Table 1
Distribution of outcome variables.
| Countries | Share of respondents who are willing to pay more taxes to improve public healthcare (%) |
|---|---|
| Panel A: Eurasia | |
| Armenia | 71 |
| Azerbaijan | 67 |
| Belarus | 48 |
| Georgia | 71 |
| Kazakhstan | 49 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 53 |
| Moldova | 67 |
| Mongolia | 67 |
| Russia | 38 |
| Tajikistan | 75 |
| Ukraine | 54 |
| Uzbekistan | 62 |
| Panel B: South Europe | |
| Albania | 53 |
| Bosnia | 71 |
| Bulgaria | 52 |
| Croatia | 63 |
| Macedonia | 66 |
| Romania | 42 |
| Serbia | 54 |
| Panel C: East Europe | |
| Czech Republic | 44 |
| Estonia | 46 |
| Hungary | 34 |
| Latvia | 46 |
| Lithuania | 41 |
| Poland | 34 |
| Slovakia | 29 |
| Slovenia | 45 |
[i] Note: Data are rounded up.
Table 2
Distribution of predictors (%).
| Absence of doctors | Disrespectful treatment | Absence of medication | Long waiting times | Unclean facilities | Informal payments | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Panel A: Eurasia | ||||||
| Armenia | 4 | 7 | 11 | 13 | 4 | 18 |
| Azerbaijan | 5 | 5 | 27 | 29 | 11 | 47 |
| Belarus | 19 | 32 | 30 | 70 | 7 | 13 |
| Georgia | 2 | 3 | 8 | 11 | 4 | 5 |
| Kazakhstan | 21 | 22 | 32 | 56 | 8 | 18 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 26 | 25 | 37 | 40 | 16 | 36 |
| Moldova | 10 | 16 | 23 | 30 | 5 | 28 |
| Mongolia | 7 | 19 | 24 | 35 | 6 | 13 |
| Russia | 13 | 26 | 26 | 64 | 6 | 15 |
| Tajikistan | 9 | 14 | 31 | 22 | 11 | 46 |
| Ukraine | 19 | 24 | 50 | 54 | 8 | 39 |
| Uzbekistan | 11 | 9 | 25 | 21 | 4 | 27 |
| Panel B: Southern Europe | ||||||
| Albania | 12 | 13 | 24 | 23 | 17 | 20 |
| Bosnia | 18 | 25 | 22 | 49 | 12 | 16 |
| Bulgaria | 9 | 14 | 12 | 42 | 10 | 10 |
| Croatia | 5 | 15 | 7 | 47 | 7 | 4 |
| Macedonia | 24 | 27 | 35 | 45 | 32 | 23 |
| Romania | 5 | 12 | 28 | 38 | 13 | 26 |
| Serbia | 14 | 26 | 24 | 54 | 9 | 10 |
| Panel C: Eastern Europe | ||||||
| Czech Republic | 3 | 11 | 6 | 51 | 3 | 8 |
| Estonia | 4 | 7 | 2 | 50 | 1 | 4 |
| Hungary | 8 | 13 | 20 | 57 | 11 | 4 |
| Latvia | 3 | 12 | 5 | 31 | 2 | 6 |
| Lithuania | 7 | 10 | 2 | 48 | 1 | 14 |
| Poland | 11 | 14 | 6 | 59 | 4 | 10 |
| Slovakia | 5 | 14 | 8 | 60 | 10 | 11 |
| Slovenia | 6 | 9 | 2 | 39 | 1 | 4 |
[i] Note: Data are rounded up.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for covariates.
| Variable | Description | Proportion (%) | Mean | Std. Dev. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age: 18–24 | = 1 if respondents are 18–24 years old, = 0 if otherwise | 9.74 | ||
| Age: 25–34 | = 1 if respondents are 25–34 years old, = 0 if otherwise | 18.41 | ||
| Age: 35–44 | = 1 if respondents are 35–44 years old, = 0 if otherwise | 17.99 | ||
| Age: 45–54 | = 1 if respondents are 45–54 years old, = 0 if otherwise | 17.34 | ||
| Age: 55–64 | = 1 if respondents are 55–64 years old, = 0 if otherwise | 16.75 | ||
| Age: 65+ | = 1 if respondents are 65+ years old, = 0 if otherwise | 19.76 | ||
| Female | = 1 if respondents are women, = 0 if otherwise | 58.96 | ||
| Married | = 1 if respondents are married, = 0 if otherwise | 58.92 | ||
| University education | = 1 if respondents have Bachelor’s degree or higher, = 0 if otherwise | 20.18 | ||
| Trust people | = 1 if respondents expressed some trust or complete trust in the people, = 0 if otherwise | 32.69 | ||
| Trust government | = 1 if respondents expressed some trust or complete trust into government, = 0 if otherwise | 31.06 | ||
| Trust parliament | = 1 if respondents expressed some trust or complete trust into parliament, = 0 if otherwise | 25.90 | ||
| Trust political parties | = 1 if respondents expressed some trust or complete trust into political parties, = 0 if otherwise | 19.11 | ||
| Economic situation improved in the country | = 1 if respondents expressed agree or strongly agree that economic situation is better today than it was 4 years ago, = 0 if otherwise | 26.37 | ||
| Household wealth status | The ladder of household wealth where 1 = the poorest households in the country and 10 = the richest households in the country | 4.381 | 1.679 | |
| Believe into redistribution from the rich to the poor | = 1 if respondents agree or strongly agree that the gap between the rich and the poor should be reduced, = 0 if otherwise | 77.28 | ||
| Health status | = 1 if respondents assess their health as very bad to = 5 if respondents assessed their health as very good | 3.437 | 0.925 |
[i] Note: Data are rounded up.
Table 4
Binomial logistic regression results for Eurasia (regression coefficients and standard errors in brackets).
| Armenia | Azerbaijan | Belarus | Georgia | Kazakhstan | Kyrgyzstan | Moldova | Mongolia | Russia | Tajikistan | Ukraine | Uzbekistan | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Absence of doctors | –1.005* | –0.109 | –0.311 | 0.634 | –0.082 | –0.214 | 0.220 | –0.406 | –0.032 | –0.216 | 0.119 | 0.163 |
| (0.430) | (0.356) | (0.193) | (0.678) | (0.177) | (0.178) | (0.313) | (0.326) | (0.187) | (0.300) | (0.157) | (0.220) | |
| Disrespectful treatment | –0.082 | 0.002 | 0.119 | 0.948 | 0.433* | 0.254 | –0.033 | –0.058 | –0.037 | –0.344 | 0.112 | –0.793** |
| (0.342) | (0.379) | (0.166) | (0.540) | (0.179) | (0.180) | (0.238) | (0.232) | (0.152) | (0.241) | (0.148) | (0.263) | |
| Absence of medication | 0.625* | 0.349 | 0.263 | –0.204 | –0.232 | –0.572*** | –0.262 | 0.318 | 0.031 | 0.089 | 0.316** | –0.219 |
| (0.286) | (0.194) | (0.163) | (0.268) | (0.152) | (0.142) | (0.207) | (0.196) | (0.153) | (0.187) | (0.115) | (0.186) | |
| Long waiting times | 0.053 | 0.032 | –0.147 | –0.036 | 0.166 | 0.700*** | –0.095 | 0.389* | 0.228 | 0.937*** | –0.182 | –0.441* |
| (0.274) | (0.191) | (0.158) | (0.273) | (0.138) | (0.145) | (0.201) | (0.181) | (0.138) | (0.230) | (0.121) | (0.175) | |
| Unclean facilities | 0.609 | –0.416 | 0.133 | –0.145 | –0.202 | 0.706*** | 0.168 | –0.163 | 0.156 | 0.272 | –0.037 | –0.537 |
| (0.488) | (0.260) | (0.253) | (0.392) | (0.256) | (0.207) | (0.374) | (0.371) | (0.248) | (0.280) | (0.207) | (0.378) | |
| Informal payments | –0.338 | 0.667*** | 0.309 | 0.015 | 0.114 | 0.151 | –0.315 | 0.450 | 0.217 | 0.065 | –0.226 | 0.124 |
| (0.210) | (0.172) | (0.214) | (0.372) | (0.183) | (0.138) | (0.198) | (0.267) | (0.176) | (0.166) | (0.120) | (0.189) | |
| Age: 25–34 | 0.112 | –0.016 | –0.017 | 0.327 | –0.752** | –0.405 | 0.048 | 0.007 | 0.002 | 0.075 | –0.318 | –0.142 |
| (0.348) | (0.265) | (0.255) | (0.312) | (0.256) | (0.233) | (0.415) | (0.259) | (0.252) | (0.264) | (0.238) | (0.238) | |
| Age: 35–44 | 0.323 | –0.154 | 0.049 | 0.660* | –0.564* | –0.354 | –0.029 | 0.032 | 0.180 | –0.079 | –0.064 | 0.130 |
| (0.381) | (0.280) | (0.262) | (0.328) | (0.251) | (0.243) | (0.418) | (0.277) | (0.252) | (0.263) | (0.244) | (0.246) | |
| Age: 45–54 | –0.237 | 0.116 | 0.471 | 0.430 | –0.348 | –0.050 | –0.234 | 0.426 | –0.037 | 0.033 | 0.006 | –0.062 |
| (0.358) | (0.294) | (0.277) | (0.329) | (0.259) | (0.249) | (0.406) | (0.290) | (0.265) | (0.282) | (0.249) | (0.262) | |
| Age: 55–64 | –0.718* | –0.456 | –0.135 | 0.229 | –0.553* | –0.275 | –0.256 | –0.132 | –0.536* | –0.400 | –0.257 | –0.299 |
| (0.343) | (0.326) | (0.286) | (0.327) | (0.280) | (0.255) | (0.405) | (0.307) | (0.271) | (0.307) | (0.254) | (0.284) | |
| Age: 65+ | –1.226*** | –0.391 | –0.287 | –0.226 | –0.333 | –0.408 | –0.434 | 0.120 | –0.249 | 0.400 | –0.618* | –0.843** |
| (0.341) | (0.368) | (0.324) | (0.317) | (0.306) | (0.279) | (0.407) | (0.316) | (0.286) | (0.426) | (0.254) | (0.318) | |
| Female | –0.065 | 0.008 | 0.049 | –0.184 | 0.212 | 0.092 | –0.149 | –0.050 | 0.113 | 0.093 | –0.031 | –0.158 |
| (0.166) | (0.163) | (0.136) | (0.158) | (0.137) | (0.129) | (0.173) | (0.154) | (0.135) | (0.160) | (0.117) | (0.138) | |
| Married | 0.101 | 0.429* | 0.259 | –0.143 | 0.210 | –0.125 | –0.008 | 0.034 | 0.083 | –0.292 | 0.235* | 0.142 |
| (0.174) | (0.191) | (0.144) | (0.164) | (0.137) | (0.154) | (0.187) | (0.171) | (0.130) | (0.221) | (0.117) | (0.171) | |
| University education | 0.157 | –0.016 | 0.339* | 0.395* | 0.145 | 0.212 | 0.720** | –0.208 | 0.087 | 0.400 | 0.448*** | 0.010 |
| (0.228) | (0.183) | (0.141) | (0.173) | (0.138) | (0.153) | (0.235) | (0.170) | (0.132) | (0.216) | (0.123) | (0.192) | |
| Trust people | –0.046 | 0.293 | 0.221 | 0.245 | 0.008 | 0.168 | 0.241 | 0.515** | 0.380** | –0.157 | 0.332** | 0.134 |
| (0.225) | (0.192) | (0.145) | (0.172) | (0.135) | (0.144) | (0.187) | (0.158) | (0.128) | (0.161) | (0.114) | (0.142) | |
| Trust government | 0.807* | 0.493* | –0.010 | –0.159 | 0.053 | –0.069 | –0.268 | –0.101 | –0.179 | 0.959*** | 0.192 | –0.139 |
| (0.349) | (0.220) | (0.212) | (0.244) | (0.178) | (0.160) | (0.348) | (0.238) | (0.157) | (0.251) | (0.217) | (0.334) | |
| Trust parliament | 0.097 | –0.066 | 0.165 | –0.399 | 0.194 | 0.657*** | 0.380 | –0.160 | 0.387* | –0.251 | –0.035 | 0.677* |
| (0.392) | (0.235) | (0.223) | (0.258) | (0.182) | (0.184) | (0.427) | (0.260) | (0.177) | (0.229) | (0.225) | (0.323) | |
| Trust political parties | 0.268 | –0.012 | –0.393 | 0.562* | 0.046 | –0.310 | –0.288 | 0.581* | 0.197 | 0.520** | 0.467* | 0.310 |
| (0.344) | (0.212) | (0.202) | (0.235) | (0.152) | (0.175) | (0.349) | (0.279) | (0.183) | (0.181) | (0.188) | (0.204) | |
| Economic situation improved in the country | 0.046 | 0.490** | –0.204 | 0.803*** | 0.247 | –0.180 | –0.021 | 0.232 | 0.342* | 0.221 | –0.532** | 0.663** |
| (0.219) | (0.167) | (0.199) | (0.191) | (0.134) | (0.158) | (0.279) | (0.209) | (0.167) | (0.183) | (0.198) | (0.207) | |
| Household wealth status | –0.035 | 0.047 | 0.132** | 0.091 | 0.145*** | 0.197*** | 0.179** | 0.095 | –0.002 | –0.127* | 0.114** | 0.152** |
| (0.047) | (0.042) | (0.047) | (0.050) | (0.043) | (0.054) | (0.057) | (0.053) | (0.032) | (0.064) | (0.039) | (0.050) | |
| Believe into redistribution from the rich to the poor | 1.098*** | –0.395* | 0.199 | 0.525** | –0.051 | 0.235 | 0.585** | 0.554* | –0.276* | 0.222 | –0.176 | 0.604** |
| (0.252) | (0.182) | (0.134) | (0.197) | (0.156) | (0.152) | (0.183) | (0.222) | (0.140) | (0.191) | (0.120) | (0.192) | |
| Health statues | –0.084 | –0.059 | 0.052 | 0.061 | 0.036 | –0.141 | 0.029 | 0.023 | 0.123 | 0.171 | 0.028 | –0.056 |
| (0.088) | (0.102) | (0.099) | (0.090) | (0.094) | (0.089) | (0.108) | (0.101) | (0.098) | (0.111) | (0.083) | (0.105) | |
| 2016 year | 0.845*** | 0.715*** | –0.641*** | 0.501** | 0.688*** | 0.984*** | 0.027 | 0.149 | –0.245 | 0.316 | –0.471*** | 1.788*** |
| (0.199) | (0.200) | (0.155) | (0.168) | (0.144) | (0.146) | (0.173) | (0.178) | (0.135) | (0.173) | (0.119) | (0.166) | |
| N | 1038.000 | 964.000 | 1024.000 | 1027.000 | 1128.000 | 1181.000 | 907.000 | 849.000 | 1209.000 | 914.000 | 1548.000 | 1214.000 |
| Log Likelihood | –527.284 | –521.234 | –668.994 | –572.459 | –741.790 | –720.775 | –463.297 | –515.905 | –766.937 | –491.778 | –996.000 | –660.849 |
| χ2 | 105.087 | 65.220 | 77.822 | 86.796 | 79.730 | 195.642 | 55.000 | 46.198 | 76.244 | 90.938 | 120.871 | 307.725 |
| p-value | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.003 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
[i] Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
Outcome variable is willingness to pay more taxes to improve public healthcare (= 1, 0 if not willing).
Table 5
Binomial logistic regression results for Southern Europe (regression coefficients and standard errors in brackets).
| Albania | Bosnia | Bulgaria | Croatia | Macedonia | Romania | Serbia | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Absence of doctors | 0.134 | 0.113 | –0.036 | –0.414 | 0.219 | 0.102 | –0.068 |
| (0.218) | (0.196) | (0.253) | (0.294) | (0.182) | (0.318) | (0.185) | |
| Disrespectful treatment | 0.161 | –0.288 | 0.379 | 0.086 | 0.529** | 0.571* | 0.203 |
| (0.217) | (0.172) | (0.200) | (0.189) | (0.176) | (0.224) | (0.143) | |
| Absence of medication | 0.344* | 0.110 | 0.297 | 0.298 | –0.375* | 0.282 | –0.104 |
| (0.167) | (0.179) | (0.213) | (0.248) | (0.160) | (0.182) | (0.143) | |
| Long waiting times | –0.273 | 0.311* | –0.558*** | –0.067 | –0.164 | –0.193 | –0.104 |
| (0.173) | (0.148) | (0.141) | (0.131) | (0.149) | (0.164) | (0.124) | |
| Unclean facilities | 0.033 | –0.246 | 0.257 | –0.111 | –0.191 | –0.488* | –0.087 |
| (0.188) | (0.225) | (0.228) | (0.255) | (0.167) | (0.235) | (0.213) | |
| Informal payments | –0.555** | –0.160 | 0.277 | 0.079 | 0.065 | 0.151 | 0.145 |
| (0.173) | (0.189) | (0.237) | (0.314) | (0.171) | (0.181) | (0.213) | |
| Age: 25–34 | –0.010 | 0.526* | 0.628 | –0.532 | 0.313 | 0.200 | –0.042 |
| (0.268) | (0.260) | (0.347) | (0.311) | (0.251) | (0.345) | (0.296) | |
| Age: 35–44 | –0.065 | 0.755** | 0.466 | –0.350 | 0.253 | –0.181 | –0.029 |
| (0.283) | (0.280) | (0.337) | (0.314) | (0.265) | (0.342) | (0.298) | |
| Age: 45–54 | –0.179 | 0.475 | 0.473 | –0.429 | 0.483 | –0.080 | 0.121 |
| (0.286) | (0.282) | (0.334) | (0.317) | (0.274) | (0.361) | (0.298) | |
| Age: 55–64 | –0.346 | 0.341 | 0.047 | –0.531 | 0.294 | –0.113 | –0.167 |
| (0.296) | (0.279) | (0.341) | (0.314) | (0.277) | (0.350) | (0.293) | |
| Age: 65+ | –0.788** | 0.476 | –0.271 | –0.784* | 0.419 | –0.553 | –0.372 |
| (0.303) | (0.282) | (0.333) | (0.312) | (0.274) | (0.342) | (0.292) | |
| Female | –0.132 | –0.020 | 0.110 | –0.069 | 0.055 | –0.131 | –0.016 |
| (0.128) | (0.137) | (0.131) | (0.127) | (0.126) | (0.142) | (0.118) | |
| Married | 0.166 | 0.365* | 0.129 | 0.258 | 0.041 | 0.323* | 0.095 |
| (0.179) | (0.148) | (0.135) | (0.132) | (0.152) | (0.149) | (0.127) | |
| University education | 0.469** | 0.012 | 0.479* | 0.242 | 0.645** | 0.625*** | 0.494* |
| (0.154) | (0.205) | (0.187) | (0.172) | (0.200) | (0.180) | (0.208) | |
| Trust people | –0.330* | 0.465** | –0.011 | 0.565*** | 0.257 | –0.373* | 0.316** |
| (0.145) | (0.149) | (0.160) | (0.148) | (0.156) | (0.166) | (0.121) | |
| Trust government | –0.044 | –0.714* | 0.387* | 0.017 | 0.270 | 0.140 | –0.184 |
| (0.178) | (0.304) | (0.196) | (0.247) | (0.193) | (0.242) | (0.195) | |
| Trust parliament | –0.093 | 0.490 | –0.026 | 0.808** | 0.102 | 0.283 | 0.558 * |
| (0.193) | (0.324) | (0.280) | (0.283) | (0.209) | (0.306) | (0.222) | |
| Trust political parties | 0.081 | –0.327 | –0.358 | 0.144 | –0.128 | 0.611 | 0.049 |
| (0.183) | (0.307) | (0.303) | (0.330) | (0.207) | (0.352) | (0.249) | |
| Economic situation improved in the country | 0.246 | –0.456 | 0.233 | 0.365 | –0.115 | 0.353 | 0.034 |
| (0.152) | (0.257) | (0.217) | (0.203) | (0.183) | (0.235) | (0.186) | |
| Household wealth status | 0.266*** | 0.227*** | 0.138** | 0.308*** | 0.125** | 0.048 | 0.215*** |
| (0.043) | (0.049) | (0.044) | (0.041) | (0.041) | (0.045) | (0.038) | |
| Believe into redistribution from the rich to the poor | 0.148 | 0.004 | 0.313 | 0.240 | 0.400* | –0.218 | 0.641*** |
| (0.153) | (0.170) | (0.164) | (0.173) | (0.175) | (0.191) | (0.175) | |
| Health statues | –0.118 | –0.003 | 0.056 | –0.172* | 0.113 | 0.265** | 0.035 |
| (0.087) | (0.085) | (0.081) | (0.073) | (0.080) | (0.086) | (0.072) | |
| 2016 year | 0.235 | 0.711*** | –0.628*** | –0.213 | –0.125 | –0.566*** | –0.522*** |
| (0.148) | (0.141) | (0.135) | (0.133) | (0.142) | (0.166) | (0.131) | |
| N | 1136.000 | 1201.000 | 1158.000 | 1263.000 | 1274.000 | 973.000 | 1366.000 |
| Log Likelihood | –725.438 | –663.483 | –720.042 | –754.666 | –769.826 | –606.675 | –868.921 |
| χ2 | 123.941 | 138.121 | 146.789 | 139.260 | 71.349 | 132.841 | 122.801 |
| p-value | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
[i] Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
Outcome variable is willingness to pay more taxes to improve public healthcare (=1, 0 if not willing).
Table 6
Binomial logistic regression results for Eastern Europe (regression coefficients and standard errors in brackets).
| Czech Republic | Estonia | Hungary | Latvia | Lithuania | Poland | Slovakia | Slovenia | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Absence of doctors | –0.474 | 0.420 | –0.574* | –0.532 | 0.126 | 0.280 | 0.022 | –0.244 |
| (0.334) | (0.303) | (0.259) | (0.345) | (0.230) | (0.186) | (0.286) | (0.232) | |
| Disrespectful treatment | –0.261 | 0.120 | 0.121 | 0.113 | 0.050 | –0.108 | –0.074 | 0.287 |
| (0.187) | (0.226) | (0.198) | (0.170) | (0.187) | (0.169) | (0.192) | (0.199) | |
| Absence of medication | 0.673** | 0.041 | –0.211 | –0.102 | 0.520 | 0.166 | –0.189 | –0.104 |
| (0.251) | (0.446) | (0.174) | (0.269) | (0.375) | (0.235) | (0.242) | (0.399) | |
| Long waiting times | 0.128 | –0.127 | –0.037 | 0.306** | –0.045 | 0.163 | –0.039 | –0.150 |
| (0.117) | (0.117) | (0.130) | (0.118) | (0.110) | (0.113) | (0.136) | (0.111) | |
| Unclean facilities | –0.590 | 0.905 | –0.150 | 0.335 | 0.894 | –0.412 | –0.064 | –0.117 |
| (0.356) | (0.738) | (0.219) | (0.388) | (0.734) | (0.290) | (0.218) | (0.485) | |
| Informal payments | –0.091 | –0.495 | 0.652* | –0.388 | 0.024 | 0.377* | 0.193 | –0.346 |
| (0.213) | (0.289) | (0.312) | (0.219) | (0.160) | (0.182) | (0.203) | (0.279) | |
| Age: 25–34 | –0.235 | 0.032 | 0.240 | –0.127 | –0.111 | –0.149 | 0.089 | –0.024 |
| (0.267) | (0.288) | (0.314) | (0.237) | (0.242) | (0.258) | (0.272) | (0.243) | |
| Age: 35–44 | –0.299 | –0.413 | 0.131 | –0.362 | –0.283 | –0.010 | 0.013 | –0.151 |
| (0.268) | (0.286) | (0.316) | (0.243) | (0.250) | (0.257) | (0.274) | (0.246) | |
| Age: 45–54 | –0.371 | –0.419 | –0.136 | 0.049 | 0.127 | –0.334 | 0.082 | –0.209 |
| (0.276) | (0.286) | (0.321) | (0.240) | (0.243) | (0.268) | (0.284) | (0.249) | |
| Age: 55–64 | –0.392 | –0.635* | 0.362 | –0.313 | –0.077 | –0.300 | 0.004 | –0.091 |
| (0.281) | (0.286) | (0.305) | (0.244) | (0.247) | (0.262) | (0.298) | (0.251) | |
| Age: 65+ | –0.542 | –0.983*** | –0.254 | –1.007*** | –0.463 | –0.488 | 0.038 | –0.224 |
| (0.279) | (0.277) | (0.303) | (0.235) | (0.243) | (0.267) | (0.308) | (0.245) | |
| Female | 0.093 | 0.046 | 0.121 | 0.193 | –0.138 | –0.025 | 0.059 | 0.179 |
| (0.115) | (0.123) | (0.127) | (0.110) | (0.112) | (0.108) | (0.130) | (0.105) | |
| Married | 0.171 | 0.269* | 0.193 | 0.223* | 0.233* | –0.039 | 0.124 | 0.197 |
| (0.121) | (0.118) | (0.129) | (0.109) | (0.114) | (0.115) | (0.137) | (0.113) | |
| University education | 0.441* | 0.073 | 0.039 | 0.085 | 0.393*** | 0.226 | 0.156 | 0.121 |
| (0.202) | (0.142) | (0.187) | (0.133) | (0.118) | (0.162) | (0.212) | (0.151) | |
| Trust people | 0.124 | –0.127 | 0.058 | 0.272* | 0.067 | –0.151 | –0.070 | 0.222 |
| (0.134) | (0.116) | (0.142) | (0.116) | (0.114) | (0.114) | (0.153) | (0.119) | |
| Trust government | –0.144 | 0.219 | 0.491* | 0.132 | 0.031 | 0.681*** | –0.067 | 0.207 |
| (0.186) | (0.143) | (0.192) | (0.209) | (0.145) | (0.163) | (0.230) | (0.218) | |
| Trust parliament | 0.044 | 0.416** | –0.190 | 0.045 | 0.448* | –0.079 | 0.250 | –0.026 |
| (0.215) | (0.156) | (0.210) | (0.226) | (0.199) | (0.177) | (0.258) | (0.258) | |
| Trust political parties | 0.000 | 0.085 | –0.039 | 0.170 | –0.039 | –0.030 | 0.128 | –0.040 |
| (0.231) | (0.161) | (0.223) | (0.262) | (0.204) | (0.176) | (0.252) | (0.256) | |
| Economic situation improved in the country | 0.080 | 0.162 | 0.083 | 0.275 | 0.186 | 0.316* | 0.101 | 0.638*** |
| (0.136) | (0.143) | (0.172) | (0.146) | (0.140) | (0.127) | (0.162) | (0.187) | |
| Household wealth status | 0.171*** | 0.117** | 0.186*** | 0.100** | 0.088* | 0.105** | 0.033 | 0.179*** |
| (0.046) | (0.040) | (0.045) | (0.037) | (0.038) | (0.035) | (0.042) | (0.037) | |
| Believe into redistribution from the rich to the poor | 0.043 | 0.659*** | –0.220 | 0.540*** | –0.049 | –0.005 | 0.027 | 0.408* |
| (0.125) | (0.171) | (0.180) | (0.160) | (0.173) | (0.121) | (0.184) | (0.168) | |
| Health statues | 0.078 | 0.063 | 0.036 | 0.141 | 0.287*** | 0.031 | 0.299*** | –0.004 |
| (0.075) | (0.079) | (0.080) | (0.076) | (0.075) | (0.071) | (0.088) | (0.066) | |
| 2016 year | 0.203 | 0.343** | –0.023 | –0.307** | 0.259* | –0.434*** | –0.886*** | –0.168 |
| (0.129) | (0.133) | (0.138) | (0.117) | (0.125) | (0.111) | (0.141) | (0.115) | |
| N | 1370.000 | 1402.000 | 1264.000 | 1674.000 | 1638.000 | 1648.000 | 1344.000 | 1588.000 |
| Log Likelihood | –914.224 | –906.743 | –768.303 | –1074.938 | –1054.626 | –1041.064 | –773.105 | –1054.135 |
| χ2 | 62.253 | 129.812 | 74.803 | 167.145 | 132.932 | 111.231 | 97.146 | 78.207 |
| p-value | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
[i] Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
Outcome variable is willingness to pay more taxes to improve public healthcare (= 1, 0 if not willing).
Table 7
Support for the tested hypotheses by countries and quality dimensions.
| Health quality | Support for Hypothesis 1: Reduction in the quality of public healthcare services will weaken support for such services | Support for Hypothesis 2: Reduction in the quality of public healthcare services will strengthen support for such services |
|---|---|---|
| Absence of doctors | Armenia, Hungary | None |
| Disrespectful treatment | Uzbekistan | Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Romania |
| Absence of medication | Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia | Armenia, Ukraine, Albania, Czech Republic |
| Long waiting times | Uzbekistan, Bulgaria | Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Bosnia, Latvia |
| Unclean facilities | Romania | Kyrgyzstan |
| Informal payments | Albania | Azerbaijan, Hungary, Poland |