Is Judicial Independence a Structural Myth? The Executive Capture of the Sri Lankan Judiciary

This article examines the structural conditions of judicial independence in Sri Lanka, focusing on constitutional provisions and institutional arrangements through which executive influence may be exercised over the judiciary under the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (as amended). The study pursues three objectives: (1) to identify and analyze constitutional provisions and institutional arrangements that enable executive influence over the judiciary; (2) to examine the practical operation and consequences of these arrangements through doctrinal analysis and case study; and (3) to propose concrete structural reforms consistent with comparative constitutional experience. Employing a qualitative, interpretive research design, the study draws on constitutional text, legislative history, case law, and peer-reviewed academic literature, analyzed through doctrinal and comparative methods. Four principal mechanisms of executive influence are identified: presidential appointment power over the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal; differential retirement ages that create career incentives for judicial deference; the institution of President's Counsel; and the conventions of executive judicial management, as illustrated by the 2013 Bandaranayake impeachment. The study finds that formal independence guaranteed in constitutional text is systematically undermined by structural arrangements that create incentives for executive alignment. Constitutional reforms including the establishment of an independent Judicial Appointments Commission, standardization of judicial retirement ages, reconstitution of the senior bar designation, and strengthened impeachment safeguards are proposed to address these structural deficiencies.