Abstract
Intolerance of Uncertainty (IU) is a transdiagnostic factor in psychological disorders, yet its underlying psychological mechanisms remain unclear. To close this gap, we first identify three potential mechanisms from existing definitions of IU: (1) negativity overweighting, (2) probability distortion, and (3) information deficit aversion. Second, we demonstrate how these mechanisms map onto well-established preference patterns in decision making under uncertainty as captured by Cumulative Prospect Theory: (1) loss aversion, (2) nonlinear probability weighting, and (3) the description–experience (DE) gap. Third, we conduct an affective decision-making experiment to investigate the relationship between self-reported IU and these preference patterns, as measured with individually estimated parameters of cumulative prospect theory. In the study, 100 participants made 120 choices between hypothetical painkillers with different probabilistic side effects. Half of the choices were made in a description condition, where all information was provided upfront; the other half in an experience condition, where participants acquired information through sampling. Trait IU was measured with a questionnaire. Participants overweighed side effects relative to treatment benefits (loss aversion), overestimated the probability of unlikely negative outcomes (increased nonlinear probability weighting), and their probability weighting patterns differed between the experimental conditions (DE gap). However, their preference patterns did not correlate with IU scores. Possible explanations are that the task did not effectively establish an affective context with real consequences for behavior, or that disorder-specific processes were not captured in our community sample. These findings highlight the need for a precise definition of IU and suggest avenues for designing tasks that enable a better understanding of IU.