Figure 1
A system-analytical approach to governing shared resource systems (based on Ostrom, 2007).
Figure 2
Conditions for collective action among rural drinking water system users (based on Agrawal (2001)).
Figure 3
Conditions for collaboration between rural drinking water system users and public agency (based on Agrawal (2001), Ansell & Gash (2008), and Huxham (2003)).
Table 1
Calculation of collective action among PSF users.
| Questionnaire question | Distributions of the answers | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Do or did you have a user committee? | Yes: No: | 13 17 |
| 2. Does or did the user committee actually meet? | Yes: No: | 6 24 |
| 3. Are maintenance and operation tasks shared among all members or out-sourced to one person? | Shared: Out-sourced: | 6 24 |
| 4. Have multiple group members made contributions to cover part of the installation costs, or are these costs covered by one single member | Multiple members Single member | 8 22 |
| 5. Do or did multiple group members contribute to cover costs related to maintenance and operation, or where/are these costs covered by one single member | Multiple members Single member | 17 13 |
Determining Collective Action Variable Value:
| ||
Table 2
Correlation results for collective action among PSF users.
| Enabling conditions for collective action among PSF users | Interview question | Answer categories | Frequency Collective action = moderate/high (n = 14) | Frequency Collective action = weak/absent (n = 16) | Pearson Chi2 | Sign. (2 tailed) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| User group characteristics | ||||||
| 1. Small size | How many households are (were) allowed to use this PSF? | 0 = >100 1 = ≤100 | 0 = 12 1 = 2 | 0 = 7 1 = 9 | 5.662 | 0.017** |
| 2. Clearly defined boundaries | Is it clearly defined who is allowed to use the PSF? | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 14 1 = 0 | 0 = 16 1 = 0 | n.a. | n.a. |
| 3. Past successful experiences—social capital | How many types of collective action (not related with PSF) did the community engage, previously? (shrimp farming, cooperative, irrigation, mosque construction, canal excavation, river embankment, and/or other) | 0 = 0–1 1 = 2–4 | 0 = 8 1 = 6 | 0 = 6 1 = 10 | 1.158 | 0.282 |
| 4. Appropriate leadership—young, familiar with changing external environments, connected to local traditional elite | Does or did the user group have appropriate leadership? (composed from the answers to questions about capacity, connectedness, and fairness of leader) | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 3 1 = 11 | 0 = 8 1 = 8 | 2.625 | 0.105 |
| 5. Interdependence among group members | The members of user group depend on each other’s contribution for well-functioning of PSF (composed of the answers to questions about interdependence regarding money, knowledge and labor) | 0 = weak 1 = strong | 0 = 2 1 = 12 | 0 = 11 1 = 5 | 9.020 | 0.003*** |
| 6. Heterogeneity of endowments | There are members that can step up to cover unforeseen costs | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 0 1 = 14 | 0 = 3 1 = 13 | 2.917 | 0.088* |
| 7. Homogeneity of identities and interests | All the members of user group have the same background in term of political identity (note: no variation observed with regard to ethnic and religious heterogeneity) | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 4 1 = 10 | 0 = 3 1 = 13 | 0.403 | 0.526 |
| 8. Low levels of poverty | All the members of user group are capable to pay the contributions required for the installation of PSF (note: for all sites it was indicated that everyone is able to contribute to maintenance and operation) | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 11 1 = 3 | 0 = 11 1 = 5 | 0.368 | 0.544 |
| Relationship between resource system characteristics and group characteristics | ||||||
| 9. Overlap between user group residential location and resource location | How much time users have to spend on collecting water? | 0 = >.5h 1 = ≤.5h | 0 = 6 1 = 8 | 0 = 5 1 = 11 | 0.433 | 0.510 |
| 10. High levels of dependence by group members on resource system | What is/was the most important drinking water source during the dry season for the user group members? | 0 = not PSF 1 = PSF | 0 = 1 1 = 13 | 0 = 8 1 = 8 | 6.531 | 0.011** |
| 11. Fairness in allocation of benefits from resource system | Do you think that fairness is maintained in the allocation of PSF water among the user group? | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 2 1 = 12 | 0 = 1 1 = 15 | 0.536 | 0.464 |
| 12. Low levels of user demand | What is the estimated total quantity of drinking water (liter) used by a household on average per day? | 0 = >40 liters 1 = ≤40 liters | 0 = 4 1 = 10 | 0 = 4 1 = 12 | 0.049 | 0.825 |
| 13. Gradual change in levels of demand | Did the demand for PSF water increase sharply over the last few years? | 0 = yes 1 = no | 0 = 1 1 = 13 | 0 = 1 1 = 15 | 0.010 | 0.922 |
| Institutional arrangements | ||||||
| 14. Rules are simple and easy to understand | Are the rules formulated in a clear way such that everybody understands and applies them in the exact same way? | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 1 1 = 13 | 0 = 3 1 = 13 | 0.871 | 0.351 |
| 15. Locally devised access and management rules | Who formulated the working rules for PSF usage and management? | 0 = others 1 = users | 0 = 5 1 = 9 | 0 = 11 1 = 5 | 3.274 | 0.070* |
| 16. Ease in enforcement of rules | Do or did you experience difficulties enforcing the rules that apply to PSF usage and management? | 0 = yes 1 = no | 0 = 8 1 = 6 | 0 = 7 1 = 9 | 0.536 | 0.464 |
| 17. Sanctions | Do you have rules that regard the sanctioning of rule breaking? | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 10 1 = 4 | 0 = 8 1 = 8 | 1.429 | 0.232 |
| 18. Availability of low-cost adjudication | Do you have a mechanism to settle internal disputes related with PSF? | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 6 1 = 8 | 0 = 9 1 = 7 | 0.536 | 0.464 |
| 19. Accountability of monitors and other officials to users | Do you have a mechanism to hold monitors and user committee members accountable? | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 12 1 = 2 | 0 = 14 1 = 2 | 0.021 | 0.886 |
| State | ||||||
| 20. Collaboration with public agency | Do or did you collaborate with the Department of Public Health and Engineering (DPHE)? (composed of answers to questions about DPHE support with regard (i) PSF installation, (ii) formation of a user committee, and (iii) repairs) (see table 4, below) | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 3 1 = 11 | 0 = 11 1 = 5 | 6.718 | 0.010** |
[i] Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.00.
Table 3
Calculation of collaboration between PSF users and public agency (DPHE).
| Questionnaire question | Distributions of the answers | |
|---|---|---|
| DPHE collaborated with regard to the installation of the PSF | Yes No | 12 18 |
| DPHE collaborated with regard to the formation of an operation and maintenance committee | Yes No | 6 24 |
| DPHE collaborated with regard to repair and maintenance activities | Yes No6 | 4 26 |
Determining Collaboration Variable Value:
| ||
Table 4
Correlation results for collaboration between PSF users and public agency (DPHE).
| Enabling conditions for collaboration between users and public agency | Interview question | Answer categories | Frequency Collaboration = moderate/strong (n = 16) | Frequency Collaboration = absent (n = 14) | Pearson Chi2 | Sign. (2 tailed) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| User group characteristics | ||||||
| 1. Small size | How many households are (were) allowed to use this PSF? | 0 = >100 1 = ≤100 | 0 = 10 1 = 6 | 0 = 9 1 = 5 | 0.010 | 0.919 |
| 2. Clearly defined boundaries | Is it clearly defined who is allowed to use the PSF? | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 16 1 = 0 | 0 = 14 1 = 0 | n.a. | n.a. |
| 3. Past successful experiences—social capital | How many types of collective action (not related with PSF) did the community engage, previously? | 0 = 0–1 1 = 2–4 | 0 = 8 1 = 8 | 0 = 6 1 = 8 | 0.153 | 0.696 |
| 4. Appropriate leadership | Does or did the user group have appropriate leadership? | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 4 1 = 12 | 0 = 7 1 = 7 | 2.010 | 0.156 |
| 5. Interdependence among group members | The members of user group depend on each other’s contribution for well-functioning of PSF | 0 = weak 1 = strong | 0 = 3 1 = 13 | 0 = 10 1 = 4 | 8.438 | 0.004*** |
| 6. Heterogeneity of endowments | There are members that can step up to cover unforeseen costs | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 1 1 = 15 | 0 = 2 1 = 12 | 0.536 | 0.464 |
| 7. Homogeneity of identities and interests | All the members of user group have the same background in term of political identity | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 2 1 = 14 | 0 = 5 1 = 9 | 2.249 | 0.134 |
| 8. Low levels of poverty | All the members of user group are capable to pay the contributions required for the installation of PSF | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 12 1 = 4 | 0 = 10 1 = 4 | 0.049 | 0.825 |
| Public agency characteristics | ||||||
| 9. Technical capacity | This DPHE branch has sufficient technical capacity to perform its tasks with regard to the PSF of this community | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 4 1 = 12 | 0 = 6 1 = 8 | 1.071 | 0.301 |
| 10. Human resources | This DPHE branch has sufficient human resources to perform its tasks with regard to the PSF of this community | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 7 1 = 9 | 0 = 3 1 = 11 | 1.674 | 0.196 |
| 11. Financial resources | This DPHE branch has sufficient financial resources to perform its tasks with regard to the PSF of this community | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 7 1 = 9 | 0 = 3 1 = 11 | 1.674 | 0.196 |
| Relationship between user group and public agency | ||||||
| 12. Trust | We trust that DPHE will help us to operate our PSF (composed of the answers to questions about users trusting DPHE to help with running the user groups and effectuating repairs) | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 7 1 = 9 | 0 = 13 1 = 1 | 8.103 | 0.004*** |
| 13. Communication | Do PSF users and DPHE communicate regularly? | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 9 1 = 7 | 0 = 6 1 = 8 | 0.536 | 0.464 |
| Institutional arrangements | ||||||
| 14. Inclusive decision-making | DPHE takes the opinion and interests of our user group into account | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 0 1 = 16 | 0 = 3 1 = 11 | 3.810 | 0.051* |
| 15. Clarity on roles and responsibilities | The respective tasks and responsibilities of our user group and DPHE are clear and well-understood | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 15 1 = 1 | 0 = 14 1 = 0 | 0.905 | 0.341 |
| 16. Transparency | Decision-making and operation of DPHE with regard to our PSF is transparent | 0 = no 1 = yes | 0 = 12 1 = 4 | 0 = 14 1 = 0 | 4.038 | 0.044** |
[i] Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.00.