers (UNECE 2020).

The interest of policymakers, NGOs, and international development agencies in informational governance reform is clear in studies and grey literature. For instance, the institutional design has been recommended to consider power relations between authorities and WCAs (Djumaboev et al. 2017). Hamidov and Helming (2020) suggest the introduction of digital agriculture concepts to provide updated information on the water table and depth of regions. Wegerich et al. (2015) refer to the development of Geographic Information System (GIS) capacity and the creation of transparent water flow information within the project activities of the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ). Karimov et al. (2015) explores alternative GW management strategies – the Managed Aquifer Recharge concluding that transboundary cooperation in using this strategy may increase GW storage and provide benefits at the local and national levels. Awareness building and knowledge transfer would be important for the adoption of new water-saving technologies, as well as awareness of the impacts of salinity issues (Hamidov et al. 2024). New resolutions include regulations to issue permits for drilling water wells in attempts to regulate and monitor GW (UNECE 2020).

5.5 Impact of informational governance

The literature indicates increasing use of GW, which we assume is locally unorganised due to the ease of establishing GW access and lack of clear collective action examples. While Knorr, Theesfeld, and Soliev (2021) describe the finding that agricultural users have coordinated GW use in times of drought, few other details are provided on how this occurred and other examples did not appear. The invisibility of GW generally complicates its collective action, but a lack of public information and communication of environmental issues further exacerbates this. Users would benefit from GW monitoring information access, to allow for comparison between monitoring results, local knowledge, and expert advice. Communication of GW issues to local communities could offer additional impetus for collective action and local monitoring, as current communication is described as inefficient. Increased information provision could help to combat status-quo local hierarchies, removing the need for informal coordination with powerful actors and dependence on experts for more basic information.

Actors’ interactions are also affected by governance disorganisation. Multiple responsible bodies infrequently share information, which is further aggravated by lack of accessible data. Regulation enforcement should be scalable and monitoring results should be shared among governance organisations to be effective. Gaps in information availability can complicate regulation enforcement, where the enforcing agency cannot access information collected by others. Some instances in the literature suggest formal information sharing could be improved between local levels to higher governing bodies, suggesting difficulties in establishing graduated sanctions. Governance would also benefit from information sharing to identify measurement issues and streamline related processes.